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ABSTRACT 
THE BUKHARAN EMIRATE AND TURKESTAN UNDER RUSSIAN RULE 
IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA: 1917-1924 
 
Öztürk, Selim 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Prof. Mark Padraig Almond 
May 2012 
 
 
This thesis analyzes the transformation and evolution of Bukharan state and 
society from a feudal monarchy, Bukharan Emirate, firstly to Bukharan People’s 
Republic as a transition regime, and from this to a national republic as Uzbekistan 
Soviet Socialist Republic in perspective of political history. While focusing on the 
transformation and change in the region, the outside and inside factors accelerating 
the transformation such as Russian intervention and invasion into the region, Russian 
capitalist penetration, increase of national awakening through the Central Asian 
intelligentsia and Jadid movement in the region are in detail reviewed. In addition, 
the identity formation of Uzbekistan and Central Asian republics are analyzed in 
detail during the period of this transformational era. While focusing upon the Emirate 
of Bukhara in detail, the related regions, states and communities in Central Asia are 
also reviewed.  
Key Words: Bukharan Emirate, Bukharan People’s Republic, Uzbekistan Soviet 
Socialist Republic, Russian intervention, Russian capitalist penetration, Central 
Asian intelligentsia, Jadid movement. 
 
iv 
 
ÖZET 
RUS DEVRİMLERİ DÖNEMİNDE RUS HÂKİMİYETİNDEKİ BUHARA 
EMİRLİĞİ VE TÜRKİSTAN: 1917-1924 
 
Öztürk, Selim 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Mark Padraig Almond 
Mayıs 2012 
 
 
Bu tez, Buhara’nın devlet ve toplum yapısının feodal monarşiden ilk önce 
geçiş dönemi rejimi olan Buhara Halk Cumhuriyetine ve bundan da ulus devlet 
konumundaki Özbekistan Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetine transformasyonunu ve 
evrimini siyasi perspektif çerçevesinde analiz etmektedir. Bölgedeki değişime ve 
transformasyona odaklanılırken Rus müdahalesi ve işgali, Rus kapitalizminin 
bölgeye nüfuzu, Orta Asya’daki aydınlar sınıfının ve Ceditçilik hareketinin etkisi ile 
gelişen ulusal uyanış gibi değişime etki eden iç ve dış faktörler de detaylıca 
incelenmiştir. İlaveten Özbekistan’ın ve Orta Asya Cumhuriyetlerinin bu dönemdeki 
kimlik oluşumları ve inşa süreçleri detaylıca analiz edilmiştir.  Bunun yanında, genel 
olarak Buhara Emirliğine odaklanılırken bu süreçle ilgili olan Orta Asya’daki ilgili 
bölgeler, ülkeler ve topluluklar da incelenmiştir. 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler:  Buhara Emirliği, Buhara Halk Cumhuriyeti, Özbekistan Sovyet 
Sosyalist Cumhuriyeti, Rus müdahalesi, Rus kapitalizminin bölgeye nüfuzu, Orta 
Asya’daki aydınlar sınıfı, Ceditçilik hareketi. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The analysis of Bukharan Emirate and the evolution from a medieval state to 
a national republic during the subjugation years under the Tsarist rule and the early 
years of the Soviet Union was significant to understand the creation, the nation 
building and the state building process of modern Uzbekistan state.  Uzbekistan was 
more important than other Central Asian states owing to its position’s being more 
strategic rather than others. The best reason behind its importance was that 
Uzbekistan had superiority of being the most populous state among others with its 
population of estimated almost 29 million. In addition, Uzbekistan’s history and 
culture was deeper than others because of Uzbek ancestor states such as Bukhara 
Khanate, Bukhara Emirate, Khivan Khanate, Kokand Khanate, Shaibani Khanate, 
Timurid Emirate etc.  These Uzbek dynasties had ruled Central Asia at once upon a 
time, therefore it was clear that the Uzbek and their predecessors’ influence, in spite 
of  a mixture of Tajik and Uzbek influence, was rather influential upon other 
communities in the region. Also, Uzbeks and Tajiks lived together and so it was very 
difficult to distinct one from other.  They both were sedentary societies thus they 
were stronger and developed societies rather than other Steppe communities. 
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Being a sedentary society enabled to leave more strong influence on the region. In 
addition, Uzbekistan as a successor state of Bukharan Emirate in the region was 
located upon the most important and strategic parts of Central Asia such as Fergana 
Valley and Transoxiana( Bukhara and Samarkand), Sri Darya , Amu Darya and 
Tashkent.  Especially Fergana Valley was the cotton stock of all Central Asia.   
At present, Uzbekistan has one of the best economies in the region with its 
natural gas resources. A probable development in Uzbekistan had bigger potential to 
cause impact upon other Central Asian states.  For example, in recent years, the 
increasing threat of radical Islamist groups and terrorism in the region either arising 
from Afghanistan and pouring into Central Asian states such as Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan or some Islamic trends such as Wahhabism backed by Saudi Arabia 
influenced the Central Asian states. Especially Uzbekistan was far more uneasy 
about dissident groups inside or neighboring outside, because it was a reality of a 
religious tradition and auld history dated back to long before. For that reason, it is 
important to analyze the Emirate of Bukhara and socio-ethnic, socio-cultural, socio-
religious structure of the ancient state in order to learn the madrasah oriented state, 
the importance of clerical class in Bukhara, the role of madrasahs, mullahs and 
madrasah students inside the formation and administrative system of the state. 
Without understanding this, it is far difficult to analyze the potential threat of radical 
Islamic groups and their spreading impact inside the Uzbek population in some parts 
of the country. It is so clear that the country still carries the remnants and effects of 
the past and this feature now shapes the current situation and reflects the effects of 
the past over the present-day society. Therefore, it is significant to review and 
analyze the history of Bukharan society and state, the evolution and transformation 
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process of the state and society in order to evaluate both the background and the 
present developments in Uzbekistan and all Central Asia. 
 
1.1. The Ancient and Early History of Bukhara and Samarkand  
Bukhara and Samarkand are historically ancient Sogdian cities. The locations 
of cities of Bukhara and Samarkand were known as Sogdiana. Sogdians were ancient 
ancestors of modern Tajiks. Sogdiana was a part of Persian Empire as a satrapy, a 
province, in the administrative system of Persian Achaemenid Empire in 500 BC. 
After the conquest of Alexander the Great, the region began to be called as 
Transoxiana. Transoxiana, in Latin language, means across the Oxus River. The 
Oxus River means Amu Darya in Greek language. Romans and Greeks called 
Sogdiana as Transoxiana. Transoxiana was ruled by Seleucid Empire, Bactrians and 
Kushans after Alexander’s Helen Empire dissolved. The region of Sogdiana, in other 
name Transoxiana ruled by a federation of principalities and the capital city was 
Samarkand in the eighth century when the Arab armies destroyed Sassanid Empire. 
Transoxiana was a neighboring region to Khurasan, Khwarazm, Sinkiang and 
Tokharistan. So, these regions were in interaction with each other. Both of the local 
people in these regions, Sogdians, Khwarazmians, Tokharistanians and Persians in 
Khurasan were ethnically Iranian people.  In addition, these regions were multi-
cultured and a group of religions were common among the local peoples. “Several 
religions coexisted in Central Asia of that time. An amalgamation of Zoroastrianism 
(and in some cases also of Hinduism) with kindred ancient native beliefs, 
Manichaeism, Buddhism, Christianity and shamanistic cults were close neighbors 
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without the fierce competition that would soon come with Islam”.1 Zoroastrianism, 
approved as the official religion by the Sasanian dynasty, was strong in Khurasan, 
but beyond the Amu Darya was out of Sasanian influence in terms of religiosity. In 
Transoxiana, Manichaeism, another type of Persian based religion, was common 
instead of Zoroastrianism. In the following centuries, in Transoxiana and Sinkiang, 
Manichaeism spread and became the main belief.
2
 Sogdians in Transoxiana also 
transferred Manichaeism to Uighurs in Sinkiang. Both Bukhara and Samarkand, 
main principalities of Sogdiana, were very wealthy cities because of locating over the 
Silk Road. They can also be named as cities of merchants or commerce. After 
Sassanids were destroyed totally in 651 with the conquest of the last satrapy 
Khurasan, the Arab armies under the command of Qutayba ibn Muslim turned 
towards Sogdiana (Transoxiana). Qutayba made a series of dramatic and heroic 
campaigns over Transoxiana and Khwarazm between 705 and 715. 
3
 The 
transformation of Sogdian cities, Bukhara and Samarkand from their ancient culture, 
religion and tradition to Islamic ones began with Qutayba ibn Muslim and continued 
in the reigns of Umayyad and Abbasid. For example, to display the example of 
transformation and conversion, Qutayba’s policies in Samarkand after the conquest 
of the city can be informative. As Tabari narrates: 
(Qutayba) was brought the idols, which were despoiled and then placed before him; amassed, they were like an 
enormous edifice. He ordered that they be burned, and the non-Arabs said to him: “Among them are idols the burner of which 
will be destroyed!” Qutayba said: “I shall burn them with my own hand!” Ghurak came, knelt before him, and said: “Devotion 
to you is a duty incumbent upon me. Do not harm these idols!” Qutayba called for fire, took a brand in his hand, stepped 
forward, proclaimed “God is great!” set fire to them, and they burned fiercely. In the remains of the gold and silver nails that 
had been in them, they found fifty thousand mithqals.
4
 
Tabari continues: Then Qutayba set off, returning to Merv. He deputed (his brother) Abdallah ibn Muslim over 
Samarkand, and left with him massive (numbers of) troops and much war material, saying to him: “ Do not let a (non-resident) 
polytheist (mushrik) enter any of Samarkand’s gates without having a seal on his hand. If the clay has dried before he goes out, 
                                                          
1
 Soucek, Svat, A History of Inner Asia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000),48. 
2
 Soucek, Svat, A History of Inner Asia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 48-49. 
3
 Ibid, 57. 
4
 Ibid, 61-62. 
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kill him! If you find on him a piece of iron or a knife, or anything else, kill him! If you close the gate at night and find any one 
of them inside, kill him! 
5
 
After the battle of Talas in 751, the whole Persian oriented Central Asia and 
its Iranian natives (Persians, Sogdians, Khwarazmians and Tokharistanians) and also 
Turks were converted in Islam. These main actors of Central Asia soon became 
members of Muslim civilization with the Arab language and script.
6
 After the 
dissolution of Abbasid Caliphate, Transoxiana, with its Arabic name Mawarannahr 
meaning “between the two rivers- between Amu Darya and Syr Darya”, came under 
the rule of Samanid Dynasty. The Samanids were the governors of Samarkand, 
Bukhara, Shahs (Tashkent) and Herat, gifted by Abbasids in return to their 
conversion to Islam and services to the Caliphate in the region. Bukhara also became 
Samanid’s capital city. 7 Since the Samanids were Iranian originally, Persian effect in 
cultural and linguistic terms was born out in the region again. In addition, The 
Samanid dynasty’s power and glory peaked under the reign of three great amirs: 
Ismail (892-907), Ahmad (907-13) and Nasr (913-43). It was during their rule that 
Transoxiana emancipated itself from the role of being Khurasan’s subordinate 
province and moved to the forefront of Islamic Central Asia.
8
 The Samanids were 
destroyed by the Qarakhanids in 999 thus Bukhara and Samarkand came under the 
rule of Muslim Turkic dynasty after an Iranian based cultural and political 
domination.  The linguistic and cultural physiognomy of Samarkand, Bukhara and 
other cities and towns as well as of the agricultural population of the countryside 
remained Iranian, though with an increasing shift from the Sogdian and 
Khwarazmian variants to Persian.
9
 After the Qarakhanids ruled the oases, the 
nomadic lifestyle of Turkic tribes began transforming into sedentary at that time. In 
                                                          
5
 Ibid, 61. 
6
 Soucek, Svat, A History of Inner Asia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 68-69. 
7
 Ibid, 71. 
8
 Ibid, 73. 
9
 Ibid, 83. 
 6 
 
addition, the installation of the Qarakhanid Turkic dynasty in the region was 
important in another aspect: the reign of Turkic sovereignty had begun in the region 
of Mawarannahr that continued until the Russian invasion in the middle of the 19
th
 
century. Most of the glamorous and splendid mosques, madrasahs, mausoleums and 
minarets that made Bukhara and Samarkand the prominent centers of Islamic world 
were built in the reign of Samanids and then Qarakhanids. After the Qarakhanids; the 
Gaznavids, the Seljukids, the Qarakhitayids, the Khwarazmshahs ruled the region of 
Mawarannahr (Transoxiana) until the Mongols emerged from the steppes. After the 
division of Mongolian Empire into four khanates, the lands including Sinkiang, 
Semireche and Transoxiana passed to the rule of Chaghatay Khan and his sons. 
“About a century after the Mongol invasion, some Chaghataid khans began to 
convert to Islam. This tended to happen when they chose to live not in Semireche but 
in Transoxiana, thus among staunchly Muslim population”.10 The population of 
Transoxiana, especially Turks who had come to the region in times of Kok Turkic 
Kaghanate and then Qarakhanid did not remain nomadic, instead, they adapted the 
local Iranian people’s sedentary situation. Turks were different from nomadic 
Mongols when Genghisid’s armies arrived there. The sedentary population of the 
region, either Turkic or Iranian, conserved the civilization of Islam much more than 
peoples of other neighboring region.
11
 “Islam played a fundamental role in the 
resilience of native identity and renaissance during these years of Mongol rule, and 
an especially seminal part was assumed by its Sufi dimension”.12 The 13th and 14th 
centuries were important for the strengthening of tariqas and Sufi orders in Central 
Asia, especially Bukhara and Samarkand. The Kubraviyya, Yasaviyya and 
Naqhsibandi tariqas were so common and effective. Kubravi Shaykh Sayf al Din 
                                                          
10
 Soucek, Svat, A History of Inner Asia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 117. 
11
 Ibid, 117. 
12
 Ibid, 117. 
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Bakharzi of Bukhara was a famous character among religious people in the reign of 
Mongols. Even, Berke Khan of the Golden Horde (1257-67), a convert to Islam, 
came to Bukhara to visit the Shaykh Sayf al Din Bakharzi was so influential that he 
had influence inside the administrative system of the Mongols.
13
 The Naqshibandi 
tariqa, founded by Kwaja Baha al Din Naqhsiband of Bukhara (1318-39) was a Sufi 
order and got more influential than other tariqas in following centuries. The 
Naqhsibandi Order continued in a chain through the khalifas of the shayks. After 
Baha al Din Naqhsiband, Khwaja Muhammad Parsa, Khwaja Yusuf Hamadani, 
Khwaja Abd al Khaliq Gijduvani maintained the tradition of the Order. Except the 
shayk of Yasavi tariqa, Khwaja Ahmad Yasavi who was ethnic Turkic originally 
from the city of Yasi; the other khwajas of both Naqhsibandi and Kubravi orders 
were Persian originally. These traditions of maintenance of sufi orders in a chain 
throughout the centuries helped the region consolidate its religious structure. The 
region was governed by Timurids and then first Uzbeks, Sheybanids (1500-99). 
Sheybanid dynasty traced their roots to Genghis Khan. They put an end to the 
Timurid dynasty and conquered almost all the Central Asia.  
The Shaybanids were Turks like the Timurids, although they spoke a different 
dialect, Kipchak, in contrast to the local Turki; both led a partly nomadic way of life 
and had a tribal social structure, although again this must have been more 
pronounced among the newcomers; both were Sunni Muslims, like the bulk of the 
sedentary population of the area; and the Uzbeks had been sufficiently exposed to 
Arabo-Persian Islamic culture to ensure a fundamental continuity.
14
  
                                                          
13
 Soucek, Svat, A History of Inner Asia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 117. 
14
 Ibid, 149. 
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The Shaybanids weakened because of the wars with the Safavids in Persia. 
The Shaybanid dynasty in Bukhara was replaced by the Janid dynasty (Astrakhanids) 
in the beginning of the 17
th
 century through a marriage. Nadir Shah, the ruler of Iran 
and founder of Afsharid Dynasty after the Safavids, made campaigns over Bukhara 
and captured the city in 1747. After that time, the khanate could not secure its 
existence from the Manghit dynasty, a strengthening Uzbek tribe against the Janid 
dynasty. Shah Murad of the Manghits, the first emir of Bukharan Emirate, captured 
the throne from the Janid dynasty and Bukharan Khanate was replaced by the 
Emirate of Bukhara in 1785. 
 
1.2. Ethnicity  
The Emirate of Bukhara is located in the heart of Central Asia as an ancient 
monarchy which had ruled during 1785-1920. The emirate was one of the three 
Uzbek khanates in Central Asia. It was geographically surrounded by Khivan 
Khanate in the northwest, Khanate of Kokand in the east, Afghanistan in the south, 
Kazakh steppe in the north and nomadic Turcoman tribes located in Transcaspia 
region, known as Turkmenistan today, in the southeast. The Emirate ruled the most 
important and historically and religiously valuable cities such as Samarkand and 
Bukhara. The city of Bukhara was the capital city of the Emirate. 
Inside the Emirate, the ruling ethnic class was Uzbeks and the other natives of 
the country were consisted of Tajiks, Turcoman, Kirghiz, Persians, Jews, Indians and 
Arabs. The ethnic map of the region was very changeable in the years. Many 
different ethnic communities came to the region through the wars or migration. But, 
the last and final shaping was conducted by the Turkic conquerors. The final shape 
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was given by the Turco-Mongol invaders of Genghis Khan. Iranians were the first 
inhabitants in Central Asia. Persian speaking Tajik peoples were descendants of early 
Iranians. Then the Turkic groups arrived in the region. Turcomans were the first 
arrivals as a Turkic group in the tenth century and they maintained their ethnic, 
cultural identity and nomadic life style. After Turcomans, Uzbeks were the last 
arrivals and they became the ruling group in the region.
15
 The Uzbeks were a group 
of Moslem, Turkiospeaking, nomadic tribes of mixed Turkic, Mongol, and Iranian 
origin.
16
 During the Russian protectorate era in Bukhara, the ethnic composition is 
that Uzbeks were the majority by 55-60 % and living in Zarafshan, Kashka Darya 
and in the river valleys of Central Bukhara, Tajiks were the second largest group 
living in the mountainous eastern region (Eastern Bukhara) by 30%, Turcoman were 
5-10% living alongside the Amu Darya and Kelif. In addition, there were several 
thousand nomadic Kirghiz population, living in Karategin. And, other minor ethnic 
groups including Persians, Jews, and Indians also live as habitants of main towns.
17
 
The Uzbeks and Turcoman were the two major Turkic communities in the region.      
Although there was no ethnic identity consciousness in the emirate, Uzbeks were 
known as sedentary population. The Russians also named both Uzbeks and Tajiks 
who were sedentary and semi sedentary in Bukhara as Sarts. The nomadic population 
was known as Turcoman and they were different in terms of culture, life style, and 
linguistics. Uzbeks are the latest arrivals in the region and had the primary role of 
ruling ethnic group deriving from Timurids and Shaybanids which had ruled the 
region for a long time. “The name Uzbek thus now includes a fairly heterogeneous 
population, ranging in culture from fully sedentary merchants and craftsmen to 
                                                          
15
 Becker, Seymour, Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924, 
(London &New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 5. 
16
 Ibid, 3. 
17
 Ibid, 5. 
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seminomadic communities having a strong tribal orientation”.18 The importance of 
Uzbeks as the ruling ethnicity was based on being Uzbek ethnically of the Manghit 
dynasty of the Emirate.  The Uzbeks, Tajiks and nomadic Turcomans were major 
ethnic groups in the emirate. These three populations were originally orthodox 
Sunnite. In addition, there were minor ethnic groups such as Arabs, Jewish, Gypsies 
and Persians which have either different sects or different religions. 
The reason of Uzbek population’s leading role in the region was the Uzbek 
rulers for centuries. “Since the sixteenth, Bukhara had been an Uzbek kingdom, and 
the Uzbeks who were Sunnis represented the largest group in the emirate (778,000 
inhabitants in 1920 or 50.7 percent of the population).With the accession to the 
throne of the Manghits, who came from a major Uzbek tribe, the Uzbek elite became 
the mainstay of power, and struggles for power itself merged with age old tribal 
struggles”.19 But, the Uzbek ruling elite constructed a very specific system between 
Uzbeks and non-Uzbeks in the Emirate and other two khanates (Kokand and Khiva). 
In the Uzbek khanates, for the pattern of government, Persians were chosen although 
the ruling klans were Uzbeks. It is claimed that some khans’ mothers were Persian, 
so this policy of Persian based government became a continual tradition.
20
 The Tajik 
population was the second largest one after Uzbeks. Since Bukhara and Samarkand 
were the old and traditional Samanid Dynasty’s21 cities, there were a large amount of 
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Tajik inhabitants. Tajiks were also Sunnite and belonged to the Hanafi Madhhab
22
 
like Uzbeks. To be more explanatory, Helen Carrere D’Enchausse gave statistical 
information in her book Islam and the Russian Empire: “In the early years 1920s, 
half of the population of the emirate was Uzbek, 31 percent was Tajik, 10 percent 
was Turcoman, 6-7 percent Kirghiz and the rest made up of Arabs, Persians, Hindus 
and Jews”.23 In addition to major ethnic groups like Uzbeks, Tajiks and Turcoman in 
the Emirate, there were minor ethnic populations including Moslem Arabs, Shiite 
Persians, Jews and Gypsies. Since Arab armies stormed the Central Asia during the 
Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates centuries ago, there were small amount of Arab 
population, stayed back in the region. “The Arabs were found scattered in small, 
compact enclaves in the eastern oases…Some believe themselves descended from 
the Arab armies who conquered Turkistan in the seventh and eighth centuries, while 
others have a tradition of coming to Turkestan in the fourteenth century during the 
reigns of Timur. In 1926 censes, 28,978 Arabs were enumerated”.24  The Bukharan 
Jews were the most interesting ethnic group among the others. They were sedentary 
and generally merchants. It was also estimated that they were numerous than 
Christians in Turkistan. “Known generally in the West as Bukharan Jews, Central 
Asian Jews were actually settled in a number of eastern oasis towns and cities such 
as Samarkand, Tashkent, Bukhara, Kokand and Khatyrchi….In 1926, 18.98 Jews 
native to Central Asia were counted”.25 They were not accepted as the equal people 
like Muslims and were exposed to too many restrictions. The Jews were eight or nine 
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thousands in claims and generally merchants and craftsmen in capital, so they were 
so effective in Bukhara’s economic life. In addition, they were restricted from many 
laws that Muslims had. For example, they could not buy a house without the Emir’s 
approval.
26
 When Russian armies entered Bukhara and founded the protectorate over 
the emirate, Jews took a large breath and managed to have some rights. Maybe the 
single ethnic group, who were content of Russian invasion in the Emirate, was the 
Jews in the emirate. Russians behaved Jews better and abandoned the restricting laws 
upon Jewish community in the country.
27
 According to General Von Kaufman, Jews 
were a useful partner for Russia to maintain an influence over the country.
28
 Jews 
were also the best supportive tool for the existence of Christian power in the region 
against Muslim inhabitants and the local Muslim kingdom. 
The Persians as a Shiite group had a different importance for the Emirate. 
They were not local people like Tajiks in the region. Although they had same origins 
with the Tajiks, they were different in terms of their religious sect. They were the 
later arrivals in the region like Moslem Arab colonies. Most of them were war 
captured slaves of the Emir. “These trace their origin to the Persian inhabitants of 
Mary (Merv) who were led into captivity when the Emir of Bukhara captured the 
oasis in 1785. In the 1926 censes 9.188 Persians were counted.”29 Besides, the 
Persian slaves had importance for the bureaucracy and army of the emirate. The Emir 
of Bukhara used Persians in administrative roles in order to limit the influence of 
Uzbek tribes. The same system was commonly used in other Muslims countries like 
Turkey and Persia. While Turkish system was based on converted Christian Balkan 
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population in military and administrative system, the Persian Empire used the similar 
system through the use of Georgians and Armenians. The Bukharan Emirate as a 
Moslem state followed the same way in administration like other Moslem co-
partners. The power of Uzbek aristocracy was lessened in high administrative system 
by the rulers through appointing Persians to the office of Kush begi, the prime 
minister, thus consolidating the loyalty to the ruler.
30
 The Manghit dynasty had to 
diminish the power of Uzbek tribes, which would be a future threat for the authority, 
and had to produce a new class to fill in the gap in the administrative system. Persian 
slaves of the Emir were the best choice for this policy. Thus the Manghit dynasty 
managed to consolidate their power and authority. The Manghit dynasty pursued 
more clever policy than their Genghisid predecessors and founded a non-Uzbek army 
and created Persian based administrative class, originated from Persian slaves while 
diminishing the efficiency of Uzbek tribal leaders in addition they gave importance 
to taking the support of the clergy so that Manghit dynasty was able to centralize the 
power and authority in their hands.
31
  
The population of Bukhara was composed of three groups like sedentary, 
semi nomadic and nomadic. “Bukhara’s population at the close of the nineteenth 
century was usually estimated at two and a half to three million, of whom two-thirds 
lived in the three western oases. Of the khanate’s total population, 5 percent was 
sedentary, 20 percent seminomadic and 15 percent nomadic. Between 10 and 14 
percent of the population was urban.”32 The sedentary population was named as Sart 
and nomadic ones were generally known as Turcoman and Kirghiz. The name of Sart 
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used for the sedentary population in the emirate was not differentiated as the Uzbek 
or Tajik origins. After Russia came to the region, they chose to define the people as 
Sart, not as Uzbek or Tajik. Turco-Mongol dynasties, dated back to Uzbek Khan, 
conquered the oasis cities in the early sixteenth century. After that time, the name 
Uzbek coming from Uzbek Khan was used for dynasties and tribes, but not to the 
Turkic sedentary communities which adapted to the Tajik way of life. The sedentary 
people were known as Sart, an Indian word meaning merchant and used by early 
Turks for Iranian speaking Tajiks in oasis cities. But, Sart was used commonly for all 
communities either Persian or Turkic by nomadic peoples after a time.
33
 
 
1.3. The Derivation of Bukhara and Samarkand’s Religious Importance and 
Holiness in the Muslim World 
The name of Bukhara means ‘lucky place’ in Sogdian language, a branch of 
old Persian language. The name of Samarkand means ‘stone fort’ in Sogdian 
language. Asmara means stone or rock and kand means fort or town in Sogdian. In 
addition, there is another claim about the name Samarkand’s meaning. In Turkic 
language, it means ‘rich city’ which is derived from ‘Semiz-Kent’. Semiz means rich 
and kent means city in Turkic language. There are also other meanings which were 
given by Arabs, the new visitors of the region in the 7th century. “Madinat al sufriya 
(the copper city) and also Madinat al tujjar (the city of merchants) was named for the 
city of Bukhara in Arabic. Also, the name of Fakhira for Bukhara and the name of 
Sumran for Samarkand were used in Arabic”.34 In addition, the installation of 
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religious and holy cult and identity of Bukhara and Samarkand in Muslim world 
began after the Arab conquest. While Arabs were giving new names and meanings to 
these ancient cities, they loaded an Islamic cult and great religiosity to these cities. 
And this strengthened in the reigns of Muslim dynasties in the centuries. The name 
of Bukhara was, even is today, and called as Bukhara-i Sharif (Holy Bukhara). Sharif 
means holy in Arabic language. The religious and holy importance of Bukhara and 
Samarkand was also referenced through the hadiths by Muslim scholars. Richard N. 
Frye gives a place to a hadith about Bukhara and Samarkand in his book al 
Narshakhi’s the History of Bukhara to demonstrate the Islamic prominence of these 
cities.  
The Prophet of God said that Gabriel told him that in the hand of the East was a country called Khurasan. On the 
Judgment Day three cities of Khurasan will be adorned with red rubies and coral, and their radiance shall shine about them. 
Around these cities will be many angels praising, glorifying and exalting God. They will bring forth these cities in grandeur and 
pomp onto the plains, as a bride who is brought into the house of her betrothed. In each of these cities will be 70,000 banners 
and under each martyr will be 70, 000 believers, speaking Persian and receiving solution. On the Judgment Day on every side of 
these cities to the right and left, front and rear, for ten days of journey it will be filled with martyrs.” The Prophet said, “Oh 
Gabriel, tell me the names of these cities.” Gabriel replied, “The name of one of these cities in Arabic is Qasimlya and in 
Persian Veshgird. The second in Arabic is Sumran, and in Persian Samarqand. The third in Arabic is Fakhira and in Persian 
Bukhara. The Prophet asked, “Oh Gabriel why is it called Fakhira?” He replied “Because on the Judgment Day, Bukhara shall 
excel all other cities in glory because of the multitude of martyrs (buried there)”. The Prophet cried, “God bless (the people of) 
Fakir and purify their hearts by the fear of God; improve their actions and make them among the merciful of my people.
35
  
The holy buildings constructed in the era of different Muslim dynasties also 
enabled these cities to obtain religious and holy identity throughout the centuries. 
The buildings such as mosques, minarets, mausoleums, tombs and madrasahs in the 
cities were and prominent in terms of architectural in addition to religiosity and 
holiness. The well-known ones of them are madrasah of Ulug Beg, Ser-Dar 
Madrasah, Tilya Kori Madrasah, Bibi-Khanym Madrasah, Gur-e Amir Mausoleum, 
Observatory of Ulugh Beg, the Registan (ancient center of the city) in Samarkand 
and Kolyan Minaret, Masjid-i Kalan, Mir-i Arab Madrasah, Ismail Samani 
Mausoleum, Chasma Ayub Mausoleum, Lab-i Hauz (ponds), the Ark (massive 
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fortress surrounding Bukhara’s city center) in Bukhara. These buildings and their 
importance were known and they were displayed as the best Islamic architects of 
Muslim world by Muslim people, even in today.  
 
1.4. Religiosity in Bukhara 
Bukharan population was mostly orthodox Sunnite Muslim. The most 
important cities of the emirate were known as the holy centers of Sunnite Islam, 
especially Samarkand and Bukhara. The cities had a source of traditional religious 
fame and legacy among other Muslim countries. In the nineteenth century, Islam was 
so effective in Turkestan and the khanates. Especially, Bukhara was one of the 
leading cities in terms of implementation of Islamic practices, for instance it was 
compulsory for each man to attend the daily prayers, especially the morning prayer 
of the day and Friday prayer.
36
 For these reasons, the citizens of Bukhara were very 
traditional and conservative in many aspects. They were open to influence of clergy 
and loyal to the orders of their holy emir. In addition, Bukhara and Samarkand were 
important centers about religious education in addition to being commercial and 
administrative centers in the Emirate. The madrasas in these cities had been growing 
mullahs and clergy for the emirate. The religiosity of these cities dated back to very 
early times. Centuries ago, they were famous with their religious scholars, for 
example Imam Bukhari, born in Samarkand and lived in Bukhara in the reign of 
Samanids, was a famous scholar of the Hadith and his books were the most reliable 
and advisable sources throughout the Islamic world. Both Bukhara and Samarkand 
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had lots of madrasas for students to take religious education; and had lots of mosques 
and tombs which influenced the cultural atmosphere of the Emirate.  
On the religious level, its madrasas-Miri Arab madrasa being the most 
famous one-gave the city the reputation of one of Islam’s foremost centers of 
learning and orthodoxy, while its Sufi shaykhs and dervishes-here the 
aforementioned shrines of Baha al-Din Naqshband in Qasr-i Arifan and of Abu Bakr 
in Sumitan led the roster- added their dimension of wide appeal and participation by 
the masses.
37
  The holy madrasas in both Samarkand and Bukhara not only welcome 
students from the citizens but also other khanates and students coming to take 
education from all the Muslim countries. 
The Emirate of Bukhara was mainly a Sunni Muslim State. In Sunni 
theology, the people of Central Asian states were mostly adapted to Hanafi sect. The 
major ethnic groups in the Emirate like Uzbeks, Tajiks and Turcoman were Sunni 
Muslims. Bukhara and Samarkand were famous with the Sufi orders of Hanafi sect. 
These cities were the birth places of Sufi orders and from here these philosophies 
spreading to the whole world. These orders are still effective and common in Sunni 
Muslim countries. There were Sufi brotherhoods, spreading to the population in the 
region such as the order of Naqshibandi which was very common in Bukhara and 
Samarkand, the order of Qadiriya in Fergana, Kubraviyya in Khwarazm and 
Yassaviyya which was followed by the nomads.
38
  
Not only Sunni groups but also there were Shiite groups like Persians coming 
from Merv region of Iran due to captivity in a war. Population of Bukhara was Sunni 
                                                          
37
 Wheeler, Geoffrey, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia, (New York: Greenword Press, 
1964), 178. 
38
 Carrere D’Encausse, Hèlene, trans., Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in 
Central Asia, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 33. 
 18 
 
in majority, but there was a Shia minority that emerged after the capture of Marv city 
in the eighteenth century.
39
 And, there were Shiite Ismailis living in Pamir region. 
Population of Bukhara was Moslem in a great majority except Jews and Hindus who 
were playing an important role in commercial life. On the other side, the Muslim 
population was divided in two as Sunni and Shi’a. Although the great majority was 
Sunni, there were Shi’a population among Tajiks in central Bukhara, and all the 
population was Shi’a in eastern Bukhara.40 The different type of Shiite population 
was located in eastern Bukhara. They are now known as Pamirians and their region is 
inside the borders of current Tajikistan. The sect of this Shiite population was known 
as Ismaili. Their theological concept was based on doctrines of Shia’s Seven Imams 
while Persians in Iran adapted to the doctrines of Twelve Imams. The peoples 
coming from Marv originally were under the influence of Iran’s Twelve Imams 
oriented Shi’a and they were different from the Shi’a of Ismailis living in eastern 
Bukhara. The most important non-Muslim population was Jews living in Samarkand 
and Bukhara and dealing with trade. Since their non-Muslim and Jewish identities, 
they were exposed to humiliation by Muslim authorities.  
The system of the government was very religion based and it was composed 
of the cooperation of the emir and the clergy’s influence. Islam and the holiness of 
the title of Emir was an important tool in the hands of the Emir to keep the society 
together.  The title of the Emir instead of the title of Khan had the importance of 
religiosity and holiness. The title of emir was firstly used by the Samanid rulers, 
founders of the first historical Tajik state. Since Muhammad Rahim obtained the 
power and founded his own dynasty, the Manghit dynasty used the title of emir and 
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then the title of sayyid so that they could trace their genealogy to the Prophet. Even, 
Emir Alim, the last ruler, used the title of Caliph in addition to other titles.
41
 The title 
of emir used by Manghits instead of khan displayed the change of their legitimacy of 
ruling from Turco-Mongol to Islamic based. The title of emir means ‘’Commander of 
Believers’’ deriving from Amir al Muminin. In some claims, the use of title emir by 
Manghits for their rulers was due to their genealogy not tracing to Genghisid 
dynasty.
42
 In Turco Mongol tradition, the begs or tribal chieftains could not take the 
title of khan if they did not own the blood of Genghisid family. For example, Timur 
used the title of emir in spite of ruling a very huge empire. According to the claims, 
the reason of Manghit ruler’s taking the title of emir was either strengthening their 
Islamic religious legitimation over the conservative and tribal masses, or that their 
trace did not go to the Genghisid ancestry so their use of the title of Khan was 
impossible. For that reason they chose the use of the ruler’s title from khan to emir. 
There are also other claims about use of title emir by Manghits. According to Dr. 
Nurettin Hatunoglu
43, use of title ‘emir’ by Manghits could be their purpose to trace 
themselves to Emir Timur. In addition, passing the caliphate from Mamluks to 
Ottomans and emergence of Ottomans as the leading power of Sunni Muslim world 
was effective for Manghits to use title of emir instead of khan, as an old and 
inefficient concept in the eighteenth century. Since Manghits were Sunni and ally of 
Ottomans against the Shi’a Safavids, the emphasis on Sunni Islam by Manghits can 
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be a rational policy.
44
 In addition, they began using the title of sayyid in the early 19
th
 
century. It was also a fact that the religion began more effective in political and 
social life of the country after the installation of the Manghit Dynasty in Bukhara. 
The reason behind the increasing importance of religion was Bukharan rulers’ 
attempts to get support of tariqas, sufi orders, madrasa students and mullahs which 
were strengthening groups in the region because of spreading to the layers of the 
society. The increasing value in the late 18th century and 19th century was religiosity 
and devotion rather than owning the blood of Genghisid Dynasty. For example, 
Sayyid Emir Haydar, second ruler of the country, began using the title of Sayyid 
(meaning a grandson of the prophet). Belonging to a family of Sayyid (grandson of 
Imam Hussein who was the son of Imam Ali and grandson of the prophet) was an 
influencing factor to maintain sovereignty in this era.
45
  
The class of clergy and mullahs took a strategic place in administrative and 
daily public life in the Emirate. Their influence was very strong and valid upon the 
students of madrasas. “On the level of culture the clergy of Bukhara could take most 
pride in its past, its traditions and the power that it represented. Those in charge of 
the emirate’s countless mosques were formed in some 150 madrasas which contained 
more than 20 000 students. These madrasas figured among the oldest in the Muslim 
world”.46 They can be named as the Central Asian versions of Mecca and Medina 
because of many mosques, shrines, madrasahs and tomb of many holy sheikhs in 
these cities. “Bukhara was a prestigious center of the Muslim world: the emir, after 
the caliph, was the second personage of the world Islamic community; and all the 
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representatives of Islam in the emirate were the pillars of that Muslim state and 
helped to preserve for the community the face that history had forged for it and that 
gave it that central place”.47 The clergy class in these cities were automatically both 
influential over the Emir and his government; and the masses. The clerical class in 
Bukhara was extremely influential over the mass consciousness and other secular 
authorities of the state because of Bukhara’s ancient and traditional religious position 
in Islamic world. The clergy had such enormous influence over madrasah students 
that it could organize and direct the masses hence it had an enormous power of 
pressure upon the governmental authorities. 
48
 The clergy was also against every type 
of reformist movement. The Mullahs could persuade or suppress the emir on behalf 
of the clergy’s interests. In the late 19th century and the early years of the 20th 
century, the increasing reformist Jadid Movement
49
 would face the opposition of the 
mullahs. Since the Mullah party owned the power of mobilizing the masses and 
madrasah students, it was the best solution for the emir to act together with the 
mullahs against the reformists aiming to limit the monarch’s authority. This policy of 
emir pushed the reformists to cooperate with the Bolsheviks in the Revolution era in 
future against the emir’s authority. 
The problem about Sunni Islam’s extreme influence and its results, a hard 
conservative society, is very disputable about Bukhara. Sunni Islam in Turkistan 
especially in the Emirate and other Khanates got shaped differently from the other 
societies in the Middle East. The communities in that region suffered from the 
disconnection with other parts of the Muslim world. The best explanation about that 
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issue did come from Olaf Caroe, ex-British administrator in India and Sovietolog. 
According to Sir Olaf Caroe, the link between Turkestan and the rest of Muslim 
world was cut off long before the Soviets, even before the Tsarist Russia. He implies 
the birth of Shiism under Safavid Dynasty in Iran. After the emergence of Shiah in 
Iran, Sunni Transoxiana and Shiah Persia had a theological rift between themselves, 
so Turkestan was imposed to isolation for centuries and that caused the fanatical 
exclusiveness in Bukhara. In addition, the change of trade routes which had 
connected Central Asia to Middle and Far East since the Ilkhanid Dynasty in the 
thirteenth century, and increasing importance sea routes between the Persian Gulf 
and the Southern Chinese Ports was another factor for the isolation of Central Asia.
50
 
In sum, these factors caused the Bukhara and its civilization to be contained and lose 
its links with other part of the Sunni Muslim world, which was in more interaction 
with modernization, the Western influence and developments. These reasons caused 
Bukhara to be late for accepting and adapting the reforms and innovations than other 
Muslim states. 
 
1.5. The Reasons of Russian Conquest  
There were many reasons for Russia’s decision to invade Central Asia and 
Khanates according to historians. It depends on how the historians approach the 
matter for instance economy-based, international relations, prestige and glory for the 
Tsarist regime or mission of civilization by Russia over the Central Asian peoples. 
The best classification was included in the book of David McKenzie, A History of 
Russia, and the Soviet Union and beyond. McKenzie classified the views in three 
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groups like Tsarist, Sovietic and Western. According to Tsarist officials, the reason 
of invasion of Central Asia can be explained with a package of necessitates like St. 
Petersburg’s policy to secure the Russia’s interests, possessions and merchants in the 
region, threatening the British influence in India after the defeat of Crimean War; 
and of spreading the superior Russian culture over the region.  
N.A. Kryzhanovskii, governor general of Orenburg and Cherniaev’s immediate superior, sounded the theme of “the 
white man’s burden”:  
It seems to me that it is time to stop catering to the languages and customs of our weak neighbors (the khanates). We 
can compel them to conform somewhat to our customs and impose our language on them. In Central Asia we alone must be the 
masters so that with time through us civilization can penetrate there and improve the lives of those unfortunate offspring of the 
human race.
51
  
The governor general emphasizes the necessity of Russian intervention 
because of spreading superior Russian-European values and civilization over 
uneducated and uncivilized Moslem communities in Turkistan. In the Tsarist view, 
the rivalry between Russia and Britain is another reason for Russia’s conquest in the 
Khanates.      
War minister Miliutin, the superior of the above-mentioned conquerors, noted in 1882 Turkestan’s significance as a 
threat to British India: In case of a European war we should especially value the occupation of (Kokand khanate) bringing us 
closer to the northern regions of India…Ruling in Kokand, we can constantly threaten England’s East Indian possessions. This 
is especially important since only there can we be dangerous to this enemy of ours.52  
Russia’s Tsarist officials also explain their conquest with the security of 
Russian diplomatic and commercial interests in the region. Russia had been suffering 
from hostile actions and captures of Russian merchants by nomadic Kazakhs. And 
these nomadic forces were supplied asylum by the Khanates. Although Russian 
officials warned the governments of Bukhara many times, the Emirate did not take 
any precautions. This reason pushed Russia to intervene in Bukhara at the end. “In 
1914 an official tsarist publication titled Asiatic Russia summarized and evaluated 
Russian expansion in Central Asia a generation after its agitation against Russia; 
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attacks on Russian settlers, merchants, and diplomats by savage tribes; and the need 
for defensible frontiers”.53 In addition, for many years, nomads had given harm to 
Russia’s possessions and Russia could not take a satisfying precaution from the 
Emirate to prevent the looting and captures of Russian citizens. Russia began 
pursuing a policy to prevent these harms caused by nomads. “Russia’s aims in 
Central Asia in the 1840’s and 1850’s were both political and economic. Bukhara 
and Khiva had to be persuaded to refrain from any hostile actions against Russia, 
including possession of Russian slaves and granting asylum to Kazakhs fleeing from 
Russian justice”.54 On the other side, there were other views, which tried to explain 
the conquest in an economic manner, and they were especially Soviet oriented views 
about Russian conquest. They were approaching the matter with compulsory 
economic and commercial reasons of Tsarist Russia. 
Soviet historians until Gorbachev stressed the British danger and economic motives for Tsarist expansion. Wrote S. 
S. Dmitrev: Central Asia was essential to Tsarist Russia not only as a source of raw materials, especially as a cotton base for 
Russian cotton textile manufacturers, but as an important market for the sale of goods produced by Russian industry, The 
Russian bourgeoisie sought new sources of raw materials, new markets for its industrial products. 
N. A. Khalfin, a Soviet specialist on Central Asia affirmed: 
The interruption in the receipt of American cotton compelled the (Russian) government, merchants, and 
industrialists… to view differently the question of turning the Central Asian khanates into sources of raw materials…Central 
Asia, regarded hitherto by Russian merchants and industrialists primarily as a profitable market, now acquired the significance 
of an important source of industrial raw materials.
55
  
According to Seymour Becker and his book Russia’s Protectorates in Central 
Asia, he pointed out the development of capitalism and bourgeois monarchy which 
were trying to supply the needs of its internal markets. While the European powers 
absorbed their raw material sources from their overseas colonies, the most easily 
reachable colony was Central Asia as a neighboring region of Russia. Turkistan 
seemed to be a suitable choice for Russia, not being able to reach the overseas, in 
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order to cover the urgent needs of its developing industry at home. While Russia was 
becoming a bourgeois monarchy and capitalism directed the governmental policies 
of the empire at home and abroad; Central Asia was seen as a colony by Russian 
capitalists in order to supply raw material for internal markets. Especially, the source 
of supply for raw cotton in Turkestan was crucial for the needs of the growth of 
Russian capitalism.
56
 Cotton had a great deal of importance for Russian markets at 
that time and Russian textile industry. Cotton had the biggest share in the 
commercial relations between Russia and the Emirate of Bukhara and other 
Khanates. Cotton of the khanates was the most important reason for the Russian 
conquest in Central Asia, because Russian textile industry had developed so rapidly 
and had depended on imports from outside by 1850. On the other side, Russian 
markets were suitable for Central Asian cotton imports. For example, 31% of 
Russian imports from the khanates were raw cotton in 1860. Indeed, Russian textile 
industry did not only need raw cotton as an importer, but also needed raw cotton to 
export manufactured cotton goods. For instance, 95% of cotton was marketed in Asia 
and 53% of manufactured cotton goods were exported to the khanates.
57
 The 
outbreak of American civil war was the biggest enforcement for Russia to intervene 
in the Bukhara and other khanates, which owned a great deal of cotton resources; 
because the USA was the biggest cotton exporter to Russia during the 19
th
 century. 
However, when the Civil War broke out between North and Southern states, the 
export was cut off thus caused the increase of cotton prices and raw material needs 
for Russia. The US was the largest supplier of cotton to Russia until the American 
civil war broke out. Since the Union blocked the confederate ports and the cotton 
exports stopped, Central Asian cotton’s importance increased for Russia’s alternative 
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source of supply. Owing to the civil war and increasing need of cotton in internal 
markets, Central Asian cotton’s price tripled from 1860 to 1862; and it doubled again 
by 1864.
58
 At that point, Russia’s increasing commercial relation with the Emirate of 
Bukhara and other Khanates should not be ignored in the 19
th
 century. Mutual trade 
relations enabled and strengthened the mutual economic interdependence between 
Russia and these ancient Central Asian states. “Between 1863 and 1867 the annual 
value of Russia’s exports to Central Asia more than tripled, and the khanates’ share 
of the Russian export trade to all Asia rose from 22 to 42 percent”.59 The economic 
motives were so strong for cause of invasion but they were not sufficient on 
themselves. On the other side, some western intellectuals approached the matter in a 
different way and with different explanations.  
According to Firuz Kazemzadeh, an American scholar, Soviet writers 
generally focused on economic reasons for the conquest. They emphasized the 
growing trade between Tsarist Russia and the khanates of Turkestan since the middle 
of the 18
th
 century, but his volume of trade was very small and the cotton industry 
was relatively insignificant for the government to accept the demands of Russian 
bourgeoisie to make large conquests.
60
 In addition, according to Kazemzadeh, the 
military’s position was more powerful factor to force the conquests in Turkestan and 
Transcaspia. Especially, the Crimean defeat was making the army impatient and 
furious to substitute the fiasco with new conquests on the way of nationalists- 
imperialist ideology of Panslavism.
61
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The Crimean defeat was a turning point at Russia’s foreign and military 
policy in the second half of the 19
th
 century. It blocked Russia’s plans to reach the 
overseas by destroying the Ottoman Empire. The European coalition, led by England 
did not permit this in Crimea. After that, Russia’s turning towards Asia was to aim 
both satisfy its disappointed and furious imperial army and to threat the British 
possessions in India through the conquest of the emirate of Bukhara which was a 
neighboring state to Afghanistan, a country under the British influence and a buffer 
state on the road to British India. 
On the other side, the fear of containment by Britain and the Porte
62
 after the 
Crimean defeat increased in St. Petersburg. Mainly, Russians were not mistaken. “In 
1854, St. Petersburg’s fears were reawakened by the activities of Turkish envoys, 
who attempted to ally the Central Asian khanates with the Porte (thus indirectly with 
Great Britain, the sultan’s protector) against Russia. Turkey’s plans were frustrated 
by the ancient antagonism among local powers…”63Turkey could use the influence 
of the Caliphate and Islam to construct ties with the conservative Emirate and other 
Khanates against Russian infidels. “Equally disturbing were conquests achieved in 
northern Afghanistan at Bukhara’s expense in the late 1850’s by Dost Muhammad, 
the emir of Kabul, who had been an ally of Britain since 1855. In the year following 
the conclusion of the Crimean War the weakness of Russia’s position was borne out 
when Britain applied pressure to Persia, Russia’s protégé, forcing her to evacuate the 
independent state of Herat and grant commercial privileges to British traders”.64 
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To sum up, Russia had several reasons to invade Turkistan, capture the lands 
of Kokand, and establish protectorates in Bukhara and Khiva. Especially for 
Bukhara, cotton potential in this country for Russia’s developing industry, its borders 
with Afghanistan which was a buffer zone with British India, and Russian armies’ 
intentions to repair their glory and prestige after the Crimean defeat made the 
conquests inevitable. In my opinion, the Crimean defeat in 1854 was the main factor 
triggering Russia to target the Central Asia. The defeat caused Russia to cease its 
spreading policies in East Europe, the Caucasus and the Balkans for a while. The 
conquest policy of Turkistan was the best choice for both not attracting the reactions 
of the Western rivals and for owning a region that was a potential colony for Russia’s 
raw material needs. In addition, it seemed a very profitable policy because it would 
produce threat for Britain in terms of approaching India and Afghanistan while not 
disturbing Britain’s other victorious European allies. Russia never destroyed the 
Emirate of Bukhara and also Khiva like it did in the Khanate of Kokand. Since 
Bukhara was a borderland to Afghanistan, Russia only established a protectorate and 
recognized the rule of the Emir. It was also a detailed policy not to encounter Britain 
severely. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
RUSSIAN INTERVETION AND BIRTH OF JADIDISM 
 
 
In this chapter, I focus on the early Russian expansion and conquests in the 
region. I also review rivalry among Russia, Britain and Ottomans over the region. In 
addition, the improving between Bukharan Emir and Tsar, capital penetration in 
Bukhara, and national awakening in Central Asia are analyzed. Also, I touch upon 
Jadidism, reasons of emergence of Jadidism, difference between Jadids and Russian 
educated intellectuals. Finally, I point out Emir Alim Khan, the last ruler of Bukhara, 
and his pro-modern and anti-reformist character. 
 
2.1. Early Russian Expansion and Campaigns 
Under the rule of the Golden Horde, born just after the division of Genghisid 
Empire among his sons; the Kipchak Steppe, can be called as European Russia, and 
the Kazakh Steppe of Central Asia were in interaction in terms of both political unity 
and economy. The trade ways on the Steppe regions were controlled by the Horde. 
The commercial and trans-shipment system continued after the decline of the Horde
 30 
 
 in the late 14
th
 century.
65
 After that time, Muscovy, the future Russia, began 
expanding to the Steppes to fill in the power vacuum in the area. Russia conquered 
the Kazan Khanate in 1552 and Astrakhan in 1556 thus succeeded in opening the 
way to the Kazakh Steppe. “Commerce was the major concern of the embassies from 
Central Asia in the 17
th
 century. Bukhara and Khivan merchants maintained an active 
trade, carrying their goods to Astrakhan, Samara, Kazan, Nizhii Novgorod, Iaroslavl, 
and Moscow itself.” 66 However Russian merchants could not trade because 
Bukharans and Khivans were suspicious of non Moslem merchants in their region.  
They did not want to share their commercial monopoly inside their countries. In 
addition the Russian citizens, the merchants and fishermen near the Caspian Sea 
were captured by Kazakh and Turcoman raiders and sold in slavery in Bukhara and 
Khiva. Neither Khivan nor Bukharan administration did prevent nomads from 
making these assaults. 
67
 The principal duties of Moscow’s embassies in the khanates 
at that period were to rescue the Russian citizens and collect information regarding 
trade routes to India.  
The first armed expedition of Russia to the region was held by Peter the Great 
(1689-1725) towards the Khivan Khanate. However, the attempt failed and the result 
was horrifying for the Russians. The Khivans slaughtered soldiers and sold the 
remains into slavery. 
68
 Russia in the early 18
th
 century was not so strengthened to 
make successful campaigns to Central Asia. Therefore, Peter I changed his policy 
from direct penetration of the region to improvement of commercial relations, 
rescuing Russian citizens from slavery and opening a trade route to India. However it 
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could not succeed in other policies except improving trade. 
69
Russia had to struggle 
with the Kazakh nomads who raid both Russian people along the Russian frontier 
and the trading caravans during the 18
th
 century. Russian armies occupied the 
Kazakh Steppe between 1824 and 1854 and this was the first of the Steppe’s history 
to be ruled by a sedentary power.
70
 
 
2.2. The Great Game on Turkestan: The Early Relations among Russian 
Empire, Ottoman Empire, British Empire and Bukharan Emirate 
After the British armies completed the invasion of India and turned towards 
Afghanistan, the first official links were established between Britain and Bukhara in 
1838. At first, Britain guaranteed Bukhara not to intervene and emphasized his aim 
of friendship. However, Bukharan emir Nasrallah gave hostile reactions to British 
officials and rejected hand of friendship. Emir consolidated his rejection by blaming 
the British as infidels.
71
 On the other hand, Emir was very close to Russians who 
were also infidels. The main reason behind this policy was Bukhara’s commercial 
links with Russia. However, Emir Nasrallah’s anti-British policies caused Bukhara to 
pay a very heavy burden at the beginning of the 20
th
 century. When Emir Alim, the 
last ruler of Bukhara, applied to British officials in India to ask for help against 
Bolsheviks, Britain rejected his application because of early policies of Bukhara 
against Britain. In short, Bukhara damaged its reliance for British Empire.
72
  
Bukhara’s hostile acts against the other khanates and cooperation with Russia 
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threatened the future of Turkestan. Both British and their ally, Ottomans attempted to 
change Bukhara’s pro-Russian and hostile policy. Although Ottoman Empire was not 
as powerful as to have strategic and economic interests and gains in Turkestan, the 
Sublime Porte pursued a pro-British policy because of being an enemy of Tsarist 
Russia and cooperating with England against Russia. Especially, after the Crimean 
War, the Ottoman and British policies were relatively common against Russia. 
73
 
Since Ottomans had cultural and religious links because of owning the Caliphate, the 
Sublime Port tried to direct these states against Russian Empire. Russian policies 
were harmful and threatening for both the Sublime Port because of attempting to 
reach the high seas over Turkey’s straits, and for England because of threatening 
British existence in India by annexing Turkestan. The main policy developed by the 
British and supported by the Port was to enable the khanates, especially Bukhara, to 
merge and defend them against Russian expansion. 
74
  
For example, the Sublime Port sent a message to Bukharan emir to express his disturbance about Bukhara’s hostility 
against Khiva and Kokand Khanates. In the message, it is written that: 
For a time, as you are aware that, there have been conflicts and wars in the region and these bloody struggles among 
Muslims gave harms to the patriotism and clemency of the Caliphate. It is hoped by us that you will not approve this evil 
situation due to your responsibility of being a good believer and this evil situation will change into a unity and auspices among 
you.
75
  
But, the warnings and suggestions to the emirate did not make any impact. 
The skirmishes among the three khanates maintained and benefited Russians in terms 
of intervening and controlling the region. On the other side, the Emirate was the 
fewer payers of the internal conflicts among the Muslim khanates. It was put into the 
protectorate after Russian invasion but secured more advantages and rights than the 
Khanate of Khiva, which was limited to protectorate with very few rights. The 
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biggest payer was Kokand, because it was destroyed and took his place in pages of 
history as a result of Russian total occupation. 
 
2.3. The Russian Conquests    
Russian armies turned to Central Asia and started their great campaign in 
1855. The main campaign, which began in 1855, was also a start of Tsarist Russian 
period in Turkistan that lasted until 1917 Revolution. There were three phrases in 
terms of Russian expansion in Central Asia. The first one was Russian annexation 
and pacification of the Steppe Region between 1730 and the middle of the 19
th
 
century. The second one was between 1855 by which time Russian Army captured 
Syr Darya line to 1865 in which time Tashkent was occupied and in 1867 in which 
time the Governorate General of Turkestan was established.
76
 After the capture of 
Tashkent from Kokand Khanate, the city was declared as the main headquarters of 
Russian Turkestan and had the importance which it had not gained throughout its 
history. In both Tsarist and Soviet rule, Tashkent was the heart of Russian 
administration. And then, Tsarist armies headed to other two khanates, Bukhara and 
Khiva. The third phase was Russia’s intervention into the khanates like the 
annexation of Kokand and establishment of protectorate upon Bukhara and Khiva, in 
addition the defeat of Turcoman tribes in the battle of Gok Tepe in 1881, resulting 
the capture of Transcaspia and Marv oasis by 1884.
77
 The main conflict broke out 
between Bukhara and Russia over the invasion of Kokand’s territories firstly. Indeed, 
Russia benefited much from the internal conflicts between the khanates. These 
Central Asian states had been struggling with each other for years and were very 
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hostile to each one. Bukhara and Khiva were rivals to each other because of their 
disputable claims upon Merv and the left bank of the lower Syr Darya. Besides, there 
was rivalry and dispute between Bukhara and Kokand because of Bukhara’s 
intervention in districts of Djizak, Ura-Tube, Khodjakent, Tashkent and Turkestan.
78
 
Bukhara invaded the Fergana Valley in 1839-1842 and in 1863 thus reduced Kokand 
into a status of vassal. The conflicts between two khanates continued until Russia 
entered the region
79
. Instead of uniting against a common enemy, the khanates 
sought ways to benefit from a high power’s attacks on one another. “The enduring 
rivalries among the Central Asian khanates prevented the formation of a united front 
against the Russian invader, and Bukhara’s involvement in Kokand’s internal affairs 
became the immediate cause of Bukhara’s conflict with Russia”.80 The Emir of 
Bukhara Muzaffar al Din preferred gaining advantages from the Russian attacks on 
Kokand by invading Kokand’s territories together with Russia. While Russian 
General Mikhail Grigoryevich Charniev
81
 had a war with Kokand and went over to 
capture Tashkent, Emir Muzaffar al Din attacked Kokand Khanate and captured the 
cities of Ura Turbe, Djizak(Jizzakh), Katta Qorghan and Khodjent. This was the 
breaking point between Russia and Bukhara. The Bukharan emir’s invasion of the 
Kokand Khanate angered Russia. Russia punished Bukhara with the suspension of its 
trade. For Russia, territorial gain was not important; however it was very cautious 
about the strengthening of an actor at the expense of another in the region.
82
 The 
Bukharan Emir followed wrong policies regarding Kokand against the Russian 
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interests. Russia replied to acts of Bukharan emir Muzaffar al Din by occupying 
Samarkand in 1868. Emir’s army could not stand against the powerful and 
modernized Russian troops. In the wars between Russia and Bukhara, Russia only 
lost very few soldiers although Bukhara’s numerous troops were killed and many 
thousands were wounded. The arithmetic imbalance in terms of killed and wounded 
troops between Russia and Bukhara was extremely high. It was clearly impossible to 
resist by Bukhara against a technological and technical superiority of Russian troops. 
“Bukhara emerged from the war of 1865-1868 in full possession of her legal 
sovereignty but a de facto dependency of the Russian empire”.83 With the treaty of 
1868, Bukhara had to accept the protectorate under Russian rule and annexation of 
Samarkand to Turkestan Guberniia under Russian rule. “The peace treaty, signed on 
June 30, 1868, gave Russia all the conquered territories: Khojand, Ura Tube, Jizzakh, 
Katta Qorghan, and especially Samarkand, which controlled the headwaters of the 
Zarafshan (all Bukhara’s water), and finally, all the commercial advantages which 
the Russian leaders had previously been unable to obtain. Bukhara became a state 
under Russian suzerainty”.84 When the Emir of Bukhara realized the danger, it was 
too late. Russia was a reality in the region and they had to learn how to get along 
with a major power. Although the Emir made several attempts against Russian 
influence in Turkestan, it failed. “The emir renewed efforts to organize a coalition 
comprising Kokand, Khiva, Kashgar and Afghanistan and backed by Turkey and 
Great Britain, but his overtunes were everywhere rejected”.85 For the Emir, there was 
no any choice rather than agreeing and obeying Russians. 
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2.4.   The Improving Relations between the Emir and Tsarist Russia 
The deteriorated relations after the 1868 Treaty was a bit repaired with the 
treaty of 1873. Russia rewarded the Emir of Bukhara because of the Emir’s aids and 
support to Russian forces in their campaign against Khivan Khanate.Bukharan Emir 
Muzaffar al Din preferred helping Russians in the Khivan campaign of Russia and 
cared about Russian interests at that time. On the other side, the Emirate again chose 
to attack a Central Asian Muslim country instead of helping him to war against an 
infidel.  
During the campaign against Khiva the emir of Bukhara preserved a friendly attitude toward Russia, probably more 
out of fear than any nobler emotion.
86
 …Muzaffar responded immediately to the governor general’s (General Von Petrovich 
Kaufman
87
) request for fresh grain and camels. On April 23 Kaufman wrote the emir, thanking him for his hospitality and 
calling him Russia’s trustworthy friend and ally.
88
  
Indeed, Bukharan Emir had no choice rather than aiding Russians. He tried to 
pursue a balance policy not to be exposed to Russian threat. Russian Governor 
General Kaufman believed in the emir’s sincerity and loyalty and gave him a small 
strip of Khivan territory on the right bank of the Amu Darya as a reward although the 
emir’s policy was relatively self-interested, for instance, he secretly supported the 
resistance of Khivan Turcomans while seeming friendly to Russia at the same time.
89
  
After the emirate came under the protectorate of Russians, Bukharan Emir 
was respected more than other khanates by Russians. The Emirate was seen as the 
best ally of Tsarist rule. Among other khanates, the best relations with Governorate 
General of Turkistan were conducted by Bukhara. This was an advantage for 
Bukharan elite. In addition, Russians gave higher status to Bukharan Emirate rather 
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than Khiva and Kokand. Russia behaved Bukhara more generously than other two 
khanates in the 1873 agreement. For example, Bukharan emir had the right to 
communicate with Russian government directly although Kokand was destroyed and 
Khiva was forced to withdraw part of its territory. While Khiva was called “the 
docile servant of the Emperor of all the Russians” and forced to accept the 
administrative hierarchy under Russian rule through the 1873 agreement, it seemed a 
type of friendship treaty to Bukhara.
90
 Russia’s soft attitude towards Bukhara was 
related to geographical importance of the Emirate in the region. The existence of 
Britain in India and British influence in neighboring Afghanistan caused Russians to 
pursue a more careful policy over Bukhara. “By avoiding political presence in 
Bukhara, Russia was able to ask Britain to observe a similar attitude in Afghanistan. 
Bukhara was an important factor in the division of Russian and British spheres of 
influence in Asia”.91 For these reasons, Russia accepted the privileged status of 
Bukhara, and the Emir became a cooperative ally for Russian administration. For 
example, the Emir of Bukhara had a right to contact with the Tsar although 
Governorate General of Turkestan was quite disturbed about the Emir’s privileged 
rights like bypassing governorate and directly contacting with St. Petersburg. 
“Bukhara’s external relations came under the Russian ministry of foreign affairs, 
while Turkistan was placed under the supervision of the ministry of war. Russia was 
represented in Bukhara by a political agent
92
, who acted like an ambassador and 
came under the foreign ministry; this gave Bukhara a semblance of quasi-
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independence which contributed to the external prestige of the emir”.93 The 
Bukharan governing elite consisted of bureaucracy, and military, both of which 
based on Persian slavery; and the most important one, the clergy which were 
controlling madrasah students. For that reason, the Emir tried to act carefully for his 
policies by cooperating with the mullahs who had great influence over conservative 
and traditional public masses. On the other side, the Emir pursued very different 
policies outside, especially towards St. Petersburg, an infidel and invader country. 
For example, Emir Muzaffar al Din had some problems with the mullahs after 
sending his successor Prince Abd al Ahad to Russia to take confirmation for 
crowning as an emir. The clergy saw that attitude as betrayal to traditions and Islam. 
“A decade earlier Muzaffar had chosen as his successor his fifth son, Abd al-Ahad, 
the Beg of Kermine, who now went to Moscow and received the imperial 
confirmation.
94
 In fact, after Abd-al Ahad’s trip to Russia, during which he had 
openly admired much of what he saw, the clerical zealots turned increasingly to Abd-
al Malik
95
 as their last hope”.96 Abd al Ahad, taken the imperial confirmation, 
succeeded to the throne in the end. Abd al Ahad pursued the same way like his 
father, the way of getting along well with Russian suzerains. On February 1880, Abd 
al Ahad celebrated Alexander II’s accession by organizing a parade and fireworks 
demonstration in Karshi. In the celebrations, Captain Arandarenko as a 
representative of the Governor General participated. In addition, Emir Muzaffar sent 
his one of sons, Mansur to St. Petersburg for education in the early 1880s. In 1883, 
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Abd al Ahad sent presents and 100 000 rubles in gold to Alexander II’s coronation. 
In return, Alexander II honored Emir Muzaffar and Crown Prince Abd al Ahad with 
the orders of St. Anna, St. Andrei and St. Stanislov.
97
 Indeed Bukharan Emir and 
Russian Tsar as monarchs had very good relations. Of course, the Emir behaved like 
that because of necessary conditions. His country was in a status of protectorate and 
his military power’s capacity was so poor and insufficient in a comparison with 
Russian troops in Turkistan Guberniia. It was a fact that the negative conditions 
necessitated him to ally with St. Petersburg. However, it was another fact that the 
Emir, as an authoritarian monarch, did not hesitate to cooperate with Russians 
against any internal opposing movements. For instance, Jadids (reformists of 
Bukhara) were suppressed by the Emir for years, and in the next period, they saw the 
best solution as cooperation with the Bolsheviks to escape from Emir backed by the 
Tsar during the civil war era. The Emir rejected revolting against Russia during the 
civil war because he thought he would cooperate with whatever came to power in St. 
Petersburg. But developments did not happen as the emir planned after the civil war. 
There had been consciousness in the emirate and that forced the emir to obey any 
power coming from Moscow or St. Petersburg.
98
 However, the Bolsheviks preferred 
to appeal to the intellectuals, Jadids, instead of appealing to the mullahs and begs 
who prayed for the Tsar for years.
99
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2.5. Capital Penetration in Bukhara 
The capitalist penetration in Bukhara started with the construction of Trans-
Caspian railways. Introduction of railroads to Bukhara enabled Bukhara to adapt to 
Russia and the West. The railways directly changed the system of Bukhara in a 
manner of economy, society and culture. Opening of Bukharan society to the 
Western world through railways was a first attempt for unpreventable change in the 
Emirate in the following years. “The first consequence of the conquest was the 
opening of Central Asia and Bukhara to capitalist penetration, especially after the 
construction of the Trans-Caspian railway. This project, undertaken for military 
purposes, profoundly altered the economic life of Central Asia”.100 The most 
benefited group in Bukhara in the construction of railways was merchants. Although 
railways benefited Russia to take the region under control more effectively and this 
situation worried the Emir; merchants were profitable because of decrease in their 
costs for carriage. “The railroad did not strip Bukhara of its central role, but 
connected the city to Moscow and to Nihny-Novgorod. And whereas the carriage of 
pud (or 16.38kg) of goods by caravan from Bukhara to Orenburg would cost a much 
as three rubles, the railway brought the cost down (carriage guaranteed and insured 
as far as Moscow) to 70 kopecks per pud, which considerably improved the situation 
of the local merchants”.101 In addition to benefits and advantages for the inner 
merchants, it enabled Bukhara to open to the world markets. The foreign merchants 
could arrive in Bukhara for trade. The railway enabled Armenian, French and Jewish 
merchants to arrive. It was not only beneficial for Russian merchants. There were so 
many European merchants, coming to Bukhara for trade that the Emir put surtax on 
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karakul in 1905 in order to protect Russian and Bukharan merchants. But, Bukhara 
continued to attract karakul buyers from London, Paris, Berlin and Constantinople as 
well as Moscow.
102
 Opening of Bukhara to foreign traders provided increase in 
economic development of the country and that opening up inevitably would bring the 
enlightenment in political and social life. 
After the spreading influence and control by Russians in the region and 
increase of capitalist penetration year by year, the number of settlers began to 
increase both in Turkistan and in Bukhara. Russians began to come to Bukhara from 
1873 on and they brought their civilization through constructing roads, railways, 
garrisons and customs posts. According to 1896 census, 12,150 Russian subjects 
were in Bukhara and there were 8000 soldiers among them. And, in the beginning of 
the Great War, the Russian population in the emirate was almost 50, 000 except 
military staff. Towards the end of the 19
th
 century, Russian colonies increased more 
along the railroad and Amu Darya.
103
According to 1906 census, 5,378,000 Central 
Asians and 322, 000 Russian settlers were in Turkestan.
104
 Of course, the policy of 
settling Russians by Tsarist rule in the region began causing problems between 
settlers and indigenous people.  The indigenous people consisted of peasant farmers, 
nomads and seminomads. And, the number of Russian settlers increased year by 
year. The settlers backed by Russian administration gained their lands by expelling 
the indigenous owners of these lands.
105
 Until the indigenous people lost their lands 
and water rights to Russian settlers, they had to welcome the introduction of Russian 
institutions and methods of the Tsarist policy of colonization between the years of 
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1906 to1911. But, the revolt broke out in 1916 because the sufferings reached the 
peak in the end.
106
 The reaction of local peoples to settlers, who came to the position 
of being more advantaged than the local people, began creating anxiety in Russia 
during the civil war period. Not only local masses but also the emir and the clerical 
elite were not content with these settlers. In Russian administration both in Tsarist 
rule and Provisional Government era, there was an anxiety of immediate attack of 
indigenous people to settlers in the region. The changing of production tools and 
economic power in Bukharan society from one hand to another through capital 
penetration and settler policy caused some social explosions and problems while 
there were its benefits and profits for the country. It is undoubtedly right that 
Russians brought so many helpful innovations to the region for the benefit of local 
people and Bukharan state. “They established a good road and railway system and 
adequate port facilities on the Caspian and Aral seas…They secured the Chinese, 
Afghan and Persian frontiers; they considerably developed trading facilities and the 
supply of raw materials…”107 Russians constructed roads, railways and ports on the 
Caspian and Aral Seas. In addition, they secured the Chinese, Afghan and Persian 
borderlands. They also developed trade and supply of raw materials. The 
construction of railways, industrial development, and the growth of towns and 
entrance of Russian capital in rural production had reinforced and enlarged the 
Emirate’s relations with Russia and improved capitalist relations inside the emirate. 
These developments caused social changes inside Bukharan socio-economic system 
such as destruction of traditional rural ownership, acceleration of class differentiation 
in villages, increase of commercial character in agrarian production, and the 
peasantry’s specialization in cotton cultivation resulting a progressive adaptation of 
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other sectors of the economy.
108
 The only innovation was not railroad in Central 
Asia. There was also construction of telegraph network by Russians throughout 
Turkistan and protectorate khanates. “During the previous decade the Russian 
telegraph network had spread throughout Russian Turkestan, reaching Tashkent in 
1873, Khodjent in 1875, Samarkand and Kokand in 1876, and Katta-Kurgan, on the 
Bukharan frontier, in 1878. General Von Kaufman raised the question of a telegraph 
link to Bukhara several times at the end of the 1870’s, but apparently without 
insistence and consequently with no effect”.109 For example, the telegraph crisis was 
the clear evidence for the influence of clergy over the Emir in Bukhara. The 
telegraph link reached the borders of Bukhara but it could not enter the city due to 
the Emir’s refusal, because the clergy was against all types of innovations inside 
Bukhara. As a protector of conservative-traditional social structure, the class of 
mullahs was keen on struggling every change and renewal. They were severe 
defenders of Emir’s old authority and early system in the country. They considered 
the changes were against Islam since they came from an infidel power. However, 
Emir’s approval of their desires was related to Emir’s necessity to take their support 
to continue his rule over masses. Otherwise, there was not any problem to implement 
with Russian orders according to Emir’s perspective. The emirs, both Muzaffar’s son 
Abd al Ahad and Ahad’s son Sayyid Alim, had Russian life styles. They spent most 
of their time during their princedoms in Russia. For instance, Alim took Russian 
education in Russian schools and knew about Russian literature and culture well. On 
the other side, they had to pursue balanced policies for not irritating domestic actors.  
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“On substantive questions Muzaffar successfully resisted Russian pressure on slavery, the slave trade, and postal 
communications and he managed for nine months to avoid an agreement on the construction of the telegraph line, the one issue 
on which Russia was adamant.
110
 If the emperor chose to command him to comply, but his authority in the khanate would 
thereby be undermined because of the clergy’s hold over the masses. A complete Russian takeover in Bukhara would be the 
inevitable outcome”.
111
 
In the end, Russians and modernization won the game and the Emir had to 
step back against Tsarist decisiveness. The telegraph line to Bukhara entered the holy 
city, Bukhara in 1884, because the Russian support behind the Emir was vital for him 
to maintain his sultanate. An immediate clash with the Tsar or the Governor General 
of Turkestan in the region would end his reign.  
Russian capitalism was taking control of Bukharan economic life and gaining 
every sector in the country. Through the established Banks, Russian based capitalism 
penetrated financially in the Emirate. Russian banks spread all over the Bukhara at 
the beginning of the 20
th
 century. Every bank had a monopoly in economic life. For 
example, the Russo-Asiatic Bank had a monopoly of railway construction; the Azov 
and Don Bank had cotton trade and the Siberian Commercial Bank had the sector of 
cotton purchases and imports of manufactured goods. In addition, the State Bank, the 
Volga Bank and Kama Commercial Bank were the other banks, operating in the 
emirate.
112
 Although there were local merchants and businessmen, they could not be 
compared to Russian capitalists and monopolists. Bukharan people were peasants 
and villagers in a great majority. Through these banks and monopolies, Tsarist 
Russia penetrated capitalism and included Bukhara financially to its economic 
system. On this way, customs union was established among Russia, Khiva and 
Bukhara in the last years of 19
th
 century. Thus the khanates’ economic 
interdependence with Russia was completed after the political and military 
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protectorate. The increase in amount of exports and imports between two countries 
consolidated the interdependence in economic realm, especially in finance and trade. 
“The inclusion of Bukhara in the empire’s customs system had the effect of 
developing considerably Russo-Bukharan economic relations: in 1865 Bukhara’s 
exports to Russia totaled 3,306,000 roubles and its imports 1,913,000 roubles; by 
1913 exports had risen to 31 million roubles and imports to 35 million”.113 On the 
eve of the World War I and Revolution, in Bukhara, the industrial development 
emerged as being depended on Russian settlements. The basic reason of this was that 
Russians formed the skilled labor force.  
In both Bukhara and Khiva the ownership of the new factories was predominantly Russian, and the management and 
skilled workers were entirely so. By contrast, the unskilled labor force was drawn from the natives of the two countries. The 
total number of workers has been estimated at almost 1300 for Bukhara in 1905, and 400-500 for Khiva in 1917. 
114
By 1913 
the total was twenty six, of which nineteen were owned by Russians, three by Russian Tatars, three by the emir of Bukhara, and 
one by a Bukharan merchant.
115
 
Since the proletariat class was Russian settlers in the region, the effects of 
Revolution spread through this Russian settler class.  In the khanates of both Bukhara 
and Khiva, the operating factories belonged to Russians and the skilled labor force 
was Russian originally. However, the unskilled workers consisted of natives. The 
total number of workers in Bukhara was 1300 in 1905 and 400-500 in Khiva in 1917. 
The number of factories was twenty six by 1913 and nineteen of these factories 
belonged to Russians, three belonged to Russian Tatars, three belonged to the Emir 
and one belonged to a Bukharan merchant.
116
 On the contrary, Bukharan indigenous 
population was peasant, uneducated and forming unskilled cheap labor force in the 
region. The local workers completely lacked theoretical infrastructure in order to 
carry out the Revolution. In railroads and factories, Russian workers were the main 
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workforce and they carried features of proletariat class in the region. Local people 
worked in fields and at works not requiring technical labor force. This situation 
became a disputable matter for years and seen as the lack of proletariat class in the 
region. After the fall of Emirate, the new Bukharan state and Khorezm state(replaced 
instead of Khivan Khanate) were founded as Bukharan Soviet Public Republic and 
Khorezm Soviet Public Republic instead of socialist republics like other ones, 
Turkestan ASSR and Kyrgyzstan ASSR. According to Soviet views, the reason was 
explained that there had been no proletariat class in Bukhara and Khiva in previous 
period, so there should be a transition period for declaration of a socialist republic.  
 
2.6. National Awakening and Jadidism 
2.6.1. Jadidism in Bukhara  
National awakening among Russian Muslims including Crimea, Turkistan, 
Steppe Region and the Khanates began with the introduction of usul-i jadid schools 
programmed by Ismail Gasprinsky, a Crimean Tatar intellectual. Tarjuman, meaning 
the Interpreter, was founded in 1883 by Ismail Gasprinsky. That journal aimed to 
propagate the ideas of reform of religious education and pan-Turkism. Gasprinsky’s 
purpose was to enable all the Turkish peoples in the empire to unite primarily around 
a common literary language and a common culture thus reaching the national 
recognition in next.
117
 And then, he developed establishment of school method 
throughout the regions where Turks lived in majority. The first schools were opened 
in Crimea and aimed to open in other Turkic places.  The usul-i jadid schools aimed 
to give modern education in Turkestan and the Khanates. Thus, an enlightened class 
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would be created in next period as a result of this educational reform that targeted to 
replace the religious-conservative based madrasah education with modern education. 
For Gasprinsky, educational reform was very important for the political and cultural 
awakening of Turco-Tatar peoples, modernization of Islamic life and emancipation 
of women in society. The name of this program was Jadidism and the reformed 
schools, established according to the aims of this modernization program, were 
known as Usul-i jaded schools (new method schools).
118
 Jadid Movement was 
introduced in Bukharan emirate through these Jadid schools and managed to create a 
small educated elite which would direct the fate of the country in future. The first 
school in Turkestan was opened by famous Jadid leader Munavvar Kari in Taskent. 
In Bukharan Emirate, Jadids were led by Abd ar Rauf Fitrat, Bukharan intellectual. 
The well-known Jadid leaders of Bukhara were Fayzallah Khodzhaev, Usman 
Khodzhaev, Abdulrauf Fitrat, Munavvar Kari, Poet Colpan, Polat Khodzhaev, 
Sadallah Khodzhaev, Ubeydullah Khodzhaev. They formed the government of 
Bukharan People’s Republic in 1920 after the fall of monarchy. On the other side, 
the Emir and   mullahs were very disturbed about the activities of Bukharan Jadid 
leader Abd ar Rauf Fitrat. “Both the Jadid group in the khanate and the 
Constantinople organization shared common aims and to some extent a common 
membership. The spokesman for both groups was Abd ar Rauf Fitrat, who left 
Bukhara for Constantinople in 1910 and there became the best known propagandist 
for reform in the khanate and the acknowledged ideological leader of the Bukharan 
reform movement”.119 Although Jadidism improved in field of education and clashed 
with the clerical education method of madrasahs; it was inevitable to spill over the 
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political arena in future. By Gasprinsky, it aimed the modernization and unification 
of Turkic nations through this new method.  
It was primarily a Muslim reformist movement with pan-Turkic overtones, which aimed at modernizing the Muslim 
system of education and also at introducing a uniform Turkic language for use by all the Turkic peoples in Russia. In the second 
of these aims it achieved no success, but in the educational field its progress was remarkable and a large number of so-called 
Jadid schools were set up in the larger towns of the Turkestan province…120  
The Bukharan Jadids had difficulty maintaining education in reformed 
schools, because both Tsarist officials and the Bukharan governing elite, the Emir 
and clergy, were against their existence. Tsarist administration saw them dangerous 
because of their pan-Turkist tones and ideas. Also, Jadid schools got more success 
than Russian schools in the region. Through these schools, intellectuals as a small 
elite were on the way of creation, so this threatened the colonizers. In addition, the 
local compradors of Tsar were deliberate to this emerging new class. The mullahs 
were basic representatives of usul-i kadim method in education. Usul-i kadim was 
the conservative, religious and traditional madrasah based education method 
supported by clergy in Bukhara. It had a legitimacy dated back to centuries ago in 
Holy Bukhara and Samarkand cities so that is the reason of the Kadims’ 
disagreement with Jadids. The Kadims saw themselves as the representatives of 
ancient historic traditions; religious based teaching of Islam and values. The 
advocates of the old method blamed the representatives of usul-i jadid to be infidels 
and saw them as their enemies. The emirs, both Abd al Ahad and his successor 
Sayyid Alim Khan, considered that the support of clergy to direct the peoples was a 
must therefore they followed a suppression policy against educational reform and 
reformist jadids. “Frustrated by the opposition of the emir’s government to 
educational reform, the Bukharan liberals soon broadened their aims and began to 
look elsewhere than to Russia’s Moslems for leadership in their attempt to modernize 
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Bukhara. Their attention was attracted by the liberal revolution in Persia in 1906 and 
even more by the liberal nationalist Young Turk revolution in Turkey in 1908”.121 
The constitutional revolutions in leading Moslem countries such as Turkey and 
Persia enforced the Bukharan Jadids to turn their direction to the developments in 
these countries. They were good examples in order to give direction to their plans 
and aims. “Late in 1909 a group of Bukharan exiles in Constantinople founded the 
Bukharan Society for the Dissemination of Knowledge (Bukhara Tamim-I Maarif), 
whose goals were to found schools in the khanate and to finance the sending of 
Bukharan students to study in Constantinople”.122 The Young Turk Movement  and 
their social party Union and Progress became the guide for both Bukharan and 
Khivan jadids, getting education in Ottoman lands. Jadids in Khivan Khanate and 
Bukharan Emirate called themselves as Young Bukharans and Young Khivans after 
they had graduated and returned from Constantinople. Constantinople was the safest 
place for reformists because they could have any aid and support from the nationalist 
Turkish Government, especially after Union and Progress Party came to power 
through a coup in 1913. “The Jadids also put forth great efforts to send students from 
Bukhara to Turkey, fifteen in 1911, thirty in 1913, and only World War I put a stop 
to this advance. While these figures seem insignificant in themselves, the young 
students in Turkey were living in an exciting atmosphere of pan-Turkism and 
hostility toward Russia”.123 Sending students to Turkey was the best method for a 
preparation of change and reform on the perspective of Jadids. It was a kind of public 
diplomacy policy at that time for Bukharan reformists. On the other side, it was the 
best way for Ottoman Young Turks to export their regime to influence the Central 
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Asian Muslim Turkic states. The Russian authorities were aware of that threat 
therefore they took their precautions on the eve of World War I. The reformists were 
exposed to arrests and prosecutions inside the Emirate. And, the ones in Turkey 
could not return back to their countries. The Jadid schools were badly affected just 
after the outbreak of the Great War. The schools and Jadid activities were suspected 
by Russia due to their close links with the Ottoman Empire which attended the war 
on the side of Central Powers in November 1914, in addition there were a large 
number of Bukharan students and emigrants in Constantinople.
124
 
 
2.6.2. The Reasons of Emergence of Jadidism 
The meaning of Jadid in both Arabic and Persian language is “new”.  
Jadidism means the renewal or reform. The basic institution of Jadid reform was the 
new method school itself. These schools were the site of the struggle for the hearts 
and minds of the next generation. Through them, the Jadids disseminated a cognitive 
style which is quite different from that of the maktab and thus created a group in 
society that was receptive to their ideas. These schools were also crucial to the social 
reproduction of the movement. 
125
 Jadids emerged as the new elite of Turkestan as a 
result of transformations of Central Asian society and economy under severe Russian 
influence and rule. These new and modern elite attempted to make a cultural 
transformation of Turkistan despite the obstacles produced by the traditional 
structure of Central Asia. The native societies and traditional cultures in Southern 
Central Asia, the lands of Transoxiana, were isolated from other parts of the world 
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before Russian armies arrived in the 1860s. Although Samarkand and Bukhara had 
been prominent cities of Muslim world regarding owning the learning centers and 
location of the Silk Road centuries ago, local wars and skirmishes for power, wealth 
and territory among the khanates in the region were under way in the beginning of 
the 19th century. But, The Russian invasion brought the region a change and 
impulsive force for transformation in realm of politics, economics, culture and 
society.
126
 The power and influence of the traditional political structures and local 
emirs and khans were lessened and limited by tsarist officials in Turkestan, for 
instance the khanates were reduced the level of protectorates.
127
 The Tsarist 
interventions and effects caused by these interventions caused the Jadid movement to 
emerge and increase for the call of social reform in Muslim regions of Russian 
Empire. The basic purpose of Jadids was the implementation of an internal reform in 
order to replace the old one with the new social order which is modern but Islamic. 
128
 The Jadid movement’s fundamental philosophy was the Bukharan intellectuals’ 
seeking a way to solve their country’s suspension between medieval Islam and 
modern West. The general feature of the Jadids is that they consisted of intellectuals 
like authors, poets, educators and students rather than economic and commercial 
actors. It was true that they got the support of shopkeepers, merchants and minor 
officials who were in expectancy of educational, clerical, fiscal and administrative 
reforms. As the last point, it should not be forgotten the Russians’ civilizing and 
enlightened role upon Russian Muslims and reform movements in Turkistan.
129
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2.6.3. The Jadids and Russian Educated Intellectuals 
The Central Asian Jadids were a bit different from the ones in European 
Russia and Transcaucasia. For example, Central Asian Jadids were much closer to 
the Islamic cultural tradition rather than other Jadids in other parts of Russia. The 
Jadids of European Russia, especially intellectuals of Crimea and Volga Tatars, and 
Transcaucasia took Russian education in modern Russian schools or academies. For 
example, Ismail Gasprinsky had attended a military academy in Moscow and served 
as a secretary of Ivan Turgunev in Paris for two years. 
130
 In addition, it should not be 
skipped that the Jadids of Crimea and Volga Tatars were the founding fathers and 
leading personalities of the Jadidism. Central Asian Jadids were not only different 
from the Jadids of European Russia but also different from the small number of 
Central Asian modern- secular and Russian educated intellectuals. As their well-
known name for these intellectuals, munevvers, which means intellectuals in Arabic 
language, was used. They were commonly known as munevvers. These Central 
Asians with a modern Russian secular education were in majority Tatar and Kazakhs. 
While Central Asian Jadids (Jadids of the khanates of Bukhara, Khiva and 
Turkestan) were coming from families of the old cultural elite, Central Asian Tatar 
intellectuals, whose families arrived in the region after the Russian conquest, came 
from aristocratic elites.
131
 The Kazakhs also came from aristocratic families. The 
Kazakh aristocracy emerged in the Steppe by the middle of the 19
th
 century.
132
 And, 
this Steppe aristocracy was very secular as compared with the other aristocrat groups 
in Bukharan, Khivan and Turkestan. Since there was no madrasas giving a religious 
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based education in the Steppe, and Kazakhs did not have a tradition of madrasa 
learning, Kazakh children were sent to Russian schools since the beginning of the 
19
th
 century and this situation caused a birth of a secular Kazakh elite class in the 
Steppe. 
133
 “The Russian conquest of Turkestan brought the Qazaq steppe under 
greater influence of the Islam reproduced in madrasas, as madrasa students found it 
safer to travel to the steppe in the summer. Writing in 1910, Ahmet Bukeykhanov 
saw two competing new elites emerging in the Qazaq lands, one formed like him in 
Russian institutions, the other increasingly Muslim and formed in the madrasas of 
Central Asia and the Volga”.134The secular intellectuals of Central Asia generally 
went to Russia to take education. To give an example, Mustafa Chokay, who was a 
descendent of Khivan royal family and a famous leader of Kokand Autonomous 
Government, which was founded in 1917 and was destroyed by the Bolsheviks in 
1918, got education in law faculty in St. Petersburg University. Although Chokay’s 
activities were similar to Jadids, he belonged to the group of Russian educated 
secular intellectuals. Even, to demonstrate the distinction between Jadids and secular 
intellectuals, “it was very difficult to find any interaction or link between them 
before 1917, the Bolshevik Revolution. The Jadids represented the modernization of 
the Muslim cultural tradition of Central Asia; the secular intellectuals were fluent in 
the idiom of European thought. The Jadids spoke to Muslim society in order to 
achieve cultural change; the secular intellectuals spoke to the Russian state and 
Russian society in order to achieve political change”.135 When Jadids and secular 
intellectual group merged into a common political movement in 1917, the modern 
educated intellectuals had the leading role in the politics although Jadids had 
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numerical majority and influence over the local people; because modern secular 
intellectual group owned an advantage of using Russian language and Russian 
political idiom perfectly.
136
 Central Asian Jadidism as being different from Russian 
educated modern secular intellectuals, concentrated on Muslim modernism, because 
Jadidism’s rhetoric had its roots in Islamic tradition and culture of Central Asian 
Muslim society. 
137
 Therefore, their basic emphasis was upon the modernity which 
was congruent with the true essence of Islam, and modernization of Muslim society 
through a new understanding of Islam.
138
 In addition, there was a difference between 
the Jadids and secular intellectuals about the program for the political future. For 
example, the main idea of Russian educated secular intellectuals (munevvers) was 
not separated from Russia; instead, they were favor of national, territorial, cultural 
and federal autonomy for the Muslim nationalities under the rule of Russia. In short, 
they were much more interested in cultural matters rather than political.
139
 However, 
The Jadids were the severe advocates of full independence for future program. 
 
2.6.4. Birth and Increase of National Awakening 
Although Jadids had conducted their secret activities against the authoritarian 
regime with the aim of weakening the national feeling in society, it was not so 
effective when compared to power of ruling elite backed by Tsar and religious class. 
In the early 19
th
 century, some developments, triggering the nationalist feeling, 
happened in Russia. The first one is the outbreak of war between Japan and Russia in 
1904. The defeat of Russia in that war was a milestone for colonized people 
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especially Russian Moslems inside the borders of Russia. “The years 1904 and 1905 
were exceptionally difficult for the Russian empire. In 1904 the empire, apparently 
strong and victorious, was defeated by Japan. This defeat was significant not only for 
Russia, but also the world: it was the first time for many centuries that a conquering 
power the Christian West had collapsed before a non-white people”.140 The idea of 
independence awakened among Russian Muslims after that defeat. For them, 
defeating Russia became possible now, even by an eastern nation. The cult of 
Russian glory and superiority ceased, and this situation was a forerunner of difficult 
days for Tsardom. Nikolai Petrovich Ostroumov
141
 (1846-1930) an educationalist in 
Turkestan and editor of Turkistan Wilayatining Gazeti from 1883 – 1917, Central 
Asian students had visited Russia to see the imperial glory and power, but the visits 
ceased suddenly just after the defeat against Japan. The defeat of Russia by an 
eastern power encouraged Central Asian Muslims to escape from Russian 
domination. Russia lost its efficiency and glory in the eyes of Muslim communities. 
Moreover, 1905 Revolution encouraged the increase of national consciousness 
more.
142
 The second important event in Russia was 1905 Revolution, as a result, its 
spreading influence in Central Asia. The Revolution of 1905 brought constitutional 
monarchy, establishment of the State Duma, a multiparty system and declaration of 
Russian constitution of 1906 to Tsarist Russia. The Monarchy’s mandates and power 
were restrained. Although there were not local regional partners of 1905 
Revolutionists in both Turkestan and Bukhara, this was an important occasion which 
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would display its effects in the next period. “The indigenous Turkestani population 
took no part in the revolutionary unrest of the years 1905-7, though in the guberniya 
this took the form of extremely violent clashes. In Turkestan, revolutionary 
developments were helped by the presence of deported Russian social democrats”.143 
These social democrats, being exiled in Turkestan by Tsarist administration, 
organized the Russian railroad workers in the region and enabled the revolution to 
spread to the whole empire. Although Russian 1905 Revolution did not influence 
Turkestani reformists to move, 1906 Revolution in Persia and especially 1908 
Revolution in Turkey had more influence upon them. The importance of 1905 
Revolution and Russian defeat in war of 1904 caused the weakness of Tsarist 
administration thus power vacuum in both Turkestan and Bukhara. These factors 
reflected in the region as revolts of peasants and increase of Jadids’ activities and 
reform demands. 
Firstly, the indigenous peasants, who lost their lands and water rights to 
Russian settlers and were disturbed about being used as cheap labor, and the nomadic 
Turkic tribes revolted against Russian administration in 1916 on the eve of the 
Revolutions. Although this revolt did not have any nationalist tendency, instead, 
included economic reasons; it was important to be the most effective one among 
other revolts since the 1868, especially regarding the size of the peasant, villager and 
nomadic rebellions increased after 1905. The great revolt of 1916 was caused by 
Tsarist policies in terms of economy and military. The Turkestani people, who had 
been exempted from military service for years, were forced to attend as workers in 
fronts. “The immediate cause of the great rebellion of 1916 was the Imperial Decree 
of June 25 calling up non-Russians for labour duties in rear of the Russian forces 
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engaged in the First World War. The quotas set were 250.000 workers from 
Turkistan and 243.000 from the four oblasts of the Steppe Region”.144 Besides, 
enforcing the peasants and villagers to specialize in only cotton agriculture against 
grain caused Central Asians to suffer from starvation and scarcity during the war 
period. These economic factors became basic reasons for revolts. Secondly, the 
reformists, conducting their secret activities underground, began emerging to the 
arena and had more nationalist feeling than peasant revolts. The reform winds from 
Persia and Turkey were successful examples and guides for their aims. These two 
movements combined after the 1917 Revolutions and especially the expansion of 
Soviet rule in the whole region. It was possible to see this in the cooperation of 
Basmachi forces and Bukharan Jadids in the early 1920s. For that reason, the two 
events, 1904 defeat and 1905 Revolution, were milestones on the way of national 
awakening of local people and Young Bukharans’ struggle. 
 
2.7. Emir Alim Khan (Pro-Modernist but Anti-Reformist Character) 
Sayyid Mir Alim succeeded to the throne after his father Abd al Ahad’s death 
in 1910. He was very close to Russian lifestyle because he took education for four 
years in the Nikolaevsky Cadets in St. Petersburg. He had numerous Russian books 
in his library and he frequently visited Russia like his father. 
145
 The Bukharan 
princes’ recognition and adoption to Russian life style and culture began in the reign 
of Emir Muzaffar . He sent his sons to St. Petersburg for travels and education. And 
then, Abd al Ahad did the same thing and sent his son Alim to Russia for education. 
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The good relations and loyalty between St. Petersburg and the Emirs was encouraged 
through early education and frequent visits. Mission civilisatrice policy of Russia 
became successful over the Emir and his family. The Tsarist administration also 
appreciated the Emirs, because both Abd al Ahad and his son Alim took Russia’s 
approval before their succession to the throne. The Emirs were protected, helped and 
honored by Russia in consideration of their loyalty.  
The tsarist Government not only helped the Emir against his own people, it 
understood also how to flatter his vanity.
146
 A. Polovtsoff relates: “Later on, when 
the new railway line which linked his country through Orenburg to Russia was 
completed, he was given a large saloon car lacquered in cherry red and ornamented 
with reproduction of his Order of the Star of Bukhara, so that railway officials should 
know what an exalted passenger was inside. He was immensely proud of this 
imperial gift.
147
  
Since Alim seemed very Western and modern in his early years of sultanate, 
the reformers got content with his succession. They expected him to allow reforms 
and take side near reformers against the mullah class. But, it did not happen.  Though 
he made several administrative reforms, the context of reforms remained limited and 
did not include freedoms. He pursued closer policies to mullah class and demands of 
Russians. On the other hand, Alim Khan was a real Jadid in terms of his background 
education and training though he was displayed as an enemy against Jadids. If he was 
a merchant’s son instead of a crown prince, he would have been a Jadid. For that 
reason, Alim Khan’s position near the Kadims (traditionalists) and against the Jadids 
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was related to politics and rather than being related to ideas and opinions. The 
organizing of Jadidism as a strong political oppositional movement in Bukhara 
forced Alim Khan to take his side near the Kadims because they were hard advocates 
of monarchy.
148
  
As an orthodox Moslem state, Bukhara itself was embarrassed by the sultankhalifs proclamation of holy war against 
the Allies. Emir Alim demonstrated his loyalty to Russia by donating several million rubles to the Russian war effort; in 
September 1916 he journeyed in person to the front to present the emperor with a gift of one million rubles. At home the 
Bukharan government proved its loyalty by suppressing all opposition and forbidding the reading of newspapers or the 
discussion of current events. 
149
  
It is a fact that Alim was a very pragmatic man. Even though he carried 
several spiritual ranks and titles such as a title of Emir (meaning Commander of 
Believers) and claimed to be a sayyid by tracing back to the prophet, he chose to 
remain an ally of Russia in the Great War although Ottoman Sultan and Caliph 
Sultan Mehmed V declared jihad for Muslims worldwide.  In sum, although he was a 
modern and western styled man in accordance with his education and training in 
Russia, he had a responsibility to rule as a monarch in his country so it was crucial 
for him to take support of the mullah class, owning a strong authority over 
conservative and uneducated public and numerous madrasa students, the Russian 
officials. The bad destiny for him was that he could not guess the fall of Russian Tsar 
and increase of Bolshevism in Russia in next period. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
REVOLUTIONARY ERA: FEBRUARY AND OCTOBER REVOLUTIONS 
 
 
In this chapter, I try to point out the stages, developments and conditions that 
prepared the traditional Bukharan society and identity to transform into a level of 
Peoples’ Republic. This transformation was important for the birth of Uzbekistan 
nation state in the region in future. I focused on the civil war conditions, and the 
developments in the region during the March and February Revolutions which were 
the most remarkable parameters for the collapse of ancient traditional structure of 
Bukhara and also the increase of bourgeoisie nationalist class, known as Young 
Bukharans, which was the most prominent internal actor for the modernization and 
transformation of the society and country. I also try to analyze the Bolshevik 
intervention as an independent variable into the struggle for reform and change 
between feudal classes led by the monarch and bourgeoisie nationalists, because the 
Soviet intervention was a crucial factor for the transformation of the Bukharan 
society and the country. It was both an important and compulsory catalyst for the 
change of the country and the local society. I analyze the examples of establishments 
of Alash Orda, Bashkurd and Kokand governments as role models with their national 
characters for the Bukharan Jadids. In addition, I try to analyze the matter of class 
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struggle in Bukharan Emirate, and I focus on the class struggle between the 
bourgeoisie nationalist class a feudal aristocracy class in Bukhara instead of a class 
struggle between the proletariat class and capitalist class as it occurred in Russia. 
3.1. Pre-Revolutionary Era 
Both Russia and the neighboring regions were in chaos just before the 1917 
Revolutions. The Great War conditions struck Tsarist Russia, and Tsarist Russia 
could not stand the heavy burden of the war. The civil war was about breaking out 
inside the country. In 1916, an important event occurred in the Steppe region of the 
Empire. Then the uprisings spread to Turkistan. Native Muslim communities 
upraised against the ongoing poverty and starvation in the lands of Central Asia. The 
indigenous in Central Asia were force to renounce their water rights and irrigation 
lands for the behalf of Russian settlers. Since the policy of specialization in cotton 
production was implemented in Turkistan and the grain needs were supplied from 
Russia; Turkistan and the Steppe fell into starvation because of collapse of grain 
supply in the war years. Moreover, recruitment of Moslem natives by Tsarist regime 
was the last triggering factor for break out of uprising. The uprisings were pressed by 
the governorate general of Turkistan. The uprisings in the Steppe continued until 
February Revolution. 
150
 The international arena was also full of problems and 
questions just after the Great War. Ottoman Empire, as the most prominent and 
leading state for Muslim countries in the world, was about collapsing at the end of 
1917. Persia was inside anarchy and Afghanistan was in a war with Britain. In China, 
the ruling Manchu dynasty fell and the region of Sinkiang (the lands of the late 
Kasghar Khanate) was in power vacuum due to the lack of ruling authority. Central 
                                                          
150
 Carrere D’Encausse, Hèlene, trans., Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in 
Central Asia, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 121. 
 62 
 
Asia was shaken by the effects of Revolutions at that time period. Inside the borders 
of Turkistan, at least 40,000 German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners of war were 
deployed by Russia.
151
 Just before the February Revolution, the peasant revolt broke 
out in 1916 among the Steppe peasants of Central Asian Muslims. The inconsistent 
policies and enormous increase of Russian and Ukrainian settlers in Central Asia 
caused native population to give reactions to the Russian rule. The break out of 1916 
peasant revolt was a result of these reactions to inconsistent policies. After the 
February Revolution, the native people got hopeful about the possible change of 
ongoing Russian policies in the region. They expected the restoration of their rights 
over water sources and lands. 
152
 After the February Revolution, a wind of freedom 
influenced the Steppe, Idil-Ural and Turkistan regions. There was not enough 
intelligentsia among Central Asian Muslims at that time (in revolutionary era). For 
instance, 97-98 % of the population was illiterate except a very small group of the 
Kazakhs. 
153
 There was no enough intelligentsia among Muslim elements to organize 
a modern state in the region. There was no military tradition for centuries. They were 
excluded from military service. There was also exception in the khanates. They had 
few military forces because of remaining under protectorate. Communication 
services, railways, telegraphs or industrial facilities, all of them belonged to 
Russians.
154
 Among the peoples of Turkestan, there was not an idea or identity of 
nation and nationality. The communities were tribal, nomadic, especially in Turkmen 
basin and the Steppe, and bound to Islam extremely in Turkestan, the khanates, the 
emirate and Fergana. Especially, sedentary population was under severe influence of 
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religiosity. The peoples did not recognize the Western ideologies like nationalism or 
nation concept because of the illiteracy of majority and lack of an intelligentsia. 
155
 
 
3.2.   Other Main Muslim Operating Forces in Russia-wide 
3.2.1. Alash Orda Autonomous Government 
February Revolution provided Muslims of Russia a relaxed atmosphere in 
order to take initiative and organize for unity depending on a common culture. 1916 
Revolt mostly harmed nomadic Steppe society, the Kazakhs. So, the first attempt to 
declare a territorial autonomy came from the Kazakhs who organized all the Kirghiz 
(Kazakh) Congress in 17 November 1917. These developments were clearly results 
of the slight atmosphere brought by February Revolution. Alash Orda
156
, a moderate 
national Kazakh Party, was founded by Kazakh intellectuals who were Russian 
educated, modern, moderate and secular. The basic policy of Alash Orda was to 
demand redistribution of the lands and end of colonization. They made an emphasis 
on agrarian issues and problems instead of politics. They openly supported the 
Provisional Government, February Revolution and continuation of war against 
Germany. Briefly, they were advocates of Kerensky and his government that were 
not too strong enough to enforce them to obey without any right. Alash Orda’s party 
program envisaged some important decisions like ceasing the Russian settlers’ 
immigration to the region, ceasing the recruitment of Kazakh males to force them to 
use as labor force at fronts, and giving the cultural-national autonomy to Alash Orda. 
The prominent leaders of Alash Orda were Alihan Bukeyhanov, Ahmad Baytursunov 
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and Mir Yakup Devlet. For instance, Ahmed Baytursunov, leader of the party, was a 
moderate nationalist and was against the Bolshevik regime. Moreover, Alash Orda 
and Kazakh intellectuals did not openly favor pan-Islamism or pan-Turkism, because 
they were opposed to Tatar cultural hegemony.
157
  It is well known that pan-Turkism 
was an ideology doctrine by Tatar intellectuals. There was a disagreement between 
Tatar and Kazakh echoless at that era. They were disagreed over some 
methodological issues regarding the context of autonomy. There were differences 
and distributions about their programs in the new era between Tatar leaders and 
Kazakh leaders. For example, in the all-Russian Muslim Congress
158
 which was 
sponsored by Tatar leaders in Moscow on May 1, 1917; the future political program 
was discussed and a common resolution was decided on.  “It was agreed that the 
form of government most capable of protecting the interests of the Muslim peoples 
was a democratic republic based on national, territorial and federal principles, with 
national-cultural autonomy for the nationalities which lacked a distinct territory”.159 
On the other hand, Kazakh leaders and Alash Orda Party sponsored another 
Congress, the all Kirghiz (Kazakh) Congress in Orenburg in April 1917, one month 
later after the all Muslim Russians Congress and firstly declared to support territorial 
autonomy.  
The Third all-Kirgiz (Kazakh) Congress, convened in Orenburg in December 1917, proclaimed an autonomous 
Kazakh region under the Alash Orda. This autonomous region had two centers, one at Semipalatinsk and the other at 
Dzhambeyty in the Ural oblast. The declared purpose of this autonomy was not apparently to create a Kazakh state, but merely 
to prevent the spread of Communism into the Kazakh steppe.
160
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The Kazakh Steppe hosted harsh skirmishes between Bolshevik and Ataman 
Dutov’s forces. Although Kazakhs firstly supported anti-Bolshevik forces at first and 
took a position against the Bolsheviks, the situation changed in November 1918, 
because the anti-Bolshevik government of Admiral Kolchak, established in Omsk, 
declared that it would not support territorial autonomy of Kazakhs anymore. After 
Kolchak rejected to assist Kazakhs, Alash Orda leaders planned to join Zeki Velidi 
Togan’s Bashkir State and to construct a union by cooperating Turkestan 
autonomists and Jadids. Bu it failed. After Kolchak began suppressing Kazakhs 
because of being antagonist towards the indigenous that would create a separation in 
Russia, Kazakhs got into cooperation with the Bolsheviks. 
161
    Finally, the 
Bolsheviks forces took all the control of the Steppe till March 1920 after Admiral 
Kolchak’s forces were defeated totally in May 1919 in Siberia. After that, Alash 
Orda government left its place to Kirghiz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.    
According to Sir Olaf Caroe,  
The Alash Orda or Kazakh State was never much more than a committee which held congresses and issued 
manifestos. Its capital was intended to be in the east at Semipalatinsk, but in fact its activities took place at Orenburg, where 
was also the seat of the Bashkurd government. Alash Orda was unable to organize any real executive power, or to obtain any 
working agreement with the many thousands of Russian colonists, who were determined not to yield control of Russian 
immigration or colonies to any Turkish authority.
162
  
The Steppe, of course, sensed more the influence of the Revolution and the 
Civil War rather than Turkestan. The penetration of revolutions was more sensible in 
the Steppe because there were 1, 5 million Russian and Ukrainian settlers and 40,000 
European war prisoners inside the borders of the Steppe. The principal participants in 
Russian revolutions and civil war were these Russians and Central European subjects 
rather than natives. However, Turkestan contained less Russian element, over 
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400,000 settlers. Therefore the effects of revolutions were felt less in Turkestan than 
the Steppe. The reasons were severe influence of Islamic culture, and limited 
intelligentsia who owned political comprehension to enforce a government like 
Alash Orda did. The Russian settlers of Turkestan, industrial and railway workers 
played main role in the era of Revolutions. 
163
 
 
3.2.2. Kokand Autonomous Government 
After the replacement of Turkestan Committee with Tashkent Soviet, the 
Muslims of Turkestan declared their territorial autonomy, and Kokand Government 
was founded. The leader of the Turkestan Autonomous Region was Mustapha 
Chokayev. Kokand Government was founded in 28
th
 November, just after the 
declaration of liberty was announced by Lenin and Stalin on 15
th
 November. 
However, the Government only lasted two months. 
164
 Indeed, Chokayev tried to find 
aid and support to resist the Bolsheviks, but he could not become successful. As 
Alash Orda had sought aid from the Whites in Siberia, Kokand attempted to ask help 
from Ataman Dutov and Orenburg Cossacks but could not take any result. Kokand 
embarked on uniting Alash Orda but it was an abortive effort. Also, Kokand tried to 
ask for aid from Bukharan Emir Alim Khan, but the Emir rejected because of the 
Jadids’ support to Kokand Government. Kokand could not find enough arms to 
defend the city. No one responded to this offer of arms purchase of Kokand. For 
instance, the Bukharan Emir rejected the Kokand’s demand of purchasing arms from 
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the emirate.
165
  Kokand was assaulted by the Red Army under the command of 
Ossipov
166
. The Kokand government could not overwhelm forty five Bolsheviks in 
Kokand citadel.
167
 The Red Army stormed the city and 5000 people were massacred. 
And, Mustapha Chokayev had to flee to Europe. 
168
 Autonomous Government of 
Turkistan was blamed for being a bourgeoisie nationalist and puppet of the 
Whites.
169
  According to Helen Carrere d’Encausse,  
The collapse of Kokand autonomy was inevitable, for it had neither sufficient political forces, nor troops, nor means. 
While it represented the heartfelt wishes of southern Central Asians, its effort could not find support, for it had no real ties with 
the general population. Still, this ephemeral government was far more important than its brief duration might indicate. It gave 
the first manifestation of open opposition to Soviet power in the name of local autonomy, and it gave birth to the Basmachi 
movement, which prolonged Central Asian protest against integration into the Soviet Union. 170  
 
The historical importance of Kokand was the attempt to grant self-
determination of Muslims in Central Asia under an autonomous Turkestan. It was the 
first attempt in Turkestan to gain the territorial autonomy by Central Asian Muslims. 
Also, it was crucial for its outcomes resulting emergence of Central Asian Muslims’ 
revolting movement, Basmachi revolt.  The Soviet official discourse about the 
destruction of Kokand was also informative and interesting. According to the Soviet 
view;  
Kokand Autonomy, a counter revolutionary bourgeois nationalist organization in Kokand which at an all Muslim 
Congress held in Kokand on the 26th November 1917 declared itself as the government and called upon the Turkestan Council 
of Peoples’ Commissars at Tashkent to hand over its power. Under the flag of Kokand the Turkestan tried to establish the older 
order. On the 20th February 1918, Red Army forces with the help of the poor people of Uzbekistan occupied the old city of 
Kokand and liquidated Kokand. The leaders of Kokand with a small force fled from the city and continued their struggle against 
Soviet power in the ranks of the Basmachi. 
171
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3.2.3. Bashkurd Autonomous Government 
After October Revolution, a National Bashkurd Government was established 
on 29 November 1917. Orenburg was the capital city of the autonomy. In addition, 
Alash Orda’s government center was same with Bashkurd’s, Orenburg.  In addition, 
a national army was formed under the defense ministry of Zeki Velidi Togan. He was 
generally known as Velidov. He also became the leader of the state after a while. His 
government was much more real and stronger than other Muslim autonomous 
governments in Russia. “The Bashkurd State was more of a reality. Its proclamation 
coincided almost exactly with the well-known Declaration of 15
th
 November 1917, 
signed by Lenin and (even so early) by Stalin also.”172 Togan also had personal 
contacts with both Lenin and Stalin. However, the revolutionary leaders of the Soviet 
did not want a strengthened autonomy in the middle of the country. In January 1918, 
the Red Army attacked Orenburg and denounced the governments and both 
Bashkurd government and Alash Orda government opted for cooperation with White 
forces under Kolchak and Russian Cossacks under Dutov.
173
  The Whites succeeded 
in recapturing Orenburg but they declared the non-recognition of any autonomous 
region or government inside Russia at time that they collected power and seemed 
likely to overcome the Bolsheviks.
174
 However, in 1919, Whites were exposed to 
great defeat. The Bolsheviks captured Orenburg again. And, both Bashkurd and 
Alash Orda governments had to negotiate and cooperate with Bolsheviks. Both 
Velidov, leader of Bashkurds and Ahmad Baytursunov, the leader of Alash Orda 
made some attempts to merge their governments in Orenburg but Bolsheviks did not 
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permit this and separated two governments by creating a Russian region in Orenburg. 
Lenin decided to cease these autonomous governments by taking Frunze’s warnings 
about Muslim autonomous regions into consideration.
175
 And, Velidov’s armed force 
was forced to join the Red Army and then Lenin decided to send it to Ukrainian front 
for the war against Denikin although Velidov insisted in sending it to Turkestan 
front.
176
 It was the only armed force of a Muslim government. Although other 
Central Asian Muslims were not recruited in the reign of Tsardom, the only 
exception was Bashkurds; Bashkurd soldiers served in the Tsar’s army. “In May 
1920 Moscow published a new decree to regulate the autonomy of Bashkiria. This 
withdrew most of the powers delegated a year before, subordinating all subjects of 
importance, political, financial and economic, to the Centre.” 177 The Soviet leaders 
did not want to share any authority inside all of Russia. The increasing threat of 
Basmachis in Turkistan, and the intervening policies of Britain and Afghanistan 
forced Moscow not to leave any problem producer inside the middle of the country. 
Zeki Velidi Togan made some mistakes in his political career influencing the stand 
of Bashkiria. For instance, his delivering Bashkurd troop to the Red army was a big 
mistake. And then, the Bashkurd leaders attempt to put a program aiming the 
compulsory expropriation of all Russian settlers in Bashkiria was another mistake 
since it frightened the Russian officials. Besides, Togan’s efforts to aid the Alash 
Orda state in Kazakhstan and attempt to establish joint government with them 
provoked Moscow to take immediate precautions against him and his Bashkurd 
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government.
178
 After Togan saw his project failing and Moscow’s preparation 
targeting himself, he left to Turkistan region over Baku to attend the national 
struggle of Basmachi forces. 
 
3.2.4. The Khivan Khanate 
The situation in the khanates was so different from the Steppe and Turkistan. 
There were not enough Russian settlers to bring Revolution to the region. There were 
only a few railway workers and that was all. On the other hand, these khanates were 
struggling with different troubles and turmoil rather than civil war and revolutions. 
For example, in Khiva, there was an uprising of nomadic Turcoman armed tribes 
against Uzbek sedentary ruling elite, The Qungrat dynasty of Khiva. Turcoman 
raiders led by Junaid Khan captured Khiva and installed his own authority over 
sedentary Uzbek population. There were also Khivan Jadids and their party, Young 
Khivans. Their role was almost same with Bukharan Jadids and Young Bukharans. 
Young Khivans, as the most moderate, modern and intellectual class of Khiva, called 
the Red army for aid against the terrorizing authority of Turcoman leader Junaid 
Khan. The Red Army, in January 1920, captured Khiva and forced Junaid Khan to 
withdraw to the Karakum Desert. Immediately after deposal of the last Khan Said 
Abdullah Khan, Khwarazm Soviet People’s Republic was declared thus Young 
Khivans Party came to power with the aid of the Red Army. 
179
 Young Khivans had 
to struggle much more against Junaid Khan, the leader of uprising Turcoman tribes 
rather than Khan of Khiva. Muhammad Qurban Junaid Khan operated in the khanate 
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against Uzbek aristocracy and he was also against the Jadids (Young Khivans) 
because he was a feudal tribal chieftain. Junaid Khan also saw the Soviets in the 
region as an infidel enemy and operated against them too. In Khiva, the conditions 
were so much similar to Bukhara. There was no capitalist bourgeoisie inside the 
country, instead feudal aristocracy and uprising ethnic- tribal elements as main 
operating classes. The Young Khivans as the representatives of bourgeoisie 
nationalists were struggling against these counter revolutionary elements. There was 
also Khwarazm Communist Party (KCP) looking like Bukharan Communist Party in 
Khiva presided by Juma Niyaz Sultan Murad. Both Young Khivans and 
Khwarazmian Communists were fractions of early Khivan Jadids. As it occurred in 
Bukhara, the Bolsheviks chose to cooperate with Young Khivans since they saw 
them more convenient transistors in the feudal society for the transition period. 
 
3.3. February Revolution Era 
There were many operating forces in Russia-wide against the Soviets. When 
Russia withdrew the Great War in 1917, Russia was drifting into the Civil war that 
lasted until 1922. The Bolshevik forces and the Red army gave large extended 
struggle against both internal dissidents and foreign powers in Russia-wide. They 
were warring with internal enemies consisting of representatives of the old regime 
such as forces of General Denikin, General Kornilov, and General Wrangel at the 
south of Russia, General Yudenitch at the northwest of Russia and with the White 
forces of Admiral Kolchak in Siberia and Russian Cossack forces of General Ataman 
Dutov in Orenburg, strategically important location for transition to Central Asia. In 
addition, there were foreign powers’ military deployments inside Russia such as 
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British, French and American troops in Arkangelsk (these troops stayed until 1919) 
and 72.000 Japanese troops in Vladivostok (Japanese troops stayed until 1922).
180
 
All of these Allied forces deployed in Russian lands aimed to collapse the Bolshevik 
regime and install a pro-war regime to get help again against the Central Powers.  
There were also other socialist groups such as Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks 
warring against the Bolsheviks. And,  there were  Czech legions numbered 45.000
181
 
and constituted a threat for the Soviet forces(these troops were captured during the 
war with Austria and organized again to war for Russia, but after the Russia’s 
withdrawal from the war, they  remained idle in the middle of the Russian lands.).  In 
the years of late 1917 and early 1918, the released prisoners of war from Germany 
and Turkey, who spread inside Russia, were causing problems for Russia. In addition 
Britain constituted a threat for Russia in case of its interventionist policies, targeted 
Russia. On the other side Turkistan was under the containment of the armies of 
Whites and Cossacks under the command of Denikin and Wrangel at the north of the 
Black Sea and under command of Admiral Kolchak in Siberia, therefore the 
Bolsheviks had difficulty installing Soviet power in Central Asia. 
182
 
The Governorate -General of Turkestan, residing in Tashkent, was replaced 
with a civilian Turkestan Committee. The Committee included five Russians and 
four natives, so the representation of the natives was encouraged with the February 
Revolution. The last military governor general of Turkistan, Kuropatkin was arrested 
by Tashkent Soviet.
183
 And he was replaced by Schepkin, a former Kadets deputy. 
184
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The diplomatic relations with Bukhara were not interrupted in the reign of 
Provisional Government. As it had been in the reign of Tsardom, both Tashkent and 
the foreign ministry were responsible with the relations with Bukhara. The only 
change was the name of the Imperial Political Agency in Bukhara with the Russian 
Residency. 
185
 After the new regime was installed, the Jadids did not lose any time to 
apply to the Provisional Government and Petrograd Soviet to persuade them to press 
on the Emir for reforms. Emir Alim also did not remain behind the Jadids, and he 
immediately presented his congratulations, loyalty and friendship to the new 
government in Petrograd and its representatives in Tashkent, the Turkistan 
Committee, and in Bukhara, the Russian Residency.
186
 The Provisional Government 
in Petrograd took account of the reform demands of the Jadids and warned the Emir 
about the new order that would never let peoples of Bukhara be deprived of rights. 187 
The manifestation of reforms of the Jadids were formed of  some demands such as establishments of a budget and a 
regular fiscal system, control over the local governors, control over the Emir’s civil list establishment of an autonomous 
administration of the capital and perhaps of other towns in the khanate improvement of education, especially in the madrasas 
and finally, with respect to the Russian institutions, an expansion of the postal and telegraphic network, the road network, and 
cultural institutions.
188
  
Emir Alim Khan was informed about the reform manifestation and was 
dictated to implement them as soon as possible by the Provisional Government. 
“Yielding to the pressure from Russia, Alim on March 18 promised Miller that he 
would begin the reforms by declaring an amnesty, lightening criminal punishments, 
establishing a printing press and permitting the publications of newspapers.” 189 
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When the mullahs learned the news about reform declaration of the Emir, the tension 
accelerated in the city of Bukhara. Their worries also rose when Alim Khan replaced 
his high bureaucrats with the ones close to the Jadids.
190
 But, Emir Alim was aware 
that he had to satisfy the new regime somehow to maintain his rule. Emir’s approval 
of a few reforms did not only rescue the independence of the emirate, but also 
juridical and political foundations, the essential components of its social structures, 
and the regime itself. On the other hand, he did not avoid applying for the path of 
coercion and rejecting the reforms when he was aware that the power of Provisional 
Government was in decline. 
191
 Indeed, Emir Alim was not a person antagonizing the 
reformism and renewal. He was educated in Russian schools and his library was full 
of Russian books. He was known with his modern personality. But, he had some 
responsibilities such as maintain his rule and satisfying the internal groups. He was a 
ruler of traditional, religious and patriarchal country.  He also knew how to play the 
game in realpolitik. He inherited from his predecessors how to act for balance of 
power.  He knew about shifting from the collapsing power to the strengthening one 
in the crisis times. However, he was not very aware of ideological developments. 
When he encountered the increasing Bolshevik power  in the region, he thought that 
he could stand by agreeing with them just he had done with Tsarist Russia and then 
with the Provisional Government. His basic philosophy was to agree with whoever 
came to power. He also remained away and objective against the developments in 
Turkistan, for instance the event of Kokand government’s collapse by the Red army. 
However, at that time, he was not aware that he did not have any chance against the 
increasing Soviet power. 
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During the era of Provisional Government, it was not very possible for 
enforcement and implementation of reforms in Bukhara, because both the 
Provisional government and Turkestan Committee were not strong and forceful 
enough for solving that question. Firstly, Russia was inside the war and dealt with 
the fronts. There was not military force to enforce the Emir and operate in the region 
for the acceptance of the demands. In addition, the position of the public opinion was 
another preventive factor. The reforms did not have advocates among the native 
population in the patriarchal Bukharan society. For that reason, the implementation 
of reforms required deployment of Russian troops in Bukharan lands, however it was 
not very possible at that time when Russian armies were in battles on German and 
Austrian fronts. Even, a probable intervention of Russian forces in Muslim areas of 
Central Asia might cause Afghan intervention.
192
 According to S. Becker, “the use of 
Russian troops might provoke a general uprising throughout the Moslem areas of 
Russia and raise the threat of Afghan intervention in Russian Central Asia”.193 In 
addition, the Provisional Government centered in Petrograd was not sufficient to 
analyze the situation of Bukhara and evaluate the developments properly. “The 
Provisional Government installed on the ruins of the monarchy was very divided and 
uncertain about what solutions might settle the national problem”.194 In Turkestan 
and the khanates, the Provisional Government was far from responding to the reform 
demands of the indigenous population. For example, a group of exiled Jadids in 
Samarkand came to express their national ideal to Alexander Kerensky, the prime 
minister of the Provisional Government. Kerensky’s reply to the Jadids was: “I know 
Turkistan and its population well. I believe in your loyalty and reject the rumors 
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about disturbances supposedly being prepared among you against Russia. But I warn 
you that if such an eventuality were to occur, I should take the most far-reaching 
measures of coercion.”195 Because the government had some many difficulties and 
problems that it had to deal with under the conditions of the war, they could not 
focus on Turkistan and Bukhara. So, the problems and conflicts in the Turkistan 
region and Bukhara were not prioritized by Kerensky and his friends. Kerensky 
expected indisputable loyalty and dependence from these protectorates of the old 
regime in his government’s era without focusing on the reasons of questions 
increasing instability in the region. 
 
3.4.  October Revolution Era 
In the years of late 1917 and early 1918, the released prisoners of war from 
Germany and Turkey, who spread inside Russia, were causing problems for Russia. 
In addition Britain constituted a threat for Russia in case of its interventionist 
policies, targeted Russia. On the other side Turkistan was under the containment of 
the armies of Whites and Cossacks under the command of Denikin and Wrangel at 
the north of the Black Sea and under command of Admiral Kolchak in Siberia, 
therefore the Bolsheviks had difficulty installing Soviet power in Central Asia.
196
 
The British support to the counter revolutionary movements in the Soviet controlled 
Central Asia during 1918 and 1919 was the main threat for the Bolsheviks. The 
reason behind the British interventionist policy in the region was Britain’s fear about 
Turkey and Central Powers’ operating in the Middle East and India after the collapse 
of Tsarist Russia and birth of power vacuum that enabled the penetration of the 
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Central Powers to spread. In order to take precautions for this penetration, prominent 
British generals in the region, General L.C. Dusterville
197
 and General W. 
Malleson
198
 operated throughout Baku and Transcaspian regions. 
199
 Britain’s main 
purpose behind the intervention in Russian was preventing the possible advance of 
Turks and Germans in Central Asia. For that reason, Britain backed the anti-Soviet 
government established in Ashkhabad thus aiming to organize a deterrent force 
before German and Turkish expansion towards Persia and India. On the other hand, 
Ashkhabad was more focused on operating against Soviet Turkestan while Britain 
dealt with the penetration on Transcaucasia and the Caspian Sea in order to put a 
barrier before the Central Powers. 
200
 Great Britain was active to back the anti-
Bolshevik forces any time against the Bolsheviks in Central Asia. Especially, 
Britain’s interventionist policies and activities gained speed between 1918 and 1919. 
They cut the links of Turkmen lands from Moscow. They organized a Turkmen 
government in Transcaspia in Ashkhabad. In Transcaspia, a government established 
in Ashkhabad by Mensheviks and Social Revolutionists (SRs) was being backed by 
the British in Persia (Meshed) in 1918. But, the puppet government, backed by 
English forces, could not capture Tashkent. Turkistan campaign of Britain backed 
anti-Bolshevik forces failed and Britain could not maintain its support to Mensheviks 
and SRs in Turkmen country because of the conditions of just after the Great War. 
201
 
In February 1919, the Red Army attacked Turkmen troops and no popular uprising 
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supported Transcaspia forces. British army under Gen. Malleson withdrew instead of 
resisting the Red forces. 
202
 
The Jadids were divided into two fractions after the October Revolution and 
the consolidation of the Soviet power in the region. For instance, the former Jadids, 
which were converted to communism, were members of the Bukharan Communist 
Party. For example, Sadriddin Aini and Abd al Vahid Burkhanov, famous former 
Jadids, directed the party newspaper. The Young Bukharans, led by Fayzallah 
Khodzhaev, radical Jadid, tried every way to seem friendly to the Bolsheviks.
203
 The 
BCP and Young Bukharans were hostile to each other. Especially, the BCP was 
disturbed about the Russian support to Young Bukharans. But, the Bolsheviks were 
in cooperation with Young Bukharans since it was beneficial and helpful for Russian 
interests in the short run. Young Bukharans’ liberal nationalist and progressive vision 
and their struggle against the despotic monarchy and feudal groups made them more 
acceptable and cooperative rather than the BCP. In addition, Young Bukharans were 
more acceptable to Bukharan population. Their experiences and skills, they had 
obtained for a long term, were more useful for Russia to cooperate.
204
 Young 
Bukharans were more suitable to respond to the needs of the patriarchal and clerical 
society because of their pro national and cultural sides. They gave the image of 
bourgeoisie nationalists and liberals rather than direct communists, and this image 
was important for the society that had been used to traditional, religious and 
patriarchal institutions for centuries. 
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After the October Revolution and consolidation of Soviet power, the feudal 
aristocratic rulers in Transoxiana began getting hurried due to the declarations and 
statements of Soviet rulers in Moscow regarding the region. Lenin was against the 
colonial status of Bukhara and Khiva; and he insisted on freeing all the nations. In 
his speech at the Seventh Party Conference, he said “We are for a fraternal union of 
all peoples…We certainly do not want the peasant in Khiva to live under the khan of 
Khiva. By developing out revolution we shall influence the oppressed masses.”205 
Lenin’s policy in brief was deposal of Emir Alim and Khan Isfendiyar. The 
statements of the Soviet leaders in terms of the rights and freedoms of workers and 
peasants, establishments of republics, federation with Soviet Russia caused the rulers 
of Bukhara and Khiva to take a stand against the October Revolution. Soviet regime 
was relatively different from the benign suzerain Romanov dynasty and the weak 
regime of Provisional Government. Soviet regime seriously posed a threat for Alim 
and Isfendiyar. 
206
 When the Jadids could not take enough support from the weak 
regime of the Provisional Government and its branch in Central Asia, Turkestan 
Committee; they turned to the Bolsheviks. However the Emir was extremely 
disturbed about the Bolsheviks’ discourse about freedoms and destruction of feudal 
aristocratic institutions. The Emir saw the Soviets as a great threat as he had not seen 
the Tsardom and Provisional Government, because the Emirate’s relations with 
Tsarist Russia as a protectorate had been compatible and it also took a large breath in 
the era of the Provisional Government owing to the Civil War and chaos throughout 
Russia. However, everything went bad because of the increase of the Bolsheviks day 
by day. In the freedom atmosphere of February Revolution, the Jadids considered 
that they would achieve the national reconquest by the help of the new regime but 
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when they saw the failure of the Provisional Government, they shifted to the side of 
the Bolsheviks.
207
 Although Jadids favored cultural and national full independence 
for their country, they did not have any choice rather than cooperate with an outside 
power to reduce the Emir to submission. At the last stage, they had to escape from 
Bukhara because of the Emir and mullahs’ extreme suppression. They began their 
propagandas in Samarkand and Tashkent in order to take support of and persuade the 
Bolsheviks. Fayzallah Khodzaev proposed Tashkent Soviet to provoke an armed 
uprising in Bukhara, however Tashkent did not respond to that offer at once, because 
the Red Army was dealing with Dutov in the Steppe and Kokand in Turkestan. 
Khodzhaev tried to pull attention to military preparations of Alim Khan and offered 
to prevent him. Alim Khan’s military preparations, establishing alliances with 
Afghanistan and attempting to take support of British India was a threat for the future 
of the Jadids. Young Bukharans were very worried about strengthening of the Emir 
and they were certainly insistent on reforms but their reforms demand was limited 
insider the border of the Emirate. They did not dream of a reform throughout 
Turkistan.
208
 For example, even though they applauded Kokand government at first, 
they could not say opposite to the invading forces of the Red army then. In fact, they 
were dependent and needy on the Bolsheviks; therefore they were considering 
themselves firstly. Moreover, they did want the joint intervention in Bukhara but 
they were against the total collapse of the Emir’s power. Although Kolesov209 
planned to replace the Emir’s sovereignty with the revolutionary committee, the 
Young Bukharans insisted on a constitutional monarchy because of the public’s 
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situation. The public in Bukhara were not ready yet to accept the institution of a new 
regime. In addition, the Emir was the key actor of backing for the uprisings and 
reforms. Kolesov was decisive to install the revolutionary committee by eliminating 
the Emir if the ultimatum was not accepted.
210
 “Kolesov himself had told him that 
the emir knows better than we do that it is not possible for him to live in peace and 
good relations with us. One day or another it will be necessary to speak and the 
languages of the debate will be that of cannon and machine guns”.211 On the other 
side, the Young Bukharans saw the intervention as a solution to restrain the authority 
and sovereignty of the Emir thus they believed in implementing the reforms. “By 
calling upon the Bolsheviks to act, they believed they could save the Emir from an 
irreversible choice that would condemn Bukhara to outright reaction, to the 
ossification from which they were striving to extract it, or to outright annexation”.212  
Alim Khan got in contact with General Malleson in January 1919 to approach 
Britain.
213
 Major General Sir Wilfred Malleson had led the Mission Malleson aiming 
to cut the German-Turkish influence into Afghanistan and India during the great 
World. In addition, he was famous for his backing the Transcaspia Government 
against the Bolsheviks in the region. Malleson sent a small quantity of arms after 
getting approval from the British existence in India. Malleson also warned the Emir 
not to provoke Tashkent Soviet and pursue a policy of neutrality. 
214
 Emir Alim also 
urged the Afghan king to found alliance against the approaching Soviet power. After 
Afghanistan went out of the third Anglo-Afghan War (March to July 1919) by 
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victory and obtaining its independence, Amanullah Khan began to give importance 
to the Emirate of Bukhara because of its position as a buffer state between 
Afghanistan and Soviet Turkestan. Bukhara’s membership to a league of Central 
Asian Moslem States under the leadership of Amanullah Khan was also another 
factor behind his interest to Bukhara.
215
 Amanullah had some dreams about being a 
prominent leader of Muslim nations under the British colonial rule. Since he ended 
the British imperialism upon his country after a victory, he saw himself as the 
protector of Muslim nations suppressed under the British rule.
216
 On the other side, 
the reports about Afghan military experts in Bukharan army for a possible war 
against Russia were sent to Tashkent. So, Frunze informed Lenin about increasing 
threat about a possible attack of Bukhara and Afghanistan upon Soviet Turkistan.
217
 
Frunze gave the order of an attack on Bukhara on September 1, 1920. The Young 
Bukharans led by Fayzallah Khodzhaev still attempted to persuade the Red Army for 
another solution instead of direct military intervention and kicking the Emir out. 
They openly avoided a great extended uprising of the population. But, Frunze was 
decisive to start the operation. On 2 September, the Red army forces invaded 
Bukhara. Jadids also attended the Red army units and entered Bukhara together.
218
 
General Frunze informed Lenin with a report that: “The fortress of old Bukhara was 
taken today following a powerful attack by Red and Bukharan units. Tyranny and 
coercion have been vanquished; the red flag of revolution is floating over the 
Rigistan.” 219 Also, Izvestiya rote the historical event; “The revolution in Bukhara 
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has triumphed. The two capitals, centers at once strategic and commercial, are in the 
hands of Bukharan red troops and Muslim regiments of the Red Army. Because of 
Bukhara’s religious character, this revolution will have a considerable importance for 
the whole of Central Asia”.220 On 31 August 1920, Emir Alim Khan firstly fled to 
Dushanbe in eastern Bukhara, present day Tajikistan and then had to leave for 
Afghanistan that he did never return to his country again; and then settled in Kabul. 
After that time, he directed his opposition movement upon Bukhara in this country. 
On October 8, the new regime was declared with the new name of the state, the 
Bukharan Peoples’ Republic. 
 
3.5.  The Right of Self Determination and Struggle of Classes in Turkistan  
3.5.1. The Right of Self Determination 
Self-determination right was the most discussed matter for the Central Asian 
Muslims after the October Revolution in Russia. Lenin had demonstrated his support 
to national self-determination before April 1917. For example, in the resolution of 
the 7
th
 All Russia Conference of the Bolsheviks Party, it was emphasized that “the 
right of all the nations forming part of Russia freely to secede and form independent 
states must be recognized. To deny them this right, or to fail to take measures 
guaranteeing its practical realization, is equivalent to supporting a policy of seizure 
or annexation. Only the recognition by the proletariat of the right of nations to secede 
can ensure complete solidarity among the workers of the various nations and help to 
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bring the nations closer together on truly democratic lines”.221 In addition, equality 
and sovereignty of the nations of Russia and the right of the nations of Russia to free 
self-determination were basic principles, released in the declaration of the Council of 
Peoples Commissars.
222
 The declaration was also released in Pravda with address of 
“All toiling Muhammadans in Russia and in the East”. It wrote that  
Muhammadans of Russia, Tatars of Volga and the Crimea, Kirghiz and Sarts of Turkistan, Turks and Tatars of 
Transcaucasia, all those whose mosques and prayer houses were destroyed and whose religion and customs were trampled upon 
by the Russian Tsars and tyrants! Henceforth your faith and customs, your national and cultural institutions, are proclaimed free 
and inviolable. Build up your national life freely and unhindered. That is your right. 
223
 
The October Revolution was supported by peoples in Muslim land because of 
Lenin’s promises regarding equality and self-determination before 1917. However, 
the expectancies concluded with disappointment. The reason of disappointment in 
transformation from Tsarist rule to the Soviets was firstly inheritance of the huge 
empire taken by the Communists, and that inheritance contained and secured its vital 
and ongoing strategic priorities. Firstly, the natural sources of Turkestan and Steppe 
were vital for Russian economy. Secondly, both Central Asia and Transcaucasia was 
open to British attacks under the conditions of the Great War and Russia’s weakness 
depending on bad effects of war and civil war inside the country.  Thirdly, Central 
Asia housed two million Russians as settlers. Therefore, it was so difficult for the 
Bolsheviks to let Muslim lands use their self-determination rights.
224
 If the self-
determination was permitted for Muslim Central Asian elements to secede, the winds 
of nationalization would strengthen and load the independence of Muslim regions of 
Central Asia and Russia.
225
 One of the main factors that got Lenin to give up 
cooperating with Muslims was also increasing armed opposition of Basmachis. 
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Frunze also warned Moscow that concession given to Muslims encouraged Basmachi 
revolt in Turkestan.  Frunze repeated his warnings many times to Lenin: “The 
Muslims are on achieving full power …Their wish is to obtain the most total 
independence possible.”226 The oppressed native people, at that time, expected the 
October Revolution and Bolsheviks to keep their promises. 
227
 However, the newly 
establishing order of the Soviets in the region had to pursue realpolitik to consolidate 
his power. The British threat was targeting the chaotic regions of Turkistan. 
Afghanistan as the neighboring state to Bukhara was also posing a threat for Soviet 
Russia. Therefore the implementation of ideological discourse into the realpolitik 
was not compulsory for the Soviet ruling elite. “The goal of a socialist society would 
be furthered by the closest international unity of the working class, not by its division 
into artificial national units. In fact, as Lenin himself admitted, what he advocated 
was merely the recognition of the right of self-determination, not the exercise of that 
right”.228  
 
3.5.2.   The Struggle of Classes 
In terms of Central Asian Muslims and Bukharans, there was not a real case 
such as proletariat brotherhood of all nations living in Russia. Central Asian Muslims 
did not see the right of self-determination as a consolidating right for the Russia’s 
unity. They immediately saw it as the right for seceding. In their perspective, the case 
was the struggle between the colonist and the native not the struggle between the 
proletariat and capitalist bourgeoisie. Indeed, the struggle concept between capitalist 
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bourgeoisie and proletariat was valid for Russians and Ukrainians because these 
nations were skilled labor force such as industrial workers or railway men 
everywhere in Russia. However, the indigenous people of Central Asia and Turkistan 
were either peasants or poor nomads in majority. And, the only increasing class was, 
for instance, the Russian educated secular intelligentsia in Steppe and Turkistan, and 
the Jadids or Young Bukharans and Young Khivans in Bukhara and Khiva. Of 
course, these small elite carried the characteristics of bourgeoisie nationalist instead 
of socialist and proletariat revolutionist character. According to Safarov,  
It was inevitable that the Russian revolution in Turkestan should have been colonist. The Turkestani working class 
was numerically small and had no leader, program, party or revolutionary tradition. It thus could not rise up against colonial 
exploitation. Under Tsarist colonialism, it was a privilege of the Russians to belong to the industrial proletariat. Because of this, 
the dictatorship of the proletariat here took on a typically colonialist character. 
229
 
According to Caroe, there was not a conception of class struggle regarding 
the conflict between the Bolsheviks and Central Asians. The question got a shape of 
a struggle between natives and colonists rather than revolutionary concept or class 
struggle case.
230
 The main struggle of those bourgeoisie nationalists was firstly 
against the feudal aristocracy and clerical classes in Bukhara and Khiva.  The 
situation in Khiva for Khivan Jadids, mostly known as Young Khivans, was a bit 
different because of their necessity to struggle against tribal powers such as Junaid 
Khan, leader of Turcoman tribes’ resistance. But, the situation in Bukhara was 
certainly against the authoritarian rule of feudal aristocracy. In order to destroy this 
class, Young Bukharans needed to find a more powerful partner. This partner had to 
be an outside power like the Bolsheviks. The basic reason that made young 
Bukharans and the Bolsheviks approach and cooperates with each other was the 
similarity of their enemies. For example, the feudal aristocracy of Bukhara, the 
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enemy of Young Bukharan Jadids was the long term partner of the capitalist 
bourgeoisie of Russian Empire, the enemy of the Bolshevik revolutionists of Russia. 
This common point enforced the two groups into cooperation. The Bolshevik forces 
struggling against the Capitalist bourgeoisie represented by the White forces during 
the civil war, could never accept the obedience of offer of Bukharan feudal 
aristocracy just as they did in the era of Tsardom and Kerensky’s government’s 
period. Lenin’s hard and decisive attitude was derived from this theoretical 
framework. According to Seymour Becker, 
The initial triumph and consolidation of Soviet power in Turkestan during the winter of 1917-1918 was accompanied 
by the establishment in Bukhara and Khiva of regimes openly hostile to the Bolsheviks and enjoying a degree of independence 
not known in either khanate since the 1860’s. The right of self-determination, even to the point of breaking long established ties 
to Russia, was exercised by governments that in Leninist terms represented not the proletariat nor the poor peasantry, nor even 
the bourgeoisie, but the feudal aristocracy. Such a development was clearly the product not of Bolshevik design but of Russian 
weakness. The future of the khanates was inevitably bound up in the larger question of the future of Soviet power in Central 
Asia.
231
  
In addition, it was impossible for Jadids to cooperate with Bolsheviks forever, 
because their programs and plans were certainly different from the Bolsheviks. The 
Jadids favored a regime of constitutional monarchy as the model of the Young Turks 
of Turkey, thus they hoped to maintain social justice and make Bukhara a leading 
model for the Muslims of Central Asia. Indeed, the Jadids did never see the case as a 
matter of class struggle or victory of the proletariat. Their cooperation with the 
Bolsheviks was not a deliberate preference, but the conditions such as the failure of 
Provisional Government’s rule enforced. 232 Their cultural- national libertarian stands 
forbade the possible clash in the short run between the two partners. For example, the 
Soviets did not create a socialist government in Bukhara and also in Khiva like it was 
in Turkistan and the Steppe (Kirghizstan-Kazakhstan). According to the Soviet view, 
the traditional and feudal character of Bukhara was preventive for the creation of 
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socialist republics in Bukhara, so the creation of People’s Republic was promoted. 
The creations of People’s Soviet Republics at the first stage instead of socialist 
republics were aimed to destroy feudal remnants and substitute bourgeois 
governments.
233
 Because the era of People's Republic was planned by the Bolsheviks 
as the transition period and the Young Bukharans as the transistor in that era, the 
Bukharan Communists, for example, was not applied much and expelled from the 
ruling government. It was obvious that the Soviets needed Young Bukharans, which 
were more acceptable to the traditions and customs of the population, in order to 
prepare the convenient atmosphere at the first stage on the way of transformation to 
the socialist republic. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
BASMACHI MOVEMENT AND REORGANIZATION OF CENTRAL ASIA 
 
 
In this chapter, I try to focus on the reasons, increase and results of the 
Basmachi movement which influenced the region and Central Asian peoples’ 
national consciousness and their identities as a national resistance movement. The 
most affected state from the Basmachi movement was the newly established 
Bukharan People’s Republic and its new regime because the movement targeted the 
new regime of Bukhara openly. The (given) support of Young Bukharan leaders to 
that movement after a while got this revolt to gain the importance of being a 
multinational anti-Bolshevik resistance including a large extended coalition of 
Central Asians. In addition, the feature of a multinational anti-Bolshevik resistance 
character of Basmachi movement was based on covering all Central Asian rebels not 
specific on single ethnic identity. Bukharan Uzbeks, Tajiks; and Khivan Turcomans, 
also Afghans and even West Turkish officials participated inside this revolt. The 
other importance of the movement was about its advantages and disadvantages for 
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the Soviet Russia. The Basmachi resistance caused Soviet Russia to get involved in 
the civil war until 1934 in some regions of Central Asia. But, while maintaining that 
war, the Soviet units got to take control of each part of the region and this benefited 
Russia for integrating with the region into the USSR. On the other side, the 
participation of Turkish officials, having departed from Ottoman Land just after 
Ottoman’s withdrawal from the Great War in 1918, was another case inside the 
matter of the Basmachi movement. This case created a strong epic especially for 
Western Turks though it did not create a same impact for Central Asians. I tried to 
point out the reasons that had caused the break-out of the revolt, its results and its 
influence upon the Central Asian communities and the Soviets’ approach to the 
region during and after the revolt which, in one sense, made an impact upon the 
shaping of national identities of Central Asian Muslims. In addition, I touch upon the 
reorganization of Central Asia from new national republics in accordance with the 
Soviets’ Nationalities Policy and how the Soviets enforced Sovietization policy upon 
Central Asia. I point out the methods implemented by the Soviets over Central 
Asians such as separating peoples and creating new nations according to linguistic 
differences. I also touch upon which methods were used to erase the conception of 
unified Central Asia and the notion of Turkestan. In addition, I focus on which socio-
economic factors lie behind the purge of nationalist leaders and cadres from Uzbek 
SSR government.  
 
4.1. Basmachi Movement in Central Asia    
British interests were under the threat because of the expansion of the Turkish 
armies towards the Caucasus and the capture of Baku by Turkish General Nuri 
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Pasha, half-brother of Enver Pasha. Also, German officers were operating in Kabul 
for offering cooperation to the Afghan Emir Habibullah against British existence in 
India. On the other side, thousands of Austrian and Hungarian prisoners released 
after the collapse of Tsarist regime, were all around Turkistan. So, these 
developments alarmed Britain’s anxiety to secure its interests in India.234 While 
Turkish-German influence began to spread from the Caucasus towards Turkistan and 
Afghanistan over the corridor of North Persia, Britain began taking a series of 
precautions such as sending General Dunsterville to Baku and General Malleson to 
North Persia.
235
 The mission of Malleson was to support a group of Mensheviks and 
aided them for establishing government in Ashkhabad against the Bolsheviks. British 
alliance with the Mensheviks was based on Mensheviks’ policy of continuation of 
war against the Central Powers while the Bolsheviks decided to withdraw from war. 
236
 “The British action was never intended to do more than achieve the limited object 
of preventing the use of Turkistan with its communications as a springboard for 
attack on India, but in carrying this out it inevitably made more difficult the 
execution of Soviet general policy in the same quarter.” 237  
The Basmachi movement emerged in Fergana Valley in which numerous 
peasant rebels occurred without any political reaction.
238
 After the Kokand 
government was destroyed by the Soviets, the insurrections took a political shape, 
because the leaders of the failed Kokand government participated in the Basmachi 
uprising to struggle against the Red Army.
239
  There were several groups, adding the 
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formation of a strengthened Basmachi force. One of the first attenders, who were the 
liberal leaders of Kokand collapsed government, was Mustafa Chokai. He had been 
the leader of Kokand government and became the advocate to Basmachi uprisings. 
After he fled to Europe from the Red Army, he continued his struggle against the 
Soviets in Europe. The second group, giving their support to Basmachis, was the 
socialist leaders, for example Zeki Velidi Togan was one of the best representatives 
of that group. Togan had aims of uniting Socialists and non-socialists under one 
single union called as the National Union of Turkistan. As the third group, the 
conservative class of Bukhara, depended on Emir Alim Khan, also attended 
Basmachi revolts.
240
  Especially Emir Alim sent his loyal commanders to the Soviet 
controlled regions to conduct the war against the Red Army. When the Soviet troops 
invaded ancient city, Bukhara, the city was exposed to huge destruction by the Red 
Army. The madrasas were destroyed and the valuable manuscripts in libraries were 
set fire.
241
  Thus, the Soviets destroyed the remnants of the ancient culture. Emir 
Alim fled to eastern Bukhara and founded his headquarters in Dushanbe. Here, he 
organized the Basmachi groups, depended on him, and directed the war remotely 
until March 1921; after that time he passed to Afghanistan.
242
 The Emir’s leave for 
Afghanistan changed the progress of the Basmachi struggle, because the struggle 
firstly seemed like a movement led by the Emir, so this prevented the attendance and 
support of liberal elite. After Alim Khan left for Afghanistan (from eastern Bukhara), 
the movement began attracting Jadid support.
243
 “The rebellion was becoming a 
refuge for all who had been victims of Soviet repression. Moreover, the rebels took 
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care to clarify their attitude towards the national government of Bukhara: ‘We are 
struggling against the Russians and not against the national government. If the 
Russians leave, we are ready to rally to the national government.” 244 The Basmachi 
movement began spreading fast throughout Turkestan after Bukhara and Khiva’s 
regimes had been replaced. For example, Junaid Khan, started a struggle against the 
Bolshevik forces in Transcaspia by directing his troops in the Karakum Desert, 
collaborated and supported the Basmachi movement thus the uprisings reached from 
Fergana to Transcaspia. 
245
 Junaid Khan was important for the spread of the revolt to 
southwest parts of Turkistan.  He gave a long struggle to the Soviets after his 
withdrawal to the desert of Karakum. The Basmachi revolt was an increasing 
problem for the Soviets in different parts of Central Asia. The density of the revolt 
drew a line from Fergana to eastern Bukhara and from eastern Bukhara to the deserts 
of Transcaspia. The mountainous and desert places were more convenient for 
conducting the resistance for the rebels. The Red army units had difficulty 
suppressing these local rebels in these areas. Shir Muhammad Beg was operating in 
Fergana, Devletmen Beg was in Baljuvan, Ishan Sultan was in Darvaz, Junaid Khan 
was in Khiva and Ibrahim Beg Lakai was in eastern Bukhara.
246
  
The economic and social reasons in terms of birth of Basmachis were also 
quite important. Although the collapse of Kokand government by the Red Army’s 
intervention seemed the common reason for the outbreak of the revolt, the 
fundamental reasons, preparing the infrastructure of the uprisings, were the 
developments inside the period of civil war and revolutionary era. Cotton production 
                                                          
244
 Ibid, 178. 
245
 Allworth, Edward et al., Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule, ed. Edward Allworth,(New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 250. 
246
 Hayit, Baymirza, Basmacilar: Turkistan Milli Mucadele Tarihi (1917-1934), (Turkiye Diyanet 
Vakfi Yayinlari,1997), 201. 
 94 
 
increased in southern Central Asia alongside the river bands and the region’s 
agriculture specialized in cotton production while importing grain from the north. 
This caused starvation during the civil war years when the railway transportation was 
cut under the conditions of war due to increase of grain prices and decrease of local 
production. That situation caused the emergence of rebels in the region. In Soviet 
terminology, these rebels were called as Basmachis meaning “bandits”.247 “They 
were the sharp edge of a rural revolt against the cities although they increasingly 
took on an anti-Soviet political and religious overlay and later, during the unveiling 
campaign, served to enforce adherence to non-Soviet ideals.” 248 These armed 
people, reacting to famine and bad economic conditions in the region at first, 
attached to anti-Soviet character in the following years. While Soviet called them 
Basmachis, they named themselves “qorbashi”, meaning police force in Bukharan 
Emirate and Turkistan.
249
  
The Basmachi movement gained a multi-dimensional character by consisting 
of the liberal elites of Kokand, the socialist leaders of Bashkiria, the tribal chieftains 
of Khivan Turcomans, the monarch of Bukhara, the peasants and the Central Asian 
middle class. The attendance of feudal aristocrats like Junaid Khan of Khivan 
Turcoman tribes and Alim Khan to the Basmachis with their full support 
strengthened the movement and enabled to spread in Turkistan-wide. However, the 
attendance of every anti-Bolshevik operating element to Basmachis prevented the 
movement from gaining an ideological character, rather than, it developed as a multi-
dimensional anti-Bolshevik resistance. The general feature of the resistance was 
being consisted of separate groups without a unity. Even, there was rivalry among 
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these separate groups. This was causing problems and preventing the movement 
from gaining a success. 
The formation of Basmachi forces by a variety of groups was the most 
important reason for its weakness in its struggle, because lack of a single command 
and authority over different, independent and idle groups caused the revolt to fail 
against the Red Army units. In addition, the lack of outside support and aid for the 
revolt prevented its success. The reason why a common front could not be formed in 
the Basmachi movement could be analyzed as the non-existence of a political and 
social unity in Central Asia for centuries even before not only Soviet expansion, but 
also Tsarist expansion. The multi-tribal and multi-ethnic characteristics of Central 
Asian Muslims were the biggest banner for a creation of a common front. In 
addition, there was a deficiency of strong ideological unity and it could be seen that 
different groups and fractions, which had been against each other before, got 
involved in the same revolt after 1920. To give an instance, the Basmachi groups 
consisting of old commanders of the emir could be classified as monarchists, the 
units of Junaid Khan the Turcoman were Turcoman ethnic-tribal rebels without 
having any ideological theory. On the other side, Jadids, having joined the 
Basmachis, had an ideology in one sense and strongly refused the emir’s authority. 
Also, the birth of each Basmachi group had different reasons. To give an example, 
the early emerging groups in Ferghana was a reaction to the collapse of Kokand 
Government, in some parts of Central Asia the reason was the famine due to the 
cease of grain imports from Russia under civil war circumstances (this was the 
failure of cotton monoculture policy), in eastern Bukhara the reason was 
monarchists’ reaction to the new regime in Bukhara etc. In short, the non-existence 
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of a single reason behind the movement was the biggest source of weakness and 
failure. 
 
4.2. Arrival of Turkish Officials to the Region 
4.2.1. Arrival of Jemal 
Both Enver’s and Jemal’s arrivals in Turkistan region were programmed 
plans conducted by the Soviet leaders for special mission. Firstly, Jemal stepped in 
Turkistan by coming from Moscow to Tashkent in August 1920. And then, he passed 
to Kabul, Afghanistan. The Soviet leaders pursued counter-policies against Britain in 
the region by sponsoring these Turkish leaders. The Soviet policy was to cause 
turmoil and trouble for British existence in India through these Turkish leaders and 
pushed Britain to possible trouble, would be produced by never and Jemal.
250
  
It was the policy of Tsarist Russia, noted by Curzon, to keep England engaged in Asia with a view to offsetting any 
movement by her against Russia in Europe. There may also have been some hope of diverting Eastern Turkish nationalism 
away from grievances against Russia, and starting it on barren road of Islamic enthusiasm against the British in India across the 
mountains. But, as the event showed the last thing Lenin wanted was a focus of nationalism in Turkistan itself. 
251
 
Jemal conducted a number of activities after his arrival in Kabul. He collected 
the Islamic Revolutionary League and began organizing the Afghan Army. The plan 
was pursued, and he was in close contact with the Soviets by conducting the 
activities. Other side, he was playing a mediating role between the Soviets and 
Basmachis. However, after a while, he gave up conducting activities of mediating 
and pacifying the rebels, and preparations targeting British India, instead, he focused 
on organizing rebels to help them bargain with the Soviets for their independence. 
The Soviet leaders were not late to suspect him of playing a double game and 
                                                          
250
 Caroe, Olaf, Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism, (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1967), 122. 
251
 Ibid, 122-123. 
 97 
 
pursuing his own aims and plans. Indeed, he was eager to prepare a huge Afghan 
army by modernizing and training them and then planned to launch a massive attack 
over British India. After that, he hoped to rescue Turkistan from Soviet rule.
252
 Since 
both Enver and Jemal were previous leaders of Union and Progressive Party in 
Ottoman Empire which had a Pan-Turkist and Pan-Turanist vision, their 
collaboration with the Soviets were so different and impossible in the long run. He 
was called back in October 1921. He was assassinated in Tiflis on 21th July 1922 
while trying to pass to Germany. His killing was a probably Bolshevik instigation.
253
   
 
4.2.2. Arrival of Enver 
Enver, one of the three leaders of Ottoman government having decided to 
participate in the Great War at the side of Central Powers, had fled to Russia after the 
defeat and was in collaboration with the Bolsheviks. He was advocated by the 
leaders in Moscow and was prepared for a leadership in Anatolian National 
Resistance against imperial powers in case Mustafa Kemal’s movement failed. 
However, the things did not go on well for Enver. After Moscow Treaty, signed in 16 
March 1921, between Kemal’s government and Moscow, Enver’s plans failed. And 
then, Enver changed his option and began making plans to pass over to Bukhara. 
“After the conclusion of the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship (March 1921, he 
realized that he could not get Soviet help against Kemal, and apparently decided to 
attempt the realization of his ambitions, using the Basmachi- the adherents of the Ex-
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Emir of Bukhara- as the first tool to his hand”.254 Enver offered the Soviets, with 
whom he was in good relation, to mediate between them and Basmachis. Although 
the Soviet elite in Moscow were suspicious of him, they accepted his offer and let 
him pass to Bukhara. 
Enver was encouraged by Young Bukharan leaders to carry the flag of 
resistance. But, he was also opposed by some Central Asian anti-Bolshevik leaders. 
Although Enver was encouraged to get in resistance by several nationalist members 
of Bukharan new government including Osman Khodzhaev, Ali Reza beg and 
Abdulhamid Arif; Zeki Velide Togan, the leader of Turkestan National Union and 
ex-leader of Bashkurd government, was opposing to Enver’s will to join Basmachis. 
Even, Togan offered Enver to leave Turkestan for Afghanistan.
255
 In the letter, sent 
by Togan to Enver, Togan emphasized that Enver’s intervention in this war would 
cause the movement to gain a Pan-Islamist identity, and advised Enver to support the 
Turkestan movement by residing in Afghanistan remotely. Togan, in his letter, 
believed in reaching a solution through founding alliances with internal fractions 
inside Russia, for example he mentioned about cooperating with social revolutionists 
against the Bolsheviks and then forcing Bolsheviks to agree with themselves.
256
 In 
sum, Togan believed in solving Turkestan question among residents of Russia, not 
by an outside actor. It was clear that there was a dichotomy between Jadid leaders of 
Bukhara and Russian educated secular Muslim leaders about Enver’s attendance and 
leading for the resistance. But, Enver gave his decision to go through with his 
dreams. 
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Enver stepped in Bukhara on October 1921 at the same month that Jemal was 
recalled by Lenin. Enver was sponsored by the Soviets and was sent to the region 
mediate between the Soviets and Basmachis and to complete Jemal’s mission. His 
aim, as announced, was the same as that which Jemal had failed to reach-alliance 
with Bolshevism in the fight for Islamic ideals against the so-called imperialism.
257
  
However, he attempted to do the same thing that Jemal had tried. He focused on 
organizing the resistance against the Soviets and rescuing Turkestan from Bolshevik 
rule instead of pacifying the resistance on Turkistan lands and mobilizing a struggle 
for Islamic ideals against British imperialism. Both of the two attempts of the Soviet 
leaders failed. Both Enver and Jemal targeted the Soviets after a while despite having 
a common mission on behalf of the Soviets. The policy of Soviets did not operate 
well. Although the Soviet elite planned to hit British imperialism through the Islamic 
ideals and probable struggle that were planned to organize by Enver and Jemal, they 
became victims of pan-Turkist ideals and programs of Enver and Jemal. The main 
aim was to firstly finish the rebels’ resistance and keep stability in Turkistan, and 
then brings Amanullah’s Afghanistan who was in antagonist position against Britain, 
closer to the Soviet side and then creates a revolutionary wind there that would 
probably strike India, under British imperialism. However, the Red Army had to deal 
with the chaotic situation and played into trouble in Turkistan as a result. Enver put 
his plans into practice immediately and joined the Basmachi groups. “Enver Pasha 
appropriated the old dream of a Pan-Turanian empire, which from the springboard of 
Turkistan would reproduce the conquests of Cinghiz Khan and Taymur(Timur). He 
would be the new conqueror, and Turkey would rid itself of Kemal and join his 
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empire.” 258 Enver purposed to unite all separate forces of the Basmachi groups. And, 
he dreamed of founding a Central Asian Muslim state. Enver’s dream did not find 
enough support from Central Asians and did not create the same impact as it did for 
Western Turkes upon Central Asian Muslims, because it was difficult to persuade 
and encourage Central Asians regarding Pan-Turanism like Western Turks. Although 
Jadids were, in one sense, influenced by Pan-Turkist and PanTuranian ideas through 
the Tatar Muslim intellectuals’ opinions; the pan-Turanian dream in minds of 
Bukharan and Khivan Jadids was a bit different from the one in minds of Western 
Turks. For Bukharan Uzbek intellectuals and elite, pan-Turanism meant greater 
Uzbekistan, so it was same with Enver’s dreams of unifying all Turkic Muslims in 
West and East under one flag. After taking the leadership of the Basmachi groups, he 
gave an ultimatum to the Soviet leaders to withdraw their forces from Turkistan at 
once.
259
 Moscow responded to him by sending Red Army. Enver sent his emissaries 
to afghan emir to demand aid for his resistance. Afghanistan responded to Enver’s 
demand and sent a thousand Afghan troops to Enver.
260
 These Afghan troops served 
as Enver’s special guards during his resistance. There are also claims around British 
support for Enver’s movement in spite of enough and strong evidence about this.  
Some said-with what truth we do not know that-Enver received funds and arms from Britain; the only thing certain is 
that the Basmachi had English rifles and ammunition, possibly obtained earlier British agents in Turkistan.
261
 
The Basmachi movement strengthened after Enver’s participation. Although 
Enver had some problems with tribal chieftains in the beginning, he succeeded in 
creating excitement against the Soviets in the early times. Enver Pasha’s activities 
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also enabled the movement to strengthen more and attract more supporters who were 
discontent under suppression of the Soviet regime. The soaring resistance of 
Basmachi forces after Enver’s arrival in the area and the Soviets’ suppression over 
the new government of Bukharan Peoples’ Republic caused a government crisis. The 
prominent leaders of the new regime’s government shifted to Basmachis’ side. For 
example, Mirza Abdulqadir Muhiddinov, one of the chief leaders of the Young 
Bukharan Party, Muhiddin Maqsumov, and the republic’s minister of police and their 
supporters shifted to the side of Basmachi rebels. Basmachi revolt strengthened 
towards the end of 1921 in spite of domestic clashes among separate groups inside 
the movement.
262
 For example, Abdul Hamid Beg, minister of war and Ali Reza Beg, 
minister of interior joined Enver’s front. Even, Osman Khodzhaev, president of 
republic, left Bukhara secretly in order for attending the Basmachi revolt.
263
 This 
event weakened the efficiency of the republic and added power and legitimacy of the 
Basmachis and increased fame and the position of the revolt. The efficiency of the 
movement began to be felt inside the government of the new regime in Bukhara. 
Even, Fayzallah Khodzhaev was attempted to assassinate in summer 1922 and Enver 
was suspected of this attempt.
264
 On the other hand, the incapability of uniting the 
separate groups and continuous rivalry among tribes were preventing Enver’s 
dreams. Also, Enver’s personal ambition and lack of tact caused his partners to 
disobey his authority and side against him.
265
 He used the title of “Commander in 
chief of all Muslim Troops, the son in law the Caliph and representative of the 
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Prophet.”266 This benefited him to establish a strong authority among the rebels and 
tribes, besides it was helpful to enable unity in the region. On the other hand, he 
collided with the ex-Emir, who was the most prominent advocate for the Basmachis, 
because of the use of title of “Emir of Turkistan”.  Enver’s use of this title in his 
orders angered ex-Emir Alim because of the fear of shadowing his authority. “His 
signing of orders with the pompous title of ‘commander in chief of all Muslim 
troops, so in law of the Caliph, and representative of the prophet’ put him on bad 
terms with the emir, Alim Khan. Gradually, his coalition force fell to pieces, and he 
came to the point of battling with his former allies”.267 The prominent Basmachi 
commanders Ibrahim Beg Lakai, loyal to the emir, left the Enver’s command.268  
Enver was killed in a sudden attack of the Red Army units in the morning on 4 
August 1922 in Baljuvan, a village in eastern Bukhara.
269
 His struggle did not last so 
long, but it did leave an effect which would last more. He became a symbol of dream 
for unity between Western and Eastern Turks. 
 
4.3. The Basmachis after Enver 
The Basmachi resistance did not cease after Enver’s death. Although it lost its 
efficiency and continued to maintain the resistance in low-density after 1924, it 
succeeded in existing until the early 1930s. For a while, Haji Sami, a Turkish official 
and a friend of Enver, continued to lead the Basmachi units after Enver’s death and 
after a while, he left Turkistan. Although the advantage of rebels was to be able to 
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pass across Afghan border and collect power to launch anti-attack, their strategy 
collapsed after the Afghan revolution in 1928. The new Afghan regime allowed the 
Soviets to operate across the border to sweep the rebels. With the capture of Ibrahim 
Lakai Beg, the prominent Basmachi commander in 1931, the movement received an 
irreparable wound and quickly weakened.
270
 In addition Junaid Khan had to give up 
the fight. Although he resisted for more than 8 years from his withdrawal to the 
Karakum desert in January 1920 to September 1928, he was forced to withdraw to 
Iran. Then, he had to pass to Afghanistan due to the Iran’s pressure for his guards to 
disarm.
271
 He was not captured but he was almost eighty-year old when he was 
retired somewhere near Herat in Afghanistan, so he did not get into any operating 
action anymore.
272
 Towards the end of 1920s and early 1930s, the Soviet regime took 
a range of efficient precautions against revolts in Fergana and Bashkiria. For 
instance, Bashkurds were exposed to artificial famine and disease and they were 
forced to leave their lands to Russian settlers. Many of them were driven to 
mountains and the Steppe. The Soviet regime punished them in the peace era more 
heavily than in the era of war.
273
 In addition, different methods in terms of military 
struggle were applied for the suppression of the movement. For example, the war 
prisoners were sent to Turkistan region for being used against resistance. According 
to Hayit, the Red army in Turkistan including war prisoners consisted of 106,000 
soldiers in 1918-19. The war prisoners, named as internationalist legions comprised 
% 16 of the Soviet army in Turkistan.
274
 In 1920, Muslim soldiers were also 
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recruited in Turkistan by force. This policy of recruitment of Muslim soldiers was 
implemented to gain superiority upon Muslim resisting Basmachi groups. 
275
 “The 
Red Army, swollen by Muslim recruits, embarked upon an intensive propaganda 
campaign among the population, presenting the Basmachis as brigands-brigands who 
were weak and doomed to imminent defeat”.276 The policy aimed to propaganda 
among Muslims against Basmachis, gaining reliance of Muslim public through these 
Muslim legions. The real aim was to benefit from Turkestan Muslims in terms of 
propaganda among public against rebels.
277
 The Soviet policies after the suppression 
for Basmachi revolts in Muslim regions developed a different method for softening 
relations with the peoples in Central Asian Muslim lands. The Turkic Bureau of the 
Russian Communist Party Central Committee and the Turkic Commission made 
some reforms for winning the Muslim communities back. The confiscated waqf 
lands were returned to the religious charities, the madrasas and religious schools 
were allowed to open again.
278
 “In economic terms, the New Economic Policy (NEP) 
made it possible to relax the situation of the Muslims; private business was 
reestablished; and the requisition of cotton and foodstuffs that had enraged the 
Muslim was ended.” 279 After these appeasement policies of the Soviets in early 
1920s, the tension decreased and revolts began weakening in spite of not ending 
completely. But, after 1923 it gave signs that the rebels’ endeavor to struggle was 
lessening and people came to the position of quitting resisting against the ruling 
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authority anymore, thus the region was in process of integration with the Soviet 
Union.
280
  
As a conclusion, the importance of the Basmachi movement was its creation 
of common epic for all Central Asian Muslims which enabled all the elements of 
Turkistan including the tribes of Uzbek, Turkmen, Kazakh and Kirghiz, the 
intellectuals, Afghans and West Turk officials like Enver and Jemal for a single aim, 
an over-all resistance against the Soviets despite comprising varied groups. It was 
even a fact that an over-all and common resistance like that had not broken out since 
the Shaibani Khan’s time in the 16th century. On the other hand, the movement 
created disadvantage for Central Asians, because of causing Russians armies to 
discover, take control and penetrate every part of the region in the Red Army’s 
military operations, from the mountains of eastern Bukhara to the regions along the 
Chinese and Afghan frontiers.
281
  
 
4.4. The New Regime in Bukhara after the Fall of Monarchy  
In this part of the chapter, I focus on the most important issue of the chapter; 
the transition stage of Bukharan society and state for the Soviet socialist republic. 
While analyzing the new regime and I point out the structure of the new regime and 
emphasized its nationalist policies and ever-increasing anti-Bolshevik attitude. I also 
analyzed the internal and external problems threatening the new regime and the 
changing circumstances that enforced the Soviets to construct the unity in the region 
by suppressing the independence of the state. In addition, I focus on two important 
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events in the transition era that enforced the transition to speed. The most important 
purpose of mine in that part is to display under what conditions and through which 
developments, the People’s Republic was transformed to Soviet People’s Republic at 
first; and then how it was transformed to Uzbekistan Soviet Socialist Republic as a 
national state of an ethnic group, at the last stage. 
In Bukhara, the monarchy was destroyed on 2 September 1920 and the 
People’s Republic was declared on 8 October 1920. The government was presided by 
Fayzallah Khodzhaev who was the most active man of the new regime. He was the 
president of the council of ministers, the prime minister, and minister of foreign 
affairs. The head of state was at first Mirza Abd al Qadir Muhitdinov and then he 
was replaced by Usman Khodzhaev. The other members of the cabinet comprised of 
well-known Young Bukharan Jadids. For instance, Qari Yuldash Pulatov was 
minister of public education and worship, Mukammil ad-Din Makhdum was minister 
justice, Ata Khodzhaev was minister of interior, Hasan Bay was minister of public 
health and Mukhtar Khan was minister of finance and economy.
282
 The most 
efficient man inside the cabinet after Khodzhaev was Abdulrauf Fitrat. Fitrat was a 
minister of education and he was the conductor of constructing the national state 
through his educational and cultural reforms; and of creating the identity of the 
Bukharan Uzbek society. He was, in short, responsible for nation building of the new 
People’s Republic. The Young Bukharans had nationalist tendencies and began 
taking an opposing attitude against the Bolsheviks. They also began pursuing 
nationalist policies through the reforms in education. For example, Abdulrauf Fitrat, 
architect of educational reforms in Bukhara, conducted the policy of nationalizing 
the official language. Persian language, which was the official language of the state 
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for centuries, was replaced with Uzbek language. This was an important revolution 
in cultural life. The new reform was seen as the indication of the new regime’s 
attempt to be “a People’s Government”, because Persian, the language of elite, was 
abolished and Uzbek, the language of local people was replaced. This reform also 
inspired the pan-Turkist ideas again. “The government’s most revolutionary measure 
was to proclaim Uzbek as the state language. By eliminating Persian- which was not 
only the official language of the emirate, but above all the language of the elite- and 
replacing it by Uzbek, the language of the people, the government was signaling 
clearly its intention of being a people’s government and no longer that of a few 
privileged groups; it was also facilitating social mobility”.283  Fitrat, Bukharan 
minister of education, also made a series of reforms in madrasah system and put the 
modern education system into implementation in Bukhara. He also organized the 
Bukharan students to send to Germany for getting undergraduate education in 
German universities.
284
 Fitrat also planned to establish the first modern-European 
styled university in Bukhara.
285
 “This reform had a further significance: under its 
impact the old pan-Turanian dream sprang to life again, which had the merit of 
making the theoretically independent state of Bukhara once more into an important 
center of spiritual renewal for all Muslims in Russia who had not forgotten their 
reformist aspirations.” 286 
The new regime began facing problems both inside the country and outside, 
especially from the Soviets. Inside the country, the Revolutionary Committee of 
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Bukhara
287
 could not keep its promises that it had given before coming to power. 
This situation put the Young Bukharans into predicament. The revolutionary 
committee had declared the nationalization of all lands, water supplies, and huge 
private properties. Even, the Revkom of Bukhara had promised the public opinion to 
redistribute the confiscated lands, properties and water supplies equally to the 
peoples of Bukhara.
288
 However, it was very difficult for the Revkom to fulfill these 
promises, because the infrastructure of the country was not ready to implement these 
policies under the existed political, social, economic and cultural conditions of the 
country.  
Revkom of Bukhara could not keep its promises because of inadequacies of the political and social circumstances of 
the country. Bukhara’s first problem was political. To reform its structures and carry through the Revkom’s promises, clearly it 
was necessary to draw a line through the past and turn to new people in order to run the new institutions. But this was 
impossible, since Bukhara possessed neither the people nor the material means for such a change. 
289
 
Other problem emerging as a threat for Bukhara was coming from the 
Soviets. This was the inevitable fate of Bukhara and Khwarazm that they would not 
escape from. The Soviets saw these countries as its hinterlands and even part of itself 
for the long run. The bourgeois nationalist regime, according to the Soviet view, was 
only allowed to provide the transition stage to the socialist state. The Young 
Bukharans were seen as the people of the bourgeoisie nationalist class and were 
permitted to remain in power temporarily. The Young Bukharans’ coming to power 
was approved by Moscow in 1920 not to face a public turmoil and uprising, in 
addition, the increase of Basmachi enforced Moscow to agree with Young Bukharan 
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Jadids as it was done with the intellectuals of Alash Orda and Turkestan ASSR.
290
 
On the other hand, the war conditions ended and a threat of foreign intervention was 
not conceivable any more. In 1923-1924, the Soviet government got into 
strengthening inside. The consolidation of unity of the state was a priority. Therefore, 
the semi-independent national governments had to be abolished and the 
implementation of socialism adapted to the particular conditions of the East had to be 
abandoned in order for providing a proletarian unity. 
291
 The first disagreement broke 
out due to the demand of deployment of Red Army troops on the Afghan frontier 
under the Soviet command. The Bukharan government did not agree on this and it 
turned into a crisis between Moscow and Bukhara. Moreover, the Bukharan 
government could not explain the reason of Soviet troops’ existence in Bukhara. Red 
Army units under the command of Frunze were free to move and were free to get 
their supplies from Bukharan people. The government demanded the command of 
Russian troops inside Bukhara. This event also turned into crisis. For the Soviets, 
keeping troops in Bukhara was necessity because of the Basmachi threat, spreading 
to the whole country.
292
 On the other side, Bukharan new regime was shaken with 
internal conflicts. The Bukharan government dissolved because of the escapes and 
passing of the ministers and prominent officials to Basmachis’ side led by Enver 
Pasha. Even, Usman Khodzhaev was one of them. The new government was at once 
organized under the presidency of Fayzallah Khodzhaev and Abdulrauf Fitrat who 
took the ministry of foreign affairs. While they were struggling against the 
Basmachis led by Enver at one side and the Soviet pressures at another; they were 
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seeking aid outside. “These two men, who had stayed in Bukhara to preserve what 
they could of its independence, sought aid on all sides. Informal discussions with 
Turkey and Afghanistan led to no positive results, and the Central Asian leaders 
remained all alone for the assault that they soon had to face”.293 After a while, they 
submitted to their fates despairingly. 
 
4.5. On the Way of Disbandment of the People’s Republics 
In 1923, two important events which influenced the fate of Bukhara and 
Young Bukharan regime happened. The first one was the establishment of economic 
union in southern Central Asia. This was the Soviet enforcement policy to restraint 
the increasing independent progress of the republics. In March 1923, the first 
conference was held with the participation of three South Central Asian republics: 
Turkistan ASSR, Bukhara and Khwarazm. A common economic policy was 
discussed and it was decided to establish Economic Council of Central Asia. This 
economic council aimed to integrate currencies, railway, telegraph and postal 
systems of Bukhara and Khwarazm into the Soviet system.
294
 Also, three republics 
(Turkestan ASSR, Bukhara, and Khwarazm) were having a common irrigation, 
commerce, agriculture and planning systems.
295
 “Two organızations instrumental in 
putting an end to the regrouping of all Central Asia under Soviet authority were the 
Economic Council of Central Asia and the Central Asian Bureau of the Communist 
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Party of the Soviet Union.” 296 The second important development was the speech of 
Stalin that targeted the Russian Muslims who were trying to organize as secret 
societies, which were especially consisted of Tatar Muslims, against the Soviet 
regime. The general Soviet policy changed against the Russian Muslims after the 4
th
 
conference named as “enlarged conference of responsible workers of the republics 
and nationality regions” in June 1923.297 In the conference, the Russian Muslims and 
the government of Bukhara were condemned for ignoring the class interests of 
proletariat and for pursuing their own nationalist interests.
298
. There was the fear that 
the improvement of bourgeoisie nationalism in Turkestan and spread among all 
Russian Muslims. After the condemnations were oriented against the activities of 
clandestine organizations of Russian Muslims and bourgeois nationalist tendencies of 
the regimes of people’s republics in the 4th conference in 9-12 June 1923 in 
Moscow,
299
 the operation of the arrest of the dissidents to Bolshevism and advocates 
of bourgeoisie nationalist government was started. “All the former officials, clerics, 
important merchants, and landowners were banned from the political community and 
deprived of the right to vote. Large business firms and then the personal properties of 
the well-to-do were confiscated while a start at agrarian reform was attempted.” 300 
The transition period, according to the Soviets, ended and it was time to 
emphasize the Soviet influence to display the integration of Central Asia to the 
Union. At the fifth congress of Bukhara Soviets on 19 September 1924, it was 
accepted on consensus that the People’s Republic of Bukhara was transformed to the 
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Soviet Republic of Bukhara.
301
 In addition, it was approved at the congress that each 
nation in Bukhara was reorganized as a nation state on its own and joined the 
USSR.
302
 The Central Executive Committee of USSR unanimously decided to 
abolish the Soviet republics, instead, to establish two socialist republics. Instead of 
these disbanded republics, Uzbekistan SSR was installed as a socialist state of Uzbek 
ethnic group and Turkmenistan SSR was installed as a socialist state of Turkmens. 
Both Bukhara Soviet and Khwarazm Soviet and also Turkestan ASSR were totally 
disbanded on 17 February 1925. 
 
4.6. Reorganization of Central Asia and Sovietization Policies in the Region    
Central Asia was divided into the new socialist republics (SSR: Soviet 
Socialist Republic) after the disbandment of Turkestan ASSR, Bukhara and 
Khwarazm People’s Republics. Instead of these dissolved states, two new socialist 
republics were founded by the decision of the Central Executive Committee of the 
USSR in October 1924. One of these two socialist republics was Uzbekistan SSR 
which was located in the region of Samarkand, Fergana, Amu Darya and Sri Darya; 
and the other was Turkmenistan located over the Turkmen regions of Western 
Bukhara, Khwarazm, and the former Transcaspian region. In addition to these new 
socialist republics, two autonomous republics (ASSR: Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic) and two autonomous oblasts were established. Two autonomous republics 
were Tajikistan, a Persian speaking state, which was located on mountainous eastern 
Bukhara, and Kazakhstan which was formed on the Steppe region. The autonomous 
regions were Kara Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast and Karakalpak Autonomous 
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Oblast.
303
 Tajik ASSR, which was associated with Uzbek SSR at first, rose to SSR 
level in 1929, Kazakh ASSR rose to SSR in 1936. Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast, 
created in 1925, rose to ASSR in 1926 and then rose to SSR in 1936. Karakalpak 
Autonomous Oblast rose to ASSR in 1932 and transferred from Kazakhstan SSR to 
Uzbekistan SSR in 1936.
304
  
The upgrading of Tajikistan’s status to the level of socialist republic (SSR) in 
5 December 1929
305
 was the most important development after the dissolution of 
peoples’ republics, because the Soviets could, thus, prevent pan-Turkist dreams of 
Jadids. Tajikistan as a Persian speaking republic in Central Asia, inside the 
traditional borders of Turkestan, emerged as the biggest obstacle for a probable 
unified Turkestan.
306
 “With its reorganizations of Central Asia the Soviet 
government delivered a terrible blow to the pan-Turk dreams of the Jadids. The 
fragmentation of Turkistan into national republics endowed with national languages 
and, worse still, the creation of a non-Turkish republic of Tajikistan, in which a 
Persian dialect was spoken, put an end to any hope of a regroupment and unification 
of all Turks of Central Asia”.307  In the history of Central Asia, after many centuries, 
since the collapse of Samanid dynasty, this was the first time that a Persian-speaking 
state was founded again. The concept of Turkestan that was promoted and defended 
by Pan-Turkist Jadids in order for creating imagines of historical and ancient Turkish 
land was somehow challenged by the creation of Tajik state in the region. For the 
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Uzbeks, Turkistan meant greater Uzbekistan and Pan-Turkism meant, in one respect, 
controlling all Turkic groups under Uzbekistan. Therefore, the Soviets ended the 
dreams of greater Uzbekistan while erasing the concept of Turkistan by creating a 
Tajik state in Central Asia. The artificially created question increased after Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan took their independence in 1991. Although both of the two nations 
were almost same inhabitants and lived together before the recreation of nations by 
the Soviets in the 1930s, they were now the biggest enemies to each other. The 
Uzbek national identity dated back to the historical and ancient Karakhanid dynasty 
and Tajik national identity dated back to the historical and ancient Samanid dynasty 
which had been collapsed by the Karakhanids is one of the reasons creating a 
question between two nation states. In addition, the great amount of Uzbek minority 
inside Tajikistan and similarly, the great Tajik population in Uzbekistan especially in 
the cities of Bukhara and Samarkand cause problems between two states. Drawing of 
the borders by leaving minorities to each state causes a minority question among 
nation republics. This situation continues to constitute problems among republics of 
Central Asia, even at present.  
The Soviets pursued the policy of “Korenizatsiya”308 which allowed the 
indigenous people of local states to pursue their cultural and national policies. It was 
given importance to these local states’ encouragement of the local cultures, local 
political freedoms and their local-native languages during the 1920s. However, after 
Joseph Stalin came to power, the indigenization policy ended and it was replaced 
with the great Russification policy all over the Soviet Union. Not only Central Asian 
states but also Ukraine, Belorussia, and Transcaucasian states   were imposed to the 
                                                          
308
 It was the policy of the Soviets implemented in the 1920s which aimed to promote native and 
indigenous peoples’ culture and local languages, and their local states’ semi-independent 
administrative units and national politics. It was seen as a transition period policy in the Leninist era. 
When Stalin came to power, the policy shifted to Russification and Sovietization in the late 1930s. 
 115 
 
Russification policies of the Soviets. With the concept of Russification, it meant the 
Sovietization in the all regions of the USSR, because Russian culture and Russian 
language were seen as the most prior, the most modern, the most probable improved 
communication tool for being a common and an official language for the 
communism and for all the nations compromising the Soviet Union. The national 
local states and their nationalist governing cadres which attempted to oppose to these 
policies were imposed to harsh sanctions. Even, the purging of national leaders and 
nationalist local cadres were made by the Soviet authorities throughout the regions 
under the Soviet rule.  The governing cadres in local states promoting their local and 
native languages were blamed for being bourgeoisie nationalists and suppressing the 
Russian language which was accepted as the international language of communism 
by the Soviets. For the policy of Sovietization, the Russian settlers in other local 
states were given great importance because of their transformative and modernizing 
characters. They were significant due to being able to spread the Russian culture and 
Russian language throughout the Union. While the Soviet authorities were 
implementing these policies, they did not aim to destroy all local and native cultures 
and linguistics and assimilating the native nations. The local cultures, folks, local 
languages used inside the local state, national state’s constitutional status and 
national politicians unless they did not act against the Soviet rules and interests were 
not imposed to any threat of destruction  or any harsh sanction and implementation 
by the Soviet authorities. The only matter was the penetration of Russian language 
and culture as the superior phenomenon for all the nations of the USSR. Russians 
were ascribed to the prominent and leading nation of the Union among others; and 
Russian was emphasized as the common culture and language of communist 
ideology inside the Union.  Not only in realm of culture and linguistics, but also in 
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realm of economic integration, were the similar policies pursued. For example, the 
raw materials produced in different local states, for example cotton in Uzbekistan or 
coal in Ukraine, were transported to the industrial centers of RSFSR and then 
delivered to other parts of the Union.  Thus, the economic and industrial 
centralization, in other words the Sovietization, was consolidated in the USSR. 
After the reorganization of Central Asia according to the rules and regulations 
of the Soviet Nationalities Policy, the Soviets produced new policies and began 
implementing them in the region. Especially, the Uzbek state was focused on in these 
Sovietizing policies because of its historical roots and traditional bonds. It 
necessitated more detailed policies for Uzbek SSR. Uzbekistan was the most 
important state among others because Uzbekistan was formed as the nation state of 
Uzbeks which were ruling ethnic groups of Bukharan Emirate and Khivan Khanate 
and then Bukharan and Khwarazmian People’s Republics which were the last two 
states that succeeded in standing until the early 1920s. For that reason, both in whole 
Central Asia and Uzbekistan, the language policy was implemented as a tool of the 
Sovietization policy. From 1924 to 1933, the Sovietizing policy took speed in 
Central Asia. The Soviets pursued Russian language policy in Turkestan for 
Russification of separated ethnic nations, because the Russian language was 
encouraged as the common official language for both creating common literature and 
encouraging common culture. The Russian language was declared as the semiofficial 
and the second compulsory language in the other Socialist Republics of the Union in 
1938. For spreading the Soviet regime’s influence more in the region, some slogans 
were produced such as “the creation of a culture which was to be nationalist in form 
and socialist essence” , “Domination of the language of the Proletarian revolution”, 
“the creation of Proletarian-Soviet literature”, and “internationalizing the 
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language”. The aim was to incorporate the new Central Asian socialist republics into 
the system of Soviet Union. 
309
 In order to create more depended nations to the 
Soviet regime through the reorganization, the Soviets particularly focused on 
philology. Each ethnic group’s philological feature was the most significant 
reference for the division of Central Asian ethnic communities into national states. 
After the definition of every ethnic group through ethnic groups’ specific languages 
such as Kazakh, Uzbek, Turkmen and Kyrgyz; Russian language was imposed as the 
upper level language by the Soviets to the region for Central Asian Muslims to both 
use among themselves and to maintain and develop their relations with Russia.  In 
other words, the national republics were obliged to obey this policy. In 1939, the 
Cyrillic Alphabet was necessitated for non-Russian nations inside the Soviet Union. 
In addition, in both whole Central Asia but also especially in Uzbekistan, the Soviet 
regime focused on religion and religiosity which was one of the most important 
concepts that was keeping different ethnic groups together for centuries. Both unity 
of religion and unity of religious school, Sunnite in majority was the most important 
element for natural formation of Sart identity. This identity was erased and disused 
after 1925.
310
 Before passing to the Cyrillic Alphabet in 1939, firstly Arabic 
Alphabet used for centuries was erased and Latin alphabet was replaced in the late 
1920s. “The elimination of Arabic Alphabet had, in this respect, an essentially 
political significance. Harsh measures were taken against Islam, a unifying factor, 
because the problem was particularly grave in most of Central Asia”.311 Even, 
softening the status of the Shariat and the rights of waqfs by the Soviets in the 1920s 
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disappeared in the 1930s owing to the harsh measures of the Sovietizing policy in the 
Stalin era. 
The reorganization of national republics in the region and the creation of 
separate Uzbekistan and Tajikistan republics according to linguistic differences 
although both of two ethnic groups Uzbeks and Tajiks were bilingual and it was so 
difficult to distinct them from each other. On the other side, the policy of distinction 
of Turkic communities was implemented and the basic criterion was Islamic 
practices of ethnic groups. This was the most convenient method to differentiate 
Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kazakhs and others.
312
 On the other hand, it was very difficult to 
make distinction between Kyrgyz and Kazakh communities because they were so 
like each other. Both of two were steppe communities. It was also very difficult to 
create different nations from these peoples having adapted to the steppe life. Even, 
Kazakhstan SSR was called as Kyrgyzstan SSR in the beginning and Kyrgyzstan 
SSR was called as Kara Kyrgyzstan SSR. In addition, the similar difficulty for 
separating nations was valid for Uzbeks and Turkmen in the region. “Uzbeks and 
Turkmen had never before lived in separate, ethnically defined states. Kirgiz and 
Kazakhs had not always been distinguished as separate nations and had previously 
been known by different names: Kara Kirgiz and Kirgiz, respectively”.313  Not only 
philological features, religious practices but also customs, traditions and life styles 
were taken into consideration to identify and build nations. For example, for 
distinguishing the nations, the women’s dress styles were taken into consideration. In 
Turkmen regions, Uzbeks were distinguished through the women’s dressing paranji, 
also known as burqa, because the Uzbek community was far more religious, their 
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women were wearing burqa while Turkmen women were wearing yashmak that only 
covered some parts of face and slighter than burqa. In addition, the same methods 
were tried for Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in border areas of Osh city and for Uzbeks and 
Kazakhs in southern areas of the Steppe.
314
  
After putting the separation policy in terms of linguistics into practice, the 
other unifying elements were taken into consideration by the Soviets, because the 
Soviets pursued policies which shattered the unity and independence understanding 
of Central Asian Muslims. “The Leninist approach was to build socialism while 
encouraging indigenous development and national differentiation.”315On the other 
hand, the Soviet view was certainly against the harmful ideologies backed by outside 
powers such as Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanism. It was attempted to erase the 
symbols and bonds in social-political and cultural realms. For example, the religion 
was an important element for the unity of Central Asian Muslims. “The elimination 
of the Arabic alphabet had, in this respect, an essentially political significance. Harsh 
measures were taken against Islam, a unifying factor, because the problem was 
particularly grave in most of Central Asia”.316 In addition, the spread of Soviet 
influence and Soviet backed modernization in the country, in one respect, occurred 
through the Russian population in Uzbekistan. While these settlers served for Tsarist 
Russia in past, they now served for the interests for the Soviets as the best and the 
most natural collaborators for the Soviet Union. “Soviet domination, as the successor 
of Russian Imperialism only rose to power in Turkestan through the Russians.”317 
                                                          
314
 Northrop, Douglas Taylor, Veiled Empire: Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia, (New 
York: Cornel University Press, 2004), 50-51. 
315
 Ibid, 48. 
316
 Allworth, Edward et al., Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule, ed. Edward Allworth, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 257. 
317
 Hayit, Baymirza, Islam and Turkestan under Russian Rule, (Istanbul: Can Matbaa, 1987), 263. 
 120 
 
There were at least two million Russian inhabitants in the region.
318
 Even, this fact 
was enforcing the Soviets and making them feel responsible to interfere and 
reorganize the region in accordance with its nationalities policy, otherwise these 
inhabitants would fall into danger, which would probably come from local 
population.
319
 Also, the Russian population in the region was extremely essential for 
the Soviets to penetrate its language policy throughout the region. Penetration of 
Russian language into the whole region would be through these Russian settlers. 
These settlers had the responsibility to help Russian, the common language of 
communism, spread to the local peoples. 
The most dangerous and threatening issue for the Soviets was the 
maintenance of Young Bukharan formed government in new Uzbek state. It was 
well- known about their Pan-Turkist ideas and educational reforms in the era of 
People’s Republic. They were blamed for planning to spread Uzbek influence and 
found greater Uzbekistan. For these reasons, the national leadership of Bukhara was 
a crucial threat for the Soviet influence in newly created Uzbekistan. Therefore, 
Fayzallah Khodzhaev, president of the Council of People’s Commissars of 
Uzbekistan SSR, and the leader of nationalist wing, and also Akmal Ikramov, first 
secretary of Uzbekistan Communist Party, the leader of Bolshevik wing, were 
arrested and tried in Moscow for being a Trotskyite and a Rightist. Both Young 
Bukharan cadres and Bukharan Communist cadres having formed Uzbekistan 
Communist Party were not allowed to maintain their existence. They were executed 
on 13 March 1938. The other figures of nationalist cadres in Uzbekistan were 
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eliminated after the executions of the leaders.
320
 Although Fayzallah Khodzhaev had 
been the prime minister of Bukhara Peoples’ Republic and then became the president 
of Uzbekistan SSR and also Akmal Ikramov was the first secretary of the Central 
Committee of the party in Uzbekistan from 1929 to 1937,in other words, both of two 
were cooperated as partners for long term; the clash between the Soviets and Young 
Bukharans controlled Uzbek SSR government regarding the Soviet’s pressure for the 
specialization of Uzbekistan in cotton production as it was enforced in the past  
broke out.   
The economic and social conflict had its origin in the raising of cotton, which the Soviet regime sought to 
emphasize, as the czarist government had done before it, Local personnel, who at the time of revolution, had seen the perils of 
economic of economic dependency based on monoculture stirred up the population against orders coming from the central 
government. Behind the cotton problem, sensed Soviet leaders, was fierce national resistance.
321
 
The main problem was economic but it spilt over the social domain and thus 
caused the strengthening of national resistance backed by nationalist Young 
Bukharans who were now in power in the government of Uzbekistan. It was 
dangerous for the Soviets that the identity of new national republic, Uzbekistan, was 
built upon nationalist resistance arising from economic and agricultural reasons in 
the early years of the Socialist Republic. Therefore, the intervention was a necessity 
for the Soviets to prevent this emerging question. Even though Khodzhaev and 
Ikramov were politically rivals to each other, they were agreed on the cotton policy 
of the Soviets. Both Ikramov and Khodzhaev were put in target for using cotton 
crisis to strengthen nationalist resistance and this caused the purge of last Jadid 
cadres’ remnants in Turkistan by the Soviets. The leaders’ arrestment and execution 
excuses were very interesting.  Fayzallah Khodzhaev was accused of burying his 
brother in accordance with Islamic rites as an excuse for his arrestment, and Akmal 
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Ikramov was accused of being a nationalist in a newspaper article as an excuse for 
his arrest.
322
 After the elimination of these last Jadid cadres, Uzbekistan SSR’s 
complete control passed to the Soviets. Thus, while impressing the identity of pan-
Turkist Jadidism maintain its influence in the region from the early 1900s, a new 
Uzbek identity, which was more compatible to the Soviet regime, was built. 
On the other perspective, the Soviet penetration in Central Asia and 
especially Uzbekistan was different from any other colonial power’s penetration in 
the world and even the Tsarist rule’s. The importance of the Soviets and their 
Sovietizing policies of the local regions carried a modernizing mission and 
modernization character. For example, although it was so difficult to draw exact 
boundaries in the culturally complex world, the Soviet Union dealt with each Soviet 
Socialist state for creating their national identities, constructing literary languages 
and alphabet, and establishing their political hierarchies. In Central Asia, the Soviet 
ethnographers collected folk tales and focused on local customs to make better 
analysis to distinct each nation’s identity. 323 The Soviets were different from the 
Tsarist administrators who only dealt with tax collection and military security. The 
Soviets focused on the matters of local society or culture because they analyzed the 
world with different terms. The Soviets saw Central Asia as a primitive region and 
wanted to modernize it thus the Soviets planned to make Central Asian nations to 
move towards socialism.
324
 The Soviets aimed a complete transformation in terms of 
economy, politics, culture and society for the region in order to recreate the men and 
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women of southern Central Asia as true modern Soviet citizens.
325
 “Unlike its Tsarist 
predecessor, however, the USSR was also a distinctively modern and modernizing 
state. In both center and periphery, that is, it sought simultaneously to build a polity 
with a common ideal of citizenship and thus its insistent anti colonization also needs 
to be taken seriously, as more than more rhetoric.  The unveiling campaign in some 
ways expressed this credo: it aimed to make Uzbeks into Soviet citizens rather than 
simply imperial subjects”.326 To recreate a modern society in Uzbekistan, according 
to the unveiling campaign, the women had to take off their veils firstly.
327
 The Soviet 
program in Central Asia was to modernize the women in order to create a modern 
nation and modern nations. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The transformation of Bukharan society and state from medieval monarchy to 
socialist national republic was significant for the transformation and change of 
Central Asia, because  both ancient Bukhara and Samarkand culture and civilization 
was fairly efficient and influential in the region, in addition the  populous Uzbek 
community had more importance than other nations because of having sedentary  
population, long historical tradition and civilization and more intellects rather than 
other nations. In short, the transformation of Bukharan emirate meant the 
transformation of Turkestan. The most important event that triggered the 
transformation and change for Bukharan society and state was their first recognition 
with the Russians. Russian intervention and influence was the basic triggering factor 
enabling the first step for the change. In 1855, the Russian armies began the great 
campaign upon Bukhara and in 1868 the treaty putting Bukhara under the 
protectorate was signed. The subjugation of Bukhara to Russia was the beginning of 
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Bukhara’s facing the Western influence. Firstly the Russian settlers came and these 
settlers became one of the most significant engine that speed the emirate’s 
transformation, because the two important events, February and October 
Revolutions, were sensed in Turkestan through these settlers. 
The other important development for Bukhara was the installation of Russian 
schools and then Usul-i Jadid (new method) schools arising from Crimean Tatar 
intellectuals’ project addressing the Russian Muslims in the Emirate. The restrictions 
of the Emir and mullahs upon Jadid schools and this new educational method caused 
clash between traditional conservatives and reformists in Bukhara. The reformist 
Jadids’ organizing as a secret society and their continual struggle against the Emir 
strengthened the oppositional character of reformist Jadids and made them an 
alternative actor that asked for change and transformation for Bukhara and Turkistan. 
In addition, Jadid cadres, having emerged from the students, were sent for education 
outside, especially in Russia and Ottoman Empire. The student getting education in 
Istanbul, capital of Ottoman State, adapted to Pan-Turkist and Pan Islamist ideas and 
these developments increased the Jadids’ dissident sides.  
The other most important events that broke out in Russia and spread to this 
region was March and February Revolutions. These revolutions enabled the change 
to speed more in one respect. For example, March Revolution brought the reform 
consciousness of installing constitutional monarchy and prompted Jadids to persuade 
the provisional government in Petrograd to force the reforms upon the Emir. The 
October Revolution was the more significant development that changed the fate of 
Bukharan society and Bukharan reformist intellectuals, because the increase of 
Bolsheviks in the Russian civil war influenced the traditional cooperation between 
the Emir and the Tsar. With the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks chose an 
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ideological partner for themselves. For that choice, the best suitable actors were 
Jadids because they asked for change and reform in Bukhara and were struggling 
against the Emir as the Bolsheviks had done against the Tsar. First time, the ruling 
power at the head of Russia rejected the Emir’s offer to cooperate and emphasized its 
priorities about not collaborating with a feudal aristocrat. The October revolution 
supplied full support from Bolsheviks to Jadids and thus the Emir’s rule collapsed 
completely. Although the Jadids were divided into two as Young Bukharans and 
Bukharan Communists, and Young Bukharans were seen as nationalist bourgeoisie; 
the Soviet authority gave the mandate of governing to Young Bukharans because of 
Bukhara’s entrenched conservative and feudal society and culture.  
The establishment of Bukharan People’s Republic and then transition to 
Bukhara Soviet People’s Republic were important stages for the creation of national 
republic. The transformation from monarchy to republic directly without 
constitutional monarchy era was through the intervention of Bolsheviks and this 
intervention prevented the natural evolution of Bukharan state although the Jadids 
insist on not extracting the Emir from the system completely. On the other side, the 
Basmachi revolt was the most important event triggering the national consciousness 
in the region. Of course, not only political developments but also socio-economic 
problems and construction of railway, telegraph lines and printing of newspapers in 
Turkestan influenced the transformation and evolution more than politics. The 
connecting of Bukhara to Russia and the West was through the railway. Railway and 
telegraph also enabled Russia to strengthen its control upon Bukhara.  
For the socio economic problems, the best instance was both Tsarist Russia’s 
and the Soviets’ cotton monoculture policy. This policy caused starvation for Central 
Asians and the 1916 peasant revolts broke out. When the Soviets continued to 
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implement this policy after the creation of Uzbek SSR, the Uzbekistan government 
tried to resist. The figures in government coming from Jadids ideologically were 
annihilated by Stalin. Although the Jadid backed nationalist construction of Uzbek 
identity was prevented by the Soviets, the era between the early 1900s and late 1930s 
was the most important parameter  for Uzbek history that enabled the creation of 
modern Uzbek state and society. Especially, Jadids’ reform policies like replacing 
Uzbek language with Persian as an official language and making nationalist 
education reforms inside the Republic in the period of Bukharan People’s Republic 
were quite crucial in the formation of modern Uzbek identity.  
The Uzbek identity question was about the creation of the identity through the 
Russian intervention and formation of the identity by the local elite and intellectuals. 
The most important difference that caused problem theoretically between the Soviets 
and Bukharan nationalist Jadids (Young Bukharans) was that the naturally formed 
Uzbek identity and national state perception was pan- Turkist and aiming greater 
Uzbekistan in Central Asia. On the other side, the Soviet created Uzbek identity 
through the Soviet lingual distinction policy upon nested nations was harmless, 
stable, Sovietic and aiming controllable and dependent Uzbekistan inside its 
frontiers. The social evolution and political transformation faced the Russian 
interference frequently. It was a truth that the start of change on its own was so 
difficult, so Russian interference was fairly important for the start of change however 
the frequent interferences caused the natural development of evolution. In addition, it 
caused many problems for Bukharan society. For example, the ignorance of 
installation of constitutional monarchy and declaration of republic directly and 
practice of these issues through the Soviet help caused the increase of Basmachi 
resistance and a low density war until 1934 in the region. Besides, the cotton 
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monoculture caused starvation in civil war era and prevented an improvement of a 
national agriculture and economy in the country. It only made the country dependent 
on Russia economically. This situation continued in the time of Uzbekistan SSR. 
Uzbekistan SSR was, thus, built as a satellite socialist state of the USSR.  
Even though the new national republic seemed as a satellite country 
politically, the change and modernization in every sphere gained speed under the rule 
of the USSR. When the country gained its independence in 1991, it carried intense 
Russian influence although Islamic consciousness and religious cult, especially in 
Bukhara Samarkand and the cities in the Fergana Valley region, seemed like sleeping 
underground, but possible to weak up suddenly.
328
 The developments just after 
dissolution of the USSR were fairly unexpected for the region. Although there was a 
long, strong and effective penetration of socialist secularism upon the society, the 
buried and sleeping past of Uzbekistan, also with the influence of radical Islam 
which penetrated in Afghanistan and prepared to spill over Central Asia, emerged 
just after the end of the SSR in Uzbekistan. This situation was important because 
there was an emerging clash, which also had a potential to last in long term, between 
the modernized and secularized sides and elements, and the oppositional operating 
sides and elements which take strength from weakening and rising traditional past. 
Since Uzbekistan is the most important and most strategic state among other post-
Soviet Central Asian states, the developments and emerging questions inside this 
state would potentially influence the others somehow.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Interview with Prof. Dr. Timur Kocaoglu 
 
 
“Professor Timur Kocaoglu is the son of Osman Khodzhaev, who was Young 
Bukharan Jadid, the minister of finance in the first Bukharan Republic’s cabinet, and 
later the president of Bukharan People’s Republic. Prof. Kocaoglu served and gave 
courses at Marmara University, and at Koç University and now serves in Central 
Asian Studies at Michigan State University. He studies over Turkish Language and 
Literature, Central Asian studies and Turkic languages.” 
 
Interviewer: What was the reason that caused your father, Osman Khodzhaev to 
shift to Enver’s side in spite of taking side near the Bolsheviks and conducting a 
presidency in the Republic at first?
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Timur Kocaoğlu: Neither Young Bukharans were a Marxist based political 
movement nor Bukharan Republic was a Soviet model state. Osman Khodzhaev 
(1878-1968) and Fayzallah Khodzhaev (1896-1937) were cousins and Osman K. was 
elder than Fayzallah K. Also, there were two groups in the Young Bukharan 
movement. The largest one compromised the nationalist intellectuals and its leader 
was my father, Osman K. while the second one, lesser than other, composed of 
sincere Marxists and their leader was Fayzallah K. 
Fayzallah K. got education in the Jadid School founded by Osman K. in 1911. The 
aim of Young Bukharan movement was to replace the emirate with an independent 
state. When we review the flag of Bukharan Republic, there were moon and star on 
the green floor and the sign of Bolshevism, hammer and sickle did not take place in 
the flag until the end of 1922. However, the name of the republic was changed into 
Bukharan Soviet People’s Republic in 1923 and the flag included hammer and 
sickle.
329
  
The Young Bukharans did not have armed strength. They asked for aid from the 
Bolsheviks to destroy the Emir’s administration. After Emir fled in 1922, Fayzallah 
K. became prime minister and Osman K. became minister of finance in the new 
government. In 1921, Osman K. rose to the presidency and later he passed to Eastern 
Bukhara (present Tajikistan) in order to coordinate and combine the scattered 
Basmachi groups. At that time, Turkish officials, captured in Transcaucasia and 
exiled to Siberia by Tsarist armies, escaped from prisoner camps and arrived in 
                                                          
329
 For the flag photos, See Timur Kocaoglu, Turkistan’da Yenilik Hareketleri ve Ihtilaller: 1900-
1924.SOTA, 2001. 
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Tashkent. Then, these Turkish officials were invited to Bukharan Republic and these 
officials were assigned to form the Bukharan army.
330
  
Osman K. attacked the Russian headquarters
331
 in Dushanbe and surrounded the 
Bolshevik units and captured the Russian generals and Russian envoy there. Osman 
K. condemned the Soviets to withdraw from Bukharan Republic. But, The Soviet 
forces in Tashkent took action and defeated the Bukharan units. Therefore, Osman K. 
had to withdraw to the Afghan border. There, Osman K. stated a declaration calling 
the whole Bukharan people for resistance.
332
 
 In sum, my father, Osman K.’s stand on the way of national independence since 
early years of his life did never shift, however Fayzallah K. and leftist group of 
Young Bukharans pursued the cooperation way with the Bolsheviks. 
Interviewer: What are the reasons that Fayzallah Khodzhaev was in cooperation 
with the Bolsheviks and did not participate in the Basmachi movement? Also, there 
were some claims that Enver organized assassination to Fayzallah K.? What do you 
think about these claims? 
Timur Kocaoğlu: Fayzallah Khoja appreciated Marxism and believed in sincerity 
but he was never a traitor. In my opinion, the claims about assassination attempts led 
by Enver against Fayzallah Khoja were not true. On the other side, Enver was a good 
friend of my father, Osman Khoja. Enver Pasha always addressed “Muhterem 
Efendim”, meaning “Dear Sir” to Osman Khoja in his letters. Also, Enver was never 
                                                          
330
 See Timur Kocaoglu, “Sibirya ve Turkistan’da Esir Turk Subaylari”, Turk Dunyasi Tarih Dergisi, 
No. 1-11 (1987). 
331
 Prof. Kocaoglu preferred to use “Russian headquarters, Russian soldiers, Bolshevik Russia” 
instead of a terminology of “the Soviets”. He especially emphasizes the terminology of “Russian”. 
332
 See Abdullah Receb Baysun , Türkistan Millî Hareketleri, (İstanbul, 1945). 
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supporter or cooperator of Bukharan Emir. For example, Ibrahim Lakay, close 
commander of the Emir kept Enver in house jail for a time. 
Interviewer: What was the ımportance of Basmachı movement in the formation of 
national identity and nation-building of Uzbekistan nation state? 
Timur Kocaoğlu: Basmachi movement was not only an important event in 
Turkestan wide but also in the worldwide. It was the first guerilla movement of the 
20
th
 century and a national awakening. The national resistance in Turkey began in 
1919 but in Turkestan it began in 1918. Basmachi movement was so severe between 
1918 and 1929 and caused a heavy burden for the Red Army units. Although Red 
army got superiority after 1929, the Basmachi resistance lasted until 1934, for that 
reason the Basmachi was the first resistance movement and had the longest process 
among guerilla movements (1918-1934, 16 years). Moscow bombed and burned the 
villages and towns in order to break the Basmachi movement. 
Of course, Basmachi movement is not significant for Uzbekistan and Uzbeks but also 
all Turkic nations in Turkestan such as Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Turkmens. This effect 
was especially sensed after 1992. During the Soviet period, Basmachi movement was 
blackened in schools and public spheres. 
Interviewer: What are the basic reasons in the failure of Bukharan Peoples 
Republic? 
Timur Kocaoğlu: Bukharan Republic could not found a strong army and the core 
army established by the Ottoman officers did not have enough arms and soldiers to 
resist against Red Army.  Basmachi bands were divided into many groups. Some of 
them depended on Osman Khoja and some of them depended on Emir Alim Khan. 
They also struggled with each other. In order to calm this chaos, Osman Khoja 
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struggled for seven months between 1921 and 1922. After the defeat of Dushanbe, he 
had to flee to Afghanistan. After Osman Khoja left, the leftist wing of Young 
Bukharans obtained the whole control and got under the rule of Bolshevik Russia. 
Interviewer: What are the basic reasons of the failure of Basmachis? 
Timur Kocaoğlu: The most important reason for the failure of Basmachi movement 
was its lack of unity and composition of scattered bands. The non-existence of the 
single center caused lack of coordination. Both Osman Khoja and Enver Pasha could 
not provide this. 
Interviewer: What are the reasons behind Young Bukharans’ cooperation with the 
Bolsheviks? 
Timur Kocaoğlu: Young Bukharans were a political movement but they did not 
have armed force. They organized public strikes in the years of 1919 and 1920 in 
order to collapse the Emir. But, every strike and uprising was suppressed bloodily by 
the Emir and his soldiers.
333
  For that reason, the leftist wing of Young Bukharans 
agreed with the Bolsheviks and asked for help from Red Army to collapse the Emir’s 
authority.  On the other side, Bukharan and Russian relations were very close. For 
example, there were a Russian garrison and a great deal of Russian soldiers in 
Dushanbe city. Bukharan Emir Alim Khan got educated in Moscow and had strong 
commercial links with Russia. 
Interviewer: Although Emir Alim Khan got modern education in Russia and had a 
modern lifestyle in his palace, what were the reasons behind his reaction to the 
reforms and constitutional monarchy? 
                                                          
333
 See Sadriddin Ayni, Buhara Inkilabi Tarihi Üçün Materyaller, Tashkent, 1922. 
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Timur Kocaoğlu: Alim Khan was a fan of Russian culture and had a Russian styled 
way of life in his palace. He always took advice from Russian tradesmen, generals 
and intellectuals. However, Alim Khan always resisted against people’s 
enlightenment, and establishment of Jadid schools. He did not avoid suppress Young 
Bukharans by killing, jailing, exiling them. Therefore, Young Bukharans was aware 
of the necessity of demolishing the rule of the Emir, because there was no another 
way. Alim Khan was also aware that his authority would fall in danger if the peoples 
took modern education. 
Interviewer: What extent did the local people and Basmachi actors take Enver Pasha 
and his activities serious? What extent did the pan-Turan idealism of Enver Pasha 
influence Turkestanians? 
Timur Kocaoğlu: The intellectuals took Enver Pasha serious very much and 
political leaders like Osman Khodzhaev tried to help him. Local people also 
respected Enver Pasha since he was an Ottoman general and his wife was a member 
of Ottoman dynasty. However, some supporters of the Emir were against Enver. 
When Enver Pasha became a martyr, famous Uzbek poet Abdulhamit Colpan wrote a 
poem dedicated to Enver Pasha and also Osman Khodzhaev, president of Bukharan 
Republic, wrote two elegies, one was Persian and other was Uzbek. I can present you 
one of his poems. When Enver was killed, Osman Khoja was in Kabul, Afghanistan.  
Interviewer: Dear Professor, thank you for answering my questions. 
Timur Kocaoğlu: Thank you. 
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APPENDIX  B 
 
 
İNTİKAM… AL İNTİKAM!334 (Osman Khodzhaev’s Poem 335) 
Türk balası oruslardan köp sıkıldı, 
Er kırıldı, kız ezildi, yurt yıkıldı. 
Hamiyetlik ENVER PAŞA onu sorab, 
Kelib azadetmek üçün şehid boldı. 
İntikam… Al İntikam! 
Vatan üçün bizimkiler can bereler, 
Millet üçün düşmanlardan öç alalar. 
Bugün Çingiz evlatları at oynatıb, 
Belde kılıç, omuzlarda beşatarlar 
İntikam… Al İntikam! 
Türkistandan oruslarnı haydab kovub,
                                                          
334
 See Abdullah Receb Baysun, Türkistan Millî Hareketleri, (İstanbul, 1945),114.  
335
 This poem was dedicated by Osman Khodzhaev for the martyrdom of Enver Pasha in Baljuvan. It 
was presented by Prof. Kocaoglu at the end of the interview.  
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Sahibkiran Timur Bekni şâdeteler. 
Balalarge mekteb açıb, ta’lim berib, 
Uluğ Beknin tarihini yâdeteler. 
İntikam… Al İntikam! 
Türklük kanı tamırlarda bugün kaynar, 
Erte çıkıb Türkistanda bayrak açar. 
Bütün dünya sözimizge kulak salar, 
Herbir devlet kelib bizden elçi sorar. 
İntikam… Al İntikam! 
O gün demek, Türk balası rahat turar, 
Barça millet necât tapıb, yüzü küler. 
Türk balası kutulmasa tinç oturmaz, 
Yer yüzide tanılmasa uruş turmaz. 
İntikam… Al İntikam! 
 
Osman Khodzhaev, Kabul, Afghanistan 
August 1922 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Interview with Emir’s Family 
 
 
“Shahzade Abdulkebir Yuce was the last son of Emir Alim Khan and he lived in 
Gaziantep. They moved to Gaziantep, Turkey in 1983 from Kabul, Afghanistan. He 
was over seventy year old. He and his sons dealt with fur manufacturing. Dr. 
Nurettin Hatunoglu was his son in law. He served in Zonguldak Karaelmas 
Univercity. Shahzade often lived in his daughter’s house in Zonguldak. He and his 
son in law avoided answering questions in detail because of facing any problem and 
causing a diplomatic problem between Turkey and Uzbekistan. They are particularly 
careful about being away from politics. I especially requested Mr. Hatunoglu to help 
me take answers of my questions.” 
Interviewer: Mullahs and madrasa students were influential over Emir Alim Khan 
and his rule. What were its reasons?
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Nurettin Hatunoğlu & Shahzade Abdulkebir: Yes, they have impact over the 
Emir. He was inclined to them and their demands because of political reasons.  
Interviewer:  Both Emir Alim and his father Emir Abdalahad got education in 
Russia. There were claims that they had a modern life in their palaces. What do you 
say about that? 
Nurettin Hatunoğlu & Shahzade Abdulkebir: Yes, it is, in one respect, true. They 
were not unfamiliar about the modern life. 
Interviewer:  What were the reasons enforcing the Emir to be against Jadids and 
their reform demands? 
Nurettin Hatunoğlu & Shahzade Abdulkebir: He was against them and their 
reform demands because of political reasons.  
Interviewer: Was there a problem between Enver and Emir Alim because of the 
leadership question fort the Basmachi movement? 
Nurettin Hatunoğlu & Shahzade Abdulkebir: There was not a friction between 
them. Emir Alim assigned Enver as “Emir ul Muminin”. 
Interviewer:  Is your dynasty known in Uzbekistan now?  What was the present 
Uzbek government’s outlook to your dynasty? 
Nurettin Hatunoğlu & Shahzade Abdulkebir: They were not any negative 
outlooks. We were officially invited by the Uzbek government and we visited 
Uzbekistan. 
Interviewer: Thank you for answering questions. 
Nurettin Hatunoğlu & Shahzade Abdulkebir: Thank you. 
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Konstantin Petrovich von Kaufman, Governor 
General of Turkestan, 1867–1882
336
  
 
 
Muzaffar ad-Din, Emir of Bukhara, 1860–1885
337
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 Becker, Seymour, Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–
1924,(London &New York:Routledge Curzon,2005), 19 
337
 Ibid, 34. 
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Mikhail Grigorevich Cherniaev, Governor of the 
Turkestan Oblast, 1865– 1866;  Governor General of Turkestan, 1882–1884 
338
 
Abd al-Ahad, Emir of Bukhara, 1885–1910
339
  
                                                          
338
 Becker, Seymour, Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–
1924,(London &New York:Routledge Curzon,2005), 74. 
339
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Alim, Emir of Bukhara, 1910–1920
340
  
Isfendiyar, Khan of Khiva, 1910–1918
341
  
                                                          
340
 Ibid, 165. 
341
 Becker, Seymour, Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924, 
(London &New York:Routledge Curzon,2005), 177.  
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Mikhail Vasilevich Frunze, Commander of the 
Turkestan Front. 1919– 1920
342
  
 Fayzullah Khodzhaev, Prime Minister of Bukharan 
People’s Soviet Republic, 1920–1924
343
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 Osman Khodzhaev, President of Bukharan 
People’s Republic, 1921-1922 
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
  
            Bukharan Emirate                                  Bukharan People's Soviet Republic  
                 (1785-1920)                                                                (1920-1925) 
 
     
    Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic                              Republic of Uzbekistan 
                (1924-1991)                                                       (Declared in 1991) 
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                 Khivan Khanate                        Khorezm People's Soviet Republic 
                     (1511-1920)                                           (1920-1925) 
 
